Micro level planning, economic performance and human capital : a study of the settler farmers in Mahaweli Project in Sri Lanka by Ekanayake, S. A. B
MICRO LEVEL PLANNING, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND HUMAN CAPITAL: 
A STUDY OF THE SETTLER FARMERS IN MAH AW ELI PROJECT IN SRI LANKA
By
Sumitha Anura Bandara Ekanayake
A thesis submit ted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
of the Austral ian National University
May 1987
D e c la r a t io n
Except where otherwise indicated 
this thesis is my own w'ork.
S u m ith a  Anura B andara E kanayake
May 1987
I l l
To P a n ch i
IV
A ck n o w led g em en ts
I have incurred many debts, both of an intellectual nature and otherwise, to many 
individuals and institutions at  various stages of this study. The settler farmers in 
Mahaweli System-H, whose performance I have been monitoring since 1979, were 
responsible for generating the initial interest in an in-depth study of farmer adjustment  to 
technological and other changes.
My greatest intellectual debt is to my supervisor Dr. R.T. Shand. This study might 
never have been undertaken without  his interest, guidence and encouragement. I am also 
indebted to my advisors Drs. S.K. Jayasuriya and P.G. Warr. Dr. Jayasuriya’s extensive 
knowledge of the economics of rice farming in Asia and Dr. W arr ’s expertise in benefit- 
cost analysis were most helpful. Dr. K.P. Kalirajan of Singapore National University 
offered many helpful suggestions, particularly on the estimation of stochastic frontier 
production functions during his frequent visits to Australia. Mr. Shyama Roy’s assistance 
in computer programming was most helpful.
1 am thankful to my employer, Mahaweli Engineering and Construction Agency of 
Mahaweli Authority of Sri banka, for granting me study leave from January 1984. The 
financial assistance of the Australian Development Assistance Bureau which awarded me 
a scholarship under the Colombo Plan, and also partially funded the field work is 
gratefully acknowledged. Professor YV.M. Corden. Drs. R.M. Sundrum, Colin Barlow, 
Dan Etherington and other members of the Department of Economics, Research School of 
Pacific Studies, of the Australian National University are gratefully acknowledged for 
their support and help at various stages of this study. The department, partially financed
the field work.
I am grateful to tlie Resident Project Manager of System 11, Mr. Jayantha  
Jayawardena and his staff for their whole hearted support and friendship offered during 
the field work. The enthusiastic support of my two field enumerators Messers Seelaratna 
Bandara and R.G. Ranaweera was a great help.
A b s tr a c t
New technologies, irrigation and changes in the broader socio-economic environment 
are often major causes of disequilibria in the decision making environment of farmers in 
developing countries. The pace and pattern  of their ad justm ent to these situations have 
im portan t  efficiency and equity implications both in private and social contexts. Most of 
the literature on ad justm ent of farmers to new situations has concentrated on the 
adoption process of new technologies as a whole or in terms of particular component 
practices. However, s ituations where farmers are required to adopt and adjust to a single 
component practice while other elements of their environment remain static are rare. 
Technologies often appear in the form of packages and accompany broader socio-economic 
changes.
In this thesis, a conceptual framework which draws heavily on human capital theory 
is developed to address broad issues of farmer ad justm ent to simultaneous changes in 
many aspects of their environment. This framework is applied to farm survey data  
gathered from a sample within the Pilot Phase of the Mahaweli Project, the single most 
im portan t  irrigation cum land settlement project in Sri Lanka. The empirical analysis 
utilizes stochastic frontier production functions to obtain measures of technical and 
allocative efficiencies of individual farmers which reflect their technical and allocative 
abilities. The analysis was conducted at two levels, using market and economic prices.
The findings show first tha t  different types of human capital have significantly 
different impacts on the ability of farmers to adjust to specific changes in technological 
and environmental factors. Second, the major source of losses to the economy is shown to 
be farm level inefficiencies rather than price distortions. Third, the differential 
p erfo rm a n ce  of fanners» resulting from varying ability to adjust to disequilibria and the
vii
heterogeneity in farm micro environments are shown to result in an unequal distribution 
of income unanticipated by planners, but significant in terms of future consequences.
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1C H A P T E R  1
I n tr o d u c t io n
The development of agriculture is widely accepted to be of vital importance for the 
overall economic development of much of today 's  third world. The large number of small, 
traditional or near traditional, farmers in the developing countries are now accepted to be 
economically rational and capable of making substantia l contributions to these economies 
given new technologies and improved access to resources. Accordingly, the basic 
strategies employed for agricultural development by national and in ternational 
authorities involve investments in research, extension and the provision of land, water 
and other inputs. These are resource intensive strategies. Given the scarcity of resources 
in these economies, the provision of technology and resources are often limited to selected 
locations and communities, and this inevitably results in inequalities between the 
beneficiaries of such programmes and others. Most of the extensive literature on the 
“Green Revolution” addresses issues related to differential rates of technology adoption 
between farmer types, possible scale economies of the technology, and implications for 
rural income distribution.
Our research, however, is focussed on the causes and effects of variable performance 
among farmers who have adopted a basic technology. It is hoped tha t  this will yield' 
valuable insights for future planning of a lternative development strategies and possibly 
for improving the performance of existing agricultural development projects.
21.1 R o le  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e  in E c o n o m ic  D e v e lo p m e n t
Although there are many variants of models employed to analyse economic 
development, m ainstream  development economics theory is derived from observing the 
historical experience of already developed nations. The role of agriculture in economic 
development is seen as th a t  of generating a surplus for investment in the modern 
industrial sector, creating a m arket for its products, and releasing labour for industry 
aided by a food surplus which leads to a s tructural transform ation in the economy. This 
classic pa th  of economic development is characterized by a falling share of agriculture in 
the gross national product and of employment of the labour force. Capital intensity and 
the resulting high labour productivity in the industrial sector results in increased per 
capita  incomes. Migration of labour out of agriculture and mechanisation increases labour 
productivity in agriculture too. This overall increase in labour productivity and the 
resulting increase in real incomes leads to the broadening of domestic markets and 
continued capital accumulation. A demographic transition occurs from high to low birth 
rates and eventually a greater equality in income distribution emerges (Jorgensen 1969, 
Kuznets 1969, Lewis 1958, Rostow 1963).
While the relevance of this particular historical pa th  of development for present day 
developing nations is often questioned (see Dillon 1979) , it is clear th a t  many of the past 
and present development policies and strategies of governments in developing countries 
are shaped by this broad view of the development sequence.
A widespread and popular strategy for the development of agriculture, to transform 
it into an “engine of grow th” , is to provide new technology and improved inputs to 
traditional or subsistence farmers. The basis for this interest in the provision of new 
technology to traditional farmers is provided by Schultz 's “efficient but poor hypothesis” . 
Schultz’s traditional farmer is small, poor, tradition  bound, but efficient. Given the 
resources currently at his disposal, the institutional environment and his objectives, it is 
impossible to achieve a more efficient, reallocation of resources. However, with new 
technologies and better  resources this poor but economically motivated farmer can
3produce a surplus. Such thinking has resulted in major investments in land and water 
resources development, in international and national agricultural research networks, and 
in the expansion of agricultural extension services with national and international funds. 
The “Green Revolution" has been the major manifestation of these investments.
1.2 Green R evo lu tion
There was much optimism tha t the new agricultural technology based on high 
yielding varieties of cereal grains would usher in a “green revolution" which would solve 
the chronic problems of widespread shortages of food, unemployment and poverty in the 
developing world. This euphoria was short lived as is evident from the post green 
revolution literature. The inability of the majority of farmers adopting this technology to 
achieve productivity levels sufficiently close to the potential observed under experimental 
conditions, the performance variations among farmers using the same technology package,
and the differences between adopters and non adopters have raised concern among the
v
social scientists monitoring the new technology.
The earliest writings suggested that this technology had increasing returns to scale 
thereby favouring larger and richer farmers at the expense of small poor farmers (Frankel 
1971, Griffin 1974). Others argued that the technology per se is scale neutral and that 
biased rural institutions and imperfect factor markets are to be blamed for the apparent 
big and rich farmer bias of the technology (Hayami 1981, Ruttan 1977, Ryan 1984). 
Feder et al. (1985) in a comprehensive survey of literature on the adoption of agricultural 
innovations state that
The conventional wisdom is that constraints to the rapid adoption of 
innovations involve factors such as the lack of credit, limited access to 
information, aversion to risk, inadequate farm size, inadequate incentives 
associated with farm tenure arrangements, insufficient human capital, absence of 
equipment to relieve labor shortages (thus preventing timeliness of operations), 
chaotic supply of complementary inputs (such as seed, chemicals, and water), 
and inappropriate transportation infrastructure, (p 255).
The conclusions of this survey raised several important points:
1. Most adoption research views the adoption decision in dichotomous terms 
(adoption or nonadoption), although for many types of innovations, the 
interesting question may be related to the intensity of the use of that 
innovation or of its components (e.g., seed and fertiliser).
42. Often, several innovations which have varying degrees of complementar ity are 
introduced simultaneously. Thus adoption decisions for various innovations 
are interrelated. When such interrelated innovat ions are introduced over time 
in a partially overlapping manner,  a lasting disequilibrium is created.
3. Many adoption models assume perfectly competit ive markets  with 
homogeneous inputs.  However, price effects in input  and output  markets  
resulting from technology adoption may influence the progress and the 
direction of the diffusion process by affecting the relative profitability of 
alternat ive technologies and by changing the income distribution. Further,  the 
“non existence” of government  policies which influence adoption is 
bothersome.
4. The conflicting conclusions about  the causes and effects of adoption sometimes 
indicated by studies from different regions or countries may in many cases be 
the result of differing, social, cultural and inst itut ional  environments quite 
apar t  from “pure economic” factors.
5. Even if differential adoption rates of green revolution technology may 
disappear once the diffusion process is sufficiently advanced (e.g., Rut tan  
1977) the early adopters  (usually larger and wealthier farms) can accumulate  
more wealth and acquire more land from the laggards. This acquisition of new 
wealth enables further adoption and thus affects the dynamic pattern of 
aggregate adoption. Thus, special a t tent ion to changes in landholding 
pat terns  and wealth accumulat ion (as well as tenency arrangements) is 
warranted.
We explore the performance of farmers in relatively favourable environments where 
it is planned that  they at ta in  high product ivity together with equity. We will argue that 
even in such favourable environments,  i.e., well irrigated areas, where all farmers adopt,  
they may still differ in terms of the degree of adoption, especially when the technology is 
introduced as a package; tha t  farmers will be required to adjust continuously to 
disequilibria resulting from technological and other changes; that  the rate and the success 
of adjustment may vary between individuals; and tha t  the differences between farmers in 
the degree and the success of adoption may have significant efficiency and equity 
implications.
1.2.1 Irrigation and the Green R evolution
Much of the Green revolution technology, particularly for rice, has been designed for 
well irrigated environments.  The importance of irrigation for reaping full benefits of this 
technology has resulted in a redefinition of wealth of farmers in terms of both land 
holding size and the extent of irrigation instead of purely in terms of the former 
(Grabowsky 1981). Even prior to the advent of “Green Revolution” irrigation helped to
5increase cropping intensity enabling double or even triple cropping of land per year. This 
substant ially increased the productivity of cultivable land which is a highly scarce 
resource in densely populated countries. Natural ly,  irrigation development has been 
closely associated with the history of permanent ly settled agriculture in the tropics and 
sub-tropics since the early days of human civilization. The oldest known dam was built  
some 5000 years ago in Egypt  (Smith 1971). The new technology, however, has widened 
the productivity difference between irrigated and non-irrigated lands.
Modern irrigation schemes are typically the result of detailed and in-depth studies 
and planning by both national and internat ional agencies and represent major  
investments in agriculture. Goering (1978) gives an account  of high and rising costs of 
irrigation and land sett lement  projects in general. An example of the high costs of an 
individual project is given by Wallace (1981) who studied the Kano River Project in 
Nigeria. Such high investment  costs of irrigation projects can only be justified by the 
higher benefits expected from agriculture.
The higher productivitv of irrigated agriculture is illustrated by the fact that  in 
1982, 40 per cent of the the world's total harvest  of crops came from irrigated lands which 
covered only 20 per cent of the total harvested area (IBRD 1982). This explains the 
continuing trend of investment in irrigation which was growing at a rate of 2 per cent 
annually in 1980. Accordingly, irrigated agriculture is expected to provide most  of the 
increase in world food supply in the near future. Oram et. ah, 1979 suggest that  nearly 60 
per cent of the increase in food production in Asia, North Africa and the Middle East ,  
West and East Africa and Latin America up to 1990 will come from irrigated agriculture. 
It will account for nearly three fourths of the increase in food production in Asia, North 
Africa and the Middle East  up to 1990. Out  of 98.7 billion dollars (at 1975 prices) 
es timated to be the required capital investment  for this increase. 52 billion dollars will be 
for water  resource development  followed by 9.9 billion for land sett lement , the two most  
important  items in IFRI projections. The importance of irrigation for increased land 
productivity is further emphasised by FAO (1984) which predicts tha t  the proport ion of
6irrigated area in arable land of developing countries will increase from 13 per cent in 1975 
to 20 per cent in 1995.
Irrigation accounted for nearly 20 per cent of in ternational capital aid to food and 
agriculture in 1976-80 period (Carruthers , 1983). Total m ultilateral aid for irrigation in 
1980 was U.S. $ 2.2 billion, bu t the total value of investment in irrigation development 
would have been far in excess of this since many of the internationally funded projects 
have had around 50 per cent local funding, and many such projects in developing 
countries are entirely domestically financed.
Apart from this high productivity of irrigated agriculture, large scale government 
investment in irrigation and land development in developed and developing countries is 
induced by the following factors (R uttan  1986).
1. The view th a t  irrigation and land development projects have social benefits 
which substantially exceed the potential private benefits in the form of user 
charges, making them  unattrac tive  to private investors,
2. the presumption th a t  infrastructural investments such as transporta tion , 
communication, power, irrigation, and related activities are a necessary pre­
condition for the inducement of the private investment required for a 
sustained growth in the economy,
3. the political appeal of “m onum ental” investments such as big dams and super 
highways, and
4. the amenability of physical infrastructure investment to the algebra of 
conventional cost benefit calculations including the ability to plan and develop 
them in “project un its” which a tt rac ts  external financing in comparison to 
research and education which are relatively difficult for cost-benefit or cost- 
effectiveness calculations.
1.3 N e w  Land S e t t le m e n t
Many large irrigation development projects (e.g., Kariba dam in Zambia, Volta 
reservoir in Ghana, Aswan High Dam in Egypt, Bhakra Nangal project in India etc.,.), 
involve the settlement of farmers in newly developed lands. The term “new land 
se ttlem ent” is synonymous with other common terms such as “colonization” popularly 
used in Latin America and pre-independance South Asia, and “transm igration” in 
Indonesia. By and large these terms refer to s ta te  sponsored settlement of migrants in
7previously uninhabited or sparsely populated lands. Sponsored land settlement is 
undertaken with a number of common objectives, with different emphasis given to each 
depending on the circumstances. The immediate objectives of land settlem ent are:
1. population re-distribution,
2. regional development,
3. increasing agricultural production and employment, and
4. achieving greater equality in income distribution.
In the long run, the achievement of these objectives is expected to make a significant 
contribution to overall national development. Spontaneous settlement in new lands, on 
the other hand, occurs owing to the natural increase in population and the resulting land 
hunger as well as to various other economic incentives. Spontaneous settlements and 
settlers have been observed to be relatively more successful than sponsored settlements 
and settlers in terms of their greater net productivity and the lesser reliance on s ta te  aid 
(Nelson 1973, James 1984). However, the latter, have been known to create a negative 
impact on the natural environment and ecology owing to the indiscriminate exploitation 
of na ture  for private profits with no regard to social costs (Majid 1978). They often 
exclude the poorest sections of the society, for only relatively well off people can afford to 
take the risk of settling in new lands in the absence of s ta te  support.
Sponsored new land settlements may either be irrigated or rainfed. Although 
sponsored land settlement has a long history, its importance in productivity term s has 
increased only relatively recently, with the advent of “green revolution” . The main 
reasons for the undertaking of pre-green revolution land settlement schemes were related 
to objectives other than increasing production mentioned above. In this study, the  focus 
is on irrigated sponsored new lands settlements. We study the performance of new 
technology among farmers who adopt it simultaneously, and with equitable access to 
resources which rules out the influence of initial differences in access to resources to a 
great extent. But even in irrigated land settlements, there may still be some differences 
among farmers in their factor endow ments, e.g.. in hum an capital.
8The realisation of the long term goal of irrigated new land settlement projects, i.e., 
making a significant positive contribution to national development effort, is dependent on 
the performance of these schemes in terms of productivity and equity. Hence the analysis 
of short run performance of these projects can illustrate likely trends-in  terms of the 
achievement of long term  goals. Successful performance of such projects is complicated by 
the presence of a large number (often running into thousands) of individual farmers who 
are to a great extent independent decision makers and managers with varying ability and 
resource endowments1.
The ability to make a significant impact on population density in highly populated 
areas by resettlement of sufficiently large numbers of people in new lands within a 
background of rapid population increase has been questioned. Further, this strategy had 
no support in terms of actual accomplishments so far, despite the long history of such 
a ttem p ts  in many parts  of the world (Arndt and Sundrum 1977, Goering 1978, and 
Scudder 1981). At best, such a strategy may have only a marginal impact in relieving 
population pressures.
Planners of new irrigated land settlements are often given “a clean slate" to design 
the physical and social infrastructure, and appropriate  institutions. They are often 
allowed to design settler selection criteria as well. Thus deliberate planning is often 
undertaken to provide settlers with equal access to the major resources. This in fact, 
provides a veritable laboratory for the close monitoring of developments in these planned 
societies for the study of many im portant social phenomena, e.g., differences in the ability 
to derive the maximum benefit from the new HYV technology. Such understanding may 
prove to be useful both in other non planned rural settlem ents and in future planned 
settlements elsewhere. In the following section, we discuss the performance of a  large 
irrigated land settlement project, in which careful planning was applied to achieve the 
objectives of high productivity together with equity using new rice technology. This 
project is the subject m a tte r  of this thesis.
^There are land se t t lem en t  projects which are centrally  m a n a g ed ,  e.g.,  tree crop sch em es  in 
Malaysia, where individual decision making is markedly less important.
91.4 M a l i a w e l i  D e v e l o p m e n t  P r o j e c t  in Sr i  L a n k a
The Mahaweli project in Sri Lanka is a good example of a large irrigated land 
sett lement  scheme with a declared goal of equity among the beneficiaries of the project 
apar t  from the usual production goals, and with detailed planning and significant costs 
incurred for the achievement of equity. The objectives of the project s ta ted in various 
project related documents and government  policy s ta tements  can be summarised as 
follows:
1. increasing agricultural product ion,
2. increasing the ou tput  of hydro-electricity,
3. increasing employment , and
4. improving rural income distribution.
T a b l e  1-1: State sponsored land set t lement  for agriculture
in selected Asian countries
Country Total Population 
In 1982 
(Millions)
No. of
families
settled
Land
area
ha.
India (1971) 1/ 705 160,000 600,000
Pakistan (1982) 1/ 87 44,000 83,682
Sri Lanka (1981) 2/ 15 110,000 307,567
Thailand (1979) 3/ 48 110,000 n . a
Indonesia (1984) 4/ 154 1,000,000 n . a
Malaysia (1976) 5/ 14 350,000 n . a
Philippines (1976) 3/ 50 100,000 n . a
l/Johnson (1983)
2/Wimaladharma (1982)
3/Klempin (1979)
4/Hardjono (1977) and (1986)
5/Macandrews (1979)
6/Crystal (1982)
Note: The years within parentheses refer to the year up to 
which the cumulative settlement data are given for each country. The 
numbers given are approximations only.
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This project diverts water from the largest river in Sri Lanka, the Mahaweli Canga, 
to the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka for irrigation and the generation of hydro-power. It 
continues the 50 year old tradition  of modern land settlem ent under irrigation in the Dry 
Zone of Sri Lanka (see Farmer 1957). Sri Lanka's experience in Land settlement under 
irrigation is perhaps greater than th a t  of any other country in the region. More than 90 
per cent of land settlem ent reported (Table 1-1) falls within major irrigation schemes. 
The Dry Zone, i.e., th a t  part  of Sri Lanka which receives less than  75 inches of rainfall 
annually, has the largest extent of uninhabited land. This is partly due to historical 
reasons and partly to natural reasons. The Dry Zone has pronounced dry and wet seasons. 
The wet season has an often high but somewhat unpredictable rainfall and the dry season 
receives much less rainfall, and thus requires irrigation for successful cultivation of crops. 
Historically, much of the Dry Zone was inhabited and developed under irrigation, but was 
abandoned eventually owing to the difficulties in resisting persistent foreign invasions 
from powerful kingdoms in South India. An increase in the incidence of malaria has also 
been thought to have contributed to the abandonm ent of the Dry Zone settlements.
The modern development of the Dry Zone had its beginnings in the British colonial 
regime. The colonial adm inistra tors  of the island saw a potential for increased food 
production under rehabilitated ancient irrigation works. However, the process of 
irrigation development and land settlement, then known as “colonisation“ , accelerated in 
the period immediately prior to independence when Sri Lankans were given greater 
powers in domestic administration. The motivation for resettlement in this period came 
from a desire to recapture the ancient glory of the Dry Zone civilization as well as from 
the desire to assist the peasantry. The plantation economy, which developed around the 
cultivation -of tea, rubber, and coconuts in the highly populated Wet Zone under the 
sponsorship of the colonial government had adversely affected the peasantry. More 
recently the development of the Dry Zone for agriculture has been viewed as a major 
avenue for increased employment and food production together with equitable 
distribution of newly generated wealth.
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This is the background to the undertaking of the massive multi-purpose project of 
diverting the water of Mahaweli Ganga. The programme of new land settlem ent under 
Mahaweli Project envisages the settlem ent of approximately 140,000 families and a 
doubling of the land area irrigated for agriculture in Sri Lanka. The series of dams and 
reservoirs built across Mahaweli and some of its tributories were designed to double the 
availability of hydro power. From the beginning of the settlem ent programme in 1976 to 
the end of 1985, the number actually settled under the project amounted to around 47,000 
families, and of these, the 26,000 families among them settled in System H contributed 5 
per cent of paddy produced in the country in 1985 (Central Bank 1985).
The long experience in irrigated land settlement in the Dry Zone had significant 
benefits for the design of Mahaweli Project. A part from a series of engineering and 
technical studies dating from 1958, agronomic and pilot farm studies for the Mahaweli 
Project were undertaken on a highly organised basis from 1964. An entire section of the 
major research station of the Departm ent of Agriculture for the Dry Zone was devoted to 
Mahaweli research. Two pilot projects were carried out in nearby locations to determine 
the optimum size of farm and related issues (D epartm ent of Agriculture, 1981).
Detailed socio economic surveys were carried out in all areas identified for 
development under the project. Separate professional bodies were established for 
engineering investigations, physical planning of social infrastructure such as spatial 
aspects in the location of settlements, transport, for settlement studies related to the 
selection of settlers, and for the determination of various forms of assistance. Foreign 
consultants with widespread experience in similar exercises internationally (U N D P /F A O  
1965, Sogreah 1972, and Nedeco 1979) were hired to provide detailed plans for irrigation 
infrastructure, social infrastructure and physical layout planning. For example, the 
detailed feasibility study for the pilot phase of the new settlement component comprised 
volumes covering agriculture, land classification, land classification maps and tables, 
engineering, engineering drawings, settlement planning and development and finally 
agricultural marketing (Sogreah 1972).
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The main strategies adopted to achieve high and equitable benefits from the 
Mahaweli Project in its Pilot Phase (System H) which commenced in 1974 as a result of 
these studies were as follow's:
1. Provision of equal sized farm allotments to all settlers. This is a principle 
followed from the earliest days of s ta te  sponsored land settlem ent in Sri 
Lanka. Cropping patterns  for different soil classes in the project area were 
developed after research station and pilot farm trials in such a way th a t  the 
annual net farm income would be more or less similar irrespective of the class 
of soil in any particular farm (Sogreah, Vol II, 1972).
2. Previous irrigation schemes had long tertiary channels often extending beyond 
a kilometre in length, resulting in tail end problems. Tertiary channels are 
farmer managed and when they are designed to serve a large number of farms 
equitable division of water became virtually impossible. Therefore, these 
channels in Mahaweli Project were designed to serve a small number of farms, 
i.e., twelve on the average, and were by and large uniform in length and had 
equal capacity to carry water (one cubic foot per second). This small number 
of farms per field channel (turn-out area) was considered to be advantageous 
for forming water user associations which were expected to take the 
responsibility of sharing water within the field channel. The overall operation 
of the irrigation system from primary to tertiary  channels was designed on a 
ro ta tion basis. A greater number of control s tructures were built along the 
channels to ensure equity and efficiency in the management of the irrigation 
system.
3. Previous settlem ent schemes in Sri Lanka allocated homesteads for settlers 
along main irrigation channels, thus creating ribbon type settlem ents which 
were difficult to be effectively and equitably served by various social and 
extension services. Those who were settled away from service centres in these 
settlements suffered from difficult access to various essential services. 
Accordingly, Mahaweli homesteads were arranged in small hamlets which 
were sited radially around village centres which provided basic services. 
These in turn were radially located around town centres which in turn 
provided a higher level of services than could be made available at village 
centre level. At the top end of this hierarchy there were area or regional 
centres which had the administrative centres, banks, etc.,.
4. Homesteads and farm allotments were located in such a way th a t  no settler 
would have to travel more than a kilometre from home to the farm.
5. Special consideration was exercised in allocating homesteads in hamlets to 
ensure social cohesion. Traditional dry zone farmers were settled as close as 
possible to places, where their pre-project villages were located and care was 
taken to settle relatives and people of the same background such as the place 
of origin and cast in order to preserve and benefit from the extended families 
and community relations in traditional villages. On the other hand settlers 
who were brought from outside were settled together according to the 
particular electorate and village from which they originated.
6. The settlers were given fully developed land which could be cultivated 
immediately after the date of settlement. The World Food Programme of the 
United Nations provided food rations to settler families for up to one year or 
up to the harvest of their second season, whichever was the earlier.
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7. The agricultural extension services provided were of t he highest intensity ever 
provided in Sri Lanka. For example the ratio of extension workers to the 
number of farmers was more than thrice the number outside the project. 
Health services, schools etc., were comparable to those services in highly 
developed areas in the country at least in terms of quantity  (the numbers) if 
not in the quality of the services provided. Im portantly , most of these services 
were functional by the time the settlers arrived.
8. Selection criteria were developed which were expected to ensure selection of 
deserving and potentially good farmers for settlem ent. A strict scoring system 
was developed to give priority to landless, educated, young and married 
people with previous experience in agriculture. However, these criteria were 
not adhered to in the case of people who traditionally  lived in the area 
developed for settlem ent (traditional farmers or purana set t lers) as well as the 
inhabitants  of lands inundated by project reservoirs outside the new lands 
developed for settlement. Such people were paid compensation for their loss of 
property and were given the option of having a farm within the project or a 
homestead close to their original residence. In addition, squatters on sta te  
lands who had been continuously residing on the lands developed for the 
project for a minimum period of five years prior to its commencement were 
also allocated farms in the project in recognition of their pioneering nature 
and enterprise.
Naturally, the cost of all these provisions was very high. A rough calculation of 
cost per settler family (at the financial cost of the project minus the headworks costs 
worked out to Rs. 125,000 per settler family (US S 5000) a t  1985 prices. The Mahaweli 
Authority  of Sri Lanka, the organisation responsible for the implementation of the 
project, maintains th a t  the head works costs which am ount to a further Rs. 169,000 (US $ 
6700) per settler family can be entirely recoverd from hydro power benefits of the project 
(see ACRES 1984). The economic costs may have been far higher. For example, the Sri 
Lanka rupee is thought to be overvalued and therefore the true value of imports for the 
project may be understated when expressed in financial terms.
The entire Mahaweli Project may take another 3-4 years to a tta in  completion. 
However, the pilot phase of the project which commenced in 1974, with the first settlers 
being introduced in 1976, has functioned long enough to reveal the future trends for the 
whole project. The basic settlement strategy and the physical plan followed in the pilot 
phase, System H, is to be replicated in other areas of the project. Project planners 
expected the farmers to reach full potential ou tput or target levels in 8 years from the 
date  of original settlement. For rice, the major crop, the average target yield in both wet
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and dry seasons was 100 bushels per acre (5.15 tonnes per hectare) at  full development, 
after about  8 years from the initial date of sett lement  (Sogreah, 1972). The cropping 
intensity of rice was to be around 140 per cent with another 60 per cent of non-rice crops.
Actual experience in the performance of the pilot project has not been quite up to 
expectations. O u tpu t  in the wet season, according to official es timates has been near 100 
bushels per acre in good seasons. However, the average dry season yield has been only 
about  half of the target  level (Table 1-2). Further ,  the cropping intensity has been around
150 per cent with very little cultivation of non-rice crops (Table 1-3).
Table 1-2: Average rice yields in System H in bushels per acre
(tons / ha.)
Year Dry season Wet season
1977/78 59.34 (3.04) 74.79 (3.86)
1978/79 51.32 (2.64) 74.22 (3.82)
1979/80 52.74 (2.71) 87.68 (4.52)
1980/81 54.02 (2.78) 95.68 (4.93)
1981/82 52.17 (2.69) 71.74 (3.69)
1982/83 52.16 (2.69) 104.23 (5.37)
1983/84 80.93 (4.17) 81.21 (4.18)
1984/85 n. a 92.43 (4.76)
Target 100.00 (5.IS) 100.00 (5.15)
Source: Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka.
Table 1-3: Cropping intensity in System II expressed as a percentage
of the land area available for cultivation
Year Paddy Other crops Total
1981/82 1.03 .22 1.25
1982/83 1.36 .23 1.59
1983/84 1.41 .25 1.66
1984/85 1. 19 . 28 1.47
Target cropping
Intensity 1.40 . 60 2.00
Source: Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka.
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The variability in crop yields among Mahaweli farmers has been similar to tha t
observed in other planned and unplanned settlem ents as shown in Tables 1-4 to 1-6.
T a b le  1-4: Interfarm variation in rice yields in Block 313
in System H
Units Percentage of farmers
bushels/ac. (tons/ha.) Wet season 
83/84
Dry season 
84
Wet season 
84/85
30 < (l.S < ) 33 35 8
30 -39 (1.50-2.01) 13 13 10
40 -49 (2.02-2.52) 17 11 13
50 -59 (2.53-3.04) 16 13 18
60 -69 (3.05-3.55) 2 10 9
70 -79 (3.56-4.07) 12 9 13
80 -99 (4.08-5.10) 2 5 19
100 > (5.11 > ) 5 4 10
Average yield * 47.56 (2.45) 46. 15 (2.38) 62.77 (3.23)
Maximum yield * 160.00 (8.24) 140.00 (7.21) 133.00 (6.85)
Source: Farm survey of Block 313 in 1984/85 crop year by author. 
* figures in parentheses are yields in tonnes per hectare.
The available indicators of possible sources of income inequality, i.e., operational 
land holding size and crop yield per unit area, are alarmingly wide. There is increasing 
evidence of differentiation between settlers with high yields and incomes and those with 
low yields and low incomes. Krimmel (1986) showed that in the 1981/82 wet season, only 
52 per cent of the farmers in one village cultivated 2.5 acres, the size of original 
allotment. In this village, 9 per cent of the farmers cultivated more than 2.5 acres. In the 
1985/86 wet season, another study in a different location within System H (Thilakasiri 
1986), reported tha t  only 56 per cent of the farmers were cultivating 2.5 acres of land. 
Overall, the performance record of System H creates doubt about the likelihood of 
achieving project targets in terms of both productivity and equity.
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T a b le  1-5: Percentage D is tr ib u tio n  o f farms by yie ld classes
in selected irr iga ted  land settlement.schemes in 
the D ry Zone o f Sri Lanka in M aha 1972/73
Range Settlement Scheme
Bu/ac. Nachchaduwa
Usgala Siyam 
balangamuwa Kandalama Giritale Kaudulla Kantalai
30 < 14 5 15 7 6 8
30-39 18 18 22 8 10 12
40-49 27 19 21 13 14 20
50-59 18 31 23 26 19 21
60-69 12 16 9 24 20 24
70-79 6 1 4 10 13 7
80-99 4 6 3 12 11 5
100 k > 1 5 4 4 6 3
average 
yield (Madia) 
Bu/Ac. 45.9 53.0 46.7 57.0 55.6 55.7
The year of 
settlement 1935-55 1960-62 1954-57 1956-59 1958-65 1950-59
Irrigable
holding
size (Ac.) 5 3 3 3 3 3
Source: Jogaratnam (1974)
The data on in te rfa rrn  va ria tio n  in rice yields show th a t between 5-10 percent o f the 
farmers in one location  (B lock 313 o f System H) obta ined ta rge t yields in the three crop 
seasons from  1983-85. The m axim um  yields obta ined were 30 to  60 percent above the 
targets. Th is w ide in te rfa rm  yie ld  gap may perhaps ind ica te  a po ten tia l for increasing 
average o u tp u t in  M ahaw eli System H i f  the lower yields were the result o f ine ffic ien t use 
of resources. Therefore, research in to  the causes o f such in te rfa rm  va ria tion  in yie lds may
be useful.
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T a b le  1-6: Percentage distribution of paddy yields in a
non-settlement area in the Dry Zone of 
Sri Lanka (H am banto ta  District) 
in 1973/74 crop year (in Bu./ac.)
Bu/Ac. Yala 1973 Maha 1973/74
40< 44 34
40-70 36 46
70-80 12.4 11
80> 7.6 9
Average
Yield
(Bu./Ac.) 52.6 56.3
Highest
[2.71] [2.90]
Yield 89.4 122.5
Lowest
[4.60] [6.31]
Yield 12.0 40.0
[0.61] [2.06]
Source: Dias (1977)
Note: Yield in tonnes/Ha. given within square brackets.
T a b le  1-7: Paddy yield distribution in a non-land settlement area
in Tamil Nadu in 1973/74 (in Tonnes/Ha.) with HYV's
Season Sornavaxi Samba Navarai
Average
Yield 4.08 3.34 3.72
Maximum
Yield 5.65 5.45 5.85
Source: Chinnappa (1977)
1 .4 .1  P e r f o r m a n c e  o f  i r r i g a t e d  n e w  l a n d  s e t t l e m e n t s
Given the extent of planning and implementing irrigated new' lands settlement 
schemes and the enormous costs involved, nations embark on such projects with great 
expectations. However, such expectations are not always realized. In fact, irrigated land 
settlem ent schemes “appear more prone to failure than settlem ent projects in rainfed 
areas* (Goering, 1978), and typically show economic rates of return at least 50 percent 
below those in project appraisal documents three to five years after the implementation 
(van Raay and Hilhorst quoted by Scudder 1981). The study of the causes of such poor
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performance in irrigated new land settlem ents may therefore have im portan t lessons for 
fu ture  settlement schemes as well as other non planned settlements which have been 
exposed to the new technology.
These low rates of return are the result of low average ou tpu t and profits at project 
level by comparison with initial targets. Such low average ou tpu t may be the outcome of 
any one or more of the following three reasons.
* First, there may be unanticipated/exogenous changes in the economic 
environment, e.g., the oil price shock of 1973 and the resulting increase in 
fertilizer prices which affect all farmers in agricultural projects,
* Second, there may be farm specific variations in soil fertility and access to 
water and other resources depending on their location within the irrigation 
network and the topography of the area resulting in interfarm variations in 
ou tpu t which lower average output.
* Finally, interfarm variations in ou tpu t may occur due to variation among 
farmers in their ability to understand and practice the available technology.
By definition, the first situation does not imply any inefficiency at project or farmer 
level. An example of such exogenous changes in relative prices with adverse implications 
for farmer incomes and overall net returns from a project is given in Table 1-8. This 
shows the changes in real prices of crops and inputs in System H of Mahaweli Project in 
Sri Lanka from the time of project appraisal (1972) to 1984/85. While the real price of 
rice remained virtually constant, real prices of urea (the major fertilizer) and labour 
wages increased substantially. The real price of chillies increased more than  the real wrage 
ra te  but still less than the price of urea. This suggests a decline in real profits for rice 
assuming tha t  the technology remained unchanged. The impact on real profits of chillies 
is not clear, since this depends on the intensity of fertilizer and labour use. However, the 
overall effect of relative price changes on profits were less for chillies than rice. If this is 
the case, then chillies were more profitable in 1984/85 relative to rice than at the time of 
project appraisal. This inference is subject to constant technology and factor use 
intensities. Technological change may alter factor use intensities and counteract the 
adverse influence of price changes. Normally, standard  project appraisal procedures allow
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for price changes by testing the sensitivity in the economic rate of return to price changes 
in key variables. Such sensitivity tests, however, do not allow for more than  10 - 20 per 
cent fluctuations in prices. Large unanticipated changes in prices, may, therefore, 
substantially depress net returns if diversification of resource use is not technically 
feasible. For example, in much of the land developed under Mahaweli Project rice is the 
only crop which can be grown in the Wet Season, and in about half the area in the Dry 
season. Diversification, therefore, is not technically feasible in much of Mahaweli Project 
lands.
T ab le  1-8: Real changes in market prices at farm gate in System H
since 1972
Year Rice price 
R s ./Bushel
Dried chillies 
Rs./Kg.
Urea 
R s ./Kg.
Hired Labour 
Rs ./Man day
1972 a/ 14.00 5.59 0.40 b/ 6.00
1984/85 62.00 30.00 2.92 29.00
1984/85
prices in constant 
1972 prices c/14.31 6.92 0.67 6.69
7% change in
real prices + 02 + 23 + 67 + 11
a /  the prices used in the appraisal of System H (Sogreah 1972). 
b /  50% of the economic farm gate price used by Sogreah (1972). The 
fertiliser subsidy during this period was 50%.
c /  adjusted on the basis of the implicit GN P deflator of the Central 
Bank of Ceylon. See Table 7-4.
The second category of causes leading to low net returns represents inefficiencies at 
project level in the optimal provision of water and other resources. These are related to 
differences in natural environment, to deficiencies in project infrastructure, and to the 
operation and m anagement of project services to the settlers. Such issues have been
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widely studied in Sri Lanka and elsewhere. In the recent times, several studies have been 
undertaken to examine the impact of differential access to irrigation water on farmer 
performance (Bromley et al. 1980, Skold et al. 1984, Moore et al. 1983). Some have 
incorporated the impact of soil type differences in their analysis of crop yield differences 
(Samarasinghe and Samarasinghe 1984). Others have surveyed settler views on causes of 
water shortages which depress rice yields and have found tha t  they were mainly related to 
deficiencies in irrigation infrastructure (Thilakasiri 1986). This observation has 
considerable support from the findings of engineering studies in Mahaweli System H 
(Nedeco 1984) and in Rajangane Scheme (W ater M anagement Synthesis Project 1983).
The third is the least studied cause of interfarm variation in performance in relation 
to land settlement schemes, although passing reference has been made to the possible 
influence of differences in farmer ability (Dias 1977, Harriss 1984). The second and third 
causes are the determ inants of interfarm variation in performance described earlier. The 
available evidence on interfarm variations in crop yields within planned settlements 
suggests th a t  the the mere provision of equal access to resources and institutions, as 
intended (if not actually achieved) has not been successful in ensuring high and equal 
performance of farmers under the new technology. In fact, many of the investigations into 
the failures of such schemes have been aimed at determining the weaknesses and 
inadequacies of the physical and social infrastructure investments at project level and 
making proposals for further investments for their improvement (e.g., Nedeco 1984).
1.4 .2  S e t t le m e n t  S tud ies
Geographers and anthropologists were the pioneers among social scientists in the 
study of the performance, development, and the evolution of irrigated newr land 
settlements (Chambers 1969, Farmer 1957 and 1974). In general, they were mainly 
concerned with spatial aspects of such settlements such as communications, access to 
information and water, etc., as well as the relationships between man and the natural 
environment. Anthropologists have been interested in the implications of resettlement of 
traditional communities in new land settlements; the influence of physical and 
psychological stress of settlement on their innovative behaviour and motivation; and the
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implications of a ttem pts  to improve human capital through formal education etc., 
(Scudder 1973 and 1978). Sociologists have concentrated on social behaviour of such 
settlers, such as conflicts among settlers in the sharing of water and the formation of 
organisations (Harriss 1977 and 1984).
Economic research to date on new land settlement has been mainly concerned with 
ex-ante  and ex-post appraisal of such projects using standard  benefit-cost criteria. Benefit 
cost analysis is normally conducted as an evaluation of costs and benefits of resource 
allocation of a representative farm /farm er at economic prices based on technically feasible 
in p u t/o u tp u t  ratios, and other simplifying assumptions on the rate  of ad justm ent (World 
Bank funded projects expect full development in 8 years from the date of initial 
settlement). This preoccupation with an “average farmer*’ and the lack of appreciation of 
processes of adjustm ent in economic appraisal of irrigated land settlement projects, has 
been a ttr ibu ted  to the inadequacy of available methodological approaches and has been 
criticised as a “black box” paradigm which ignores what happens within the box, i.e., 
from settlement to full development, when the reality is in fact a “pandora 's  box” 
(Barnett  1981).
Harriss (1984) describes the process of social and economic differentiation arising 
from differential rates of adoption and performance under the new rice technology 
characteristic of Sri Lankan Land Settlement schemes as follows:
What seems to happen is this: the settler households s ta r t  off with more or 
less the same resources, but differences in family size and in the stage in the 
developmental cycle of the household (which determines the ratio between the 
numbers of consumers and the number of workers on the family farm); 
differences in access to resources from outside and to cheap credit; and 
differences resulting from what may initially be random factors like variations in 
soil fertility or differences in access to w'ater; as well as, perhaps d i f f erences in 
individual abili ty , soon begin to create disparities of wealth between households 
which tend to become accentuated over time, and particularly as the second 
generation takes over [italics are mine], (p 327).
Typically, studies of causes of performance variation ignore the contribution of 
farmer ability to this process (for example, see Samarasinghe and Samarasinghe 1984,
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Thilakasiri 1980, Siriwardhana 1984, James 1984). This arises from an implicit 
assumption th a t  the new technology is simple enough to be effectively adopted and 
implemented by any farmer irrespective of his stock of human capital. In reality, the new 
technology is highly complex and involves the adoption of technological packages in whole 
or in part ,  often requires the adap ta tion  of the recommended practices to specific 
environments, and continuous ad justm ent during the crop growth cycle with frequent 
calls for changes in strategies according to vagaries in the weather and exogenous shocks 
in the form of pest and disease outbreaks'6. This lack of a tten tion  to the role of human 
capital is widespread in development studies. Schultz (1981) observed tha t  much of the 
current decline in the understanding of the economics of productivity is related to an 
overrating of the importance of land (and other physical factors of production) and an 
under rating of the importance of human capital since the time of Ricardo and Malthus.
Some researchers have recognised tha t  the rate  and the degree of adoption may vary 
according to the individual’s ability, but assume th a t  efficiency differentials will disappear 
in the long run with the demonstration effect of successful farmers and a process of 
learning from experience (Dias 1977, R u ttan  1977). Others, however, have noted the long 
term  implications of short run differential adoption and performance between farms (e.g., 
Feder et al. (1985) quoted earlier). Ryan (1984) s ta tes  that:
It is clear th a t  early adopters of technologies earn innovators' rents. Indeed in 
situations where commodity demand is inelastic these can be the only producer 
benefits. Operators of large farms will often (but not always) be the early 
adopters due to potential size economies. Innovators rents are thus a pay-off to 
superior information searching and processing capacity, and also a necessary 
compensation for the risk of failure of new techniques born by early adopters 
with cheaper and more reliable information, (pp 118-120).
Clearly, short run variability in productivity between individuals in irrigation and 
land settlem ent schemes and elsewhere can have substantial equity implications. On the 
other hand, where this variability is due to variations in individual abilities, related to
♦
9^See, Godell et al. (1982) on the complex nature of modern pest control methods and Godell  
(1984) on organisational requirements in coordinating water issues with timing of crop 
establishment etc., for successful practice of the new technology.
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information searching and processing rapacities, and perhaps to market imperfections 
which favour some farmers at the expense of others, they may result in significant 
efficiency losses. Such efficiency losses may be detrimental to the success of large capital 
intensive agricultural development programmes where overall performance depends on the 
individual decisions of a m ultitude of small farmers. For example, the low average 
productivity resulting from interfarm variation in productivity may lead to negative net 
benefits from investments in agriculture in terms of social opportunity  cost. The net 
present values of such projects can be substantially reduced with a significant drop in the 
net benefits in the early years, even if eventually all farmers reach the target ou tpu t level 
and raise the overall project ou tpu t to the expected level. The impact on the economic 
rate  of return of a project affected by poor average performance in the early period will 
depend on the social rate  of discount in the economy. The higher this rate, the greater 
will be the reduction in project benefits owing to a delay in reaching the target.
In addition, the rural differentiation noted by Feder (1985), Harriss (1984) and 
Ryan (1984) may have substantial social costs due to increasing inequality in income 
although such costs do not usually enter the calculus of benefit-cost analysis.
1.5 R esea rch  O bject ives
While the introduction of new technologies and better inputs to small farmers is an 
accepted means of developing agriculture, a major concern is tha t  differences in 
productivity, incomes and inequality among farmers appear to increase with such a 
strategy. Often researchers a ttr ibu te  such differences in performance and their 
consequences solely to initial differences in factor endowments among farmers. Irrigated 
new land settlements offer an interesting experiment where equal initial endowments of 
resources are provided with the objective of achieving equity together with high 
productivity. Yet these projects, too, often end up with differences in interfarm 
performance, low average productivity and income inequality.
This thesis focusses on the issues related to differential performance among farmers
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who adopt modern high yielding seed varieties, but apply different levels of other inputs, 
e.g., fertilizer, labour etc., and who vary in their ability to realize the full potential of the 
technology. Technological change creates a disequilibrium in the farmer environment 
which requires ad justm ent by each individual. The ability to adjust and the success 
achieved may vary between individuals depending on their human capital endowments. 
A continuing stream  of technological changes creates a persisting disequilibrium with 
individuals at different stages of adjustm ent. In such circumstances, differences in relative 
efficiency may be observed among individuals as well as between groups of individuals. 
Inefficiencies may also be caused by market imperfections some of which may arise from 
government intervention in markets. Such imperfections may create inefficiencies in 
resource allocation even when farmers have fully adjusted to technological change. 
Finally, the differential performance may imply inefficiencies or losses to the society as 
well as to the individuals concerned. In the case of development projects, differences in 
farmer performance may lower average outpu t and thus reduce net economic returns. 
Further, even if all farmers fully adjust over time, the differences in their individual rates 
of adoption may set off trends in inequality.
This approach, in analysing the causes and effects of varying farmer performance 
under conditions of technological change, is applied to a selected sample of farmers of the 
Pilot Phase of the Mahaweli Project in Sri Lanka surveyed in the 1984/85 crop year.
1.6 Thesis O utline
Literature relevant to the analysis of differential performance among apparently 
similar firms in a given industry is reviewed in Chapter 2, in which the conceptual 
framework of the thesis is also developed.
The formal methodology to be used in the measurement of interfarm 
productivity/efficiency differentials is presented in Chapter 3. This methodology is based 
on recent developments in the estimation of stochastic frontier production functions, 
which provide a basis for measurement of firm specific technical and allocative
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efficiencies, and rost,s of market price distortions. A definition of allocative efficiency 
appropriate  to this situation is presented, and measures of social efficiency are also 
derived.
The study area, the sample, methods of da ta  collection etc. are described in C hap ter  
4 . Empirical estimation of the parameters of frontier functions are reported in C hap ter  5. 
Technical, allocative and economic efficiencies are estimated and reported for each farm 
and their determinants are explored. In Chapter 6, the implications of interfarm variation 
in performance for the economy in general are discussed and the potential for 
improvements in current resource allocation are examined. An analysis of the distribution 
of farm incomes from various sources in the context of the efficiency differentials 
discussed in Chapter 5 is given in Chapter 7. A summary of the research and conclusions 
is presented in Chapter 8.
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C H A P T E R  2 
L itera tu re  R e v ie w
The extant literature bearing on issues related to efficiency variation among similar 
firms, and the literature which distinguishes divergences between private and social 
efficiency are reviewed in this chapter. This is followed by an exploration of the available 
alternative approaches for empirically analysing firm level efficiency variation. The formal 
modelling based on the concepts developed here is undertaken in the following chapter. 
Although we present our review in separate sections as mentioned above, it is impossible 
to divide the literature into mutually exclusive com partm ents  or to order it into a neat 
sequential pa ttern  consistent with our approach in this thesis. Thus there is a certain 
am ount of unavoidable overlapping between sections and therefore some degree of 
repetition in the presentation.
2.1 The M easurem ent o f P rod u ctiv ity  D ifferences
The existence of productivity differences between farms/firms with similar 
land/capita l endowments has been the subject of interest and the study of some 
economists for a considerable time (see Koopmans 1951 and 1957, Debreu 1951). It was 
Farrell (1957) who introduced the now standard  approach to define and measure firm 
efficiency in production. He measured firm efficiency in relation to the neoclassical 
production function ( “frontier” ) which gives the maximum feasible outpu t for a given 
level of inputs. Those firms which operate below this frontier by obtaining less than the 
maximum output for a given level of inputs are technically inefficient. Those who do not 
use the profit maximizing combination of inputs (given the production frontier and prices 
of inputs and output) are allocatively inefficient. This model is illustrated in Figure 1.
For simplicity, and to allow graphic illustration, let us assume a two input
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F ig u r e  2-1: Farrell’s decomposition of the economic efficiency
of the firm
technology for the production of one commodity, i.e., Y =  f (X j ,X 2). Assuming constant
returns to scale, the frontier may be characterized by the efficient unit isoquant
(alternative representations of the frontier technology are discussed in the following
*  *  r *
chapter). This is QQ in Figure 1. Suppose the firm uses inputs and X 9 to produce Y
level of output operating at point A. The technical inefficiency of the firm, 1-O B/O A ,  
measures the proportion by which inputs (and costs) can be reduced without reducing
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output.  Now given input price ratio PP, the cost minimising combination C is obtained. 
Since the cost at D is the same as at  C, allocative efficiency is defined by the ratio 
OD/OB and allocative inefficiency by 1-OD/OB. Finally, the overall economic efficiency 
of the firm A given the technology QQ is given by the ratio OD/OA. Total efficiency can 
be decomposed as the product of technical and allocative efficiency.
Although Farrell provided a means of measuring efficiency, his analysis did not
provide an explanation as to why firms would vary in their individual technical and
, \
allocative efficiencies. Needless to say, Without theoretical reasoning as to the causes of
I *
firm level inefficiency, a purely empirical search for them cannot be very rew-arding. 
Therefore, in the following section, we undertake a l iterature survey of alternative 
theoretical explanations of variations in efficiency among similar firms.
2.2 Theories E xp la in in g  V aria tions  in F ir m /F a r m  P erform ance
Farrell's approach to measure firm level efficiency is based on the neo-classical 
definition of the opt imum input/output  combination under a competitive market 
environment with profit maximizing individuals. Therefore, we will briefly look at the 
wav the neo-classical model analyses variable performance between firms. This is followed 
by other approaches which relax some or most of the assumptions of the former, e.g., 
where firm- cannot adjust instantaneously to disequilibria, where firms are not always 
motivated 10 maximize profits, where markets are often imperfect, where firms operating 
m riskv environments have alternative objectives, etc.
2.2.1 T he N eo-C lassica l  Theory
Neo-classical economic theory shows that  if all factor markets were competitive and 
firms were profit maximizing , production would be carried out with identical techniques 
by all firms It follows that when there are differences in the quality of fixed factors of 
firms, their opt imum techniques will differ, e.g.. w'here land quality differs between farms. 
In such a setting productive efficiency cannot be improved with a reallocation of 
resources. Income distribution among individuals will be determined purely by their factor 
endowments and this would not affect opt imum resource allocation in production, i.e.,
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product ion will he efficiently carried out regardless of the nature of the dstribution of 
factor ownership. In other words, the economy would be in a “Pareto optimum . 
Therefore, given sufficient faith in the equilibrating tendency of markets and maximizing 
behaviour of farmers, inefficiencies in production have to be necessarily treated as short 
term phenomena. In the long run, inefficient firms will be forced to increase their 
efficiency or suffer losses and eventually be crowded out from production. In fact, the 
theory of general equilibrium addresses different states of equilibrium and ignores the 
dynamics of adjustment . The conditions required for an equilibrium after particular 
disequilibria, e.g., technological change, are provided by costs of information and 
t ransaction costs. When interpreted in this manner,  observed variations in performance 
between individuals do not represent losses in private or social efficiency or welfare.
The major disadvantage of this approach in the analysis of firm level efficiency 
variations is the absence of a useful economic role for entrepreneurship. The reward for 
entrepreneurship in an economy in equilibrium is zero. The total revenues of enterprises 
are fully exhausted when the other factors, e.g.. land, labour, and capital, are rewarded at 
their market prices. Most of the alternative approaches to explain variable performance of 
firms are a t tempts  to provide a useful role to entrepreneurship and stem from a 
conventional wisdom that  entrepreneurship is an important factor explaining differences 
in performance between firms and is an important  force in economic development.
2.2.2 Abil ity to Adjust  to Disequil ibria
( i i \en our interest in explaining obsened  productivity differences between farmers 
who initially had apparently similar factor endowments under conditions of technological 
and environmental change, an interesting approach is provided by Schultz (1975) with his 
concept of the differential ability of individuals to adjust to disequilibria.
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2.2.2.1  F a r m e r  Eff ic iency in Stati c  E n v ir o n m e n t s
The view tha t  farmers in static environments are efficient has gained general 
acceptance among development  economists as against  the earlier view that  tradi tional  
farmers were inefficient and were incapable of a “ rational* response to economic stimuli. 
The best known proponent  of the view tha t  farmers in static environments are rational 
economic beings is Schultz (1964) who formulated the hypothesis of e f f i c i en t  but poor 
f arm ers  in tradi tional  agriculture. The general acceptance of this hypothesis among 
development  stategists has had a great influence on agricultural development policies 
which concentrate on improving the resource base of farmers ( through land and irrigation 
development,  subsidised credit etc) as well as in developing new technologies.
Schultz (1975) summarised this concept as follows:
...farm people under t radi tional  conditions are closer to an economic opt imum, 
given the resources tha t  are available to them than are ’modern farm people’ in 
view of the new and better possibilities that  are constant ly crowding on the 
latter.. .  The reasoning underlying this inference can be s tated simply. Farm 
people who have lived for generations with essentially the same resources tend to 
approximate the economic equilibrium of the s tat ionary state. A stat ionary state 
implies zero growth,  and it also implies that  the economic value of allocative 
abilities would be zero. If the supply of resources and the demand for their 
services were to remain constant  long enough, the economy would arrive at a 
stat ionary s ta te with no economic disequilibria. When the productive arts 
remain virtually constant over many years, farm people know' from long 
experience what their own effort can get out  of the land and equipment,  (p 831).
Although Schultz (1964) explicitly referred only to allocative efficiency of farmers it 
is clear tha t  he implicitly assumed technical efficiency too as shown by the following 
s ta tement:
the number of times and depth of cultivation, the time of planting, watering, 
and harvesting, the combination of hand tools, ditches to carry water to the 
Fields, draft  animals and simple equipment-are all made with a fine regard for 
marginal  costs, (p 39).
The reference to the time and the manner  of cultivation implies technical efficiency 
i.e., the ability to get the maximum output  from a given level of inputs,  while the 
reference to marginal cost is made in relation to allocative efficiency (see Shapiro (1983) 
on this point).
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Although many empirical studies have been cited as providing support for the 
e f f i c i en t  but poor tradi tional  farmers  hypothesis (Hopper 1965, Tax 1953, Chennareddy 
1967, Sahota 1968 ) it has been criticized on several grounds. In particular, on the 
inference tha t  farmers are allocatively efficient in a neo-classical sense, i.e., tha t  they 
equate marginal value products with their marginal costs has been contested. Lipton 
(1968), for example, argued tha t  the risks and uncertainties, as well as various 
imperfections in rural markets and associated constraints make farmers non-maximizers 
from a neo-classical sense. Rather, they are optimizers with a survival algori thm , but he 
accepted tha t
...the farmer is no fool. A non-fool, in a static environment learns to live 
efficiently: to optimize, given his values and constraints, and teach his children 
to do the same, (p 327).
Similarly, Myrdal (1968) described traditional farmers in South Asia in the 
following manner:
the absence of anything like perfect markets; many transactions are not of the 
market type at all...price incentives are wreak. few people calculate in terms of 
costs and returns, and if they do, their economic behaviour is not primarily 
determined by such calculations. The masses of people are survival minded. (Vol 
2, pp 912-13).
A recent re-examinantion of the empirical studies which were earlier thought of as 
supporting the view th a t  traditional farmers were allocatively efficient indicated tha t  in 
fact, the results show substantial deviations from an allocative optimum (Shapiro 1983). 
However, it should be noted tha t  Schultz (1964) cautioned th a t  static environments are 
difficult to observe in the modern world. The traditional settings which have been studied 
may in fact be static  only in a relative sense and observed deviations from economic 
efficiency in such situations - in a static sense - cannot be used to reject the Schultz thesis. 
In any case, the argum ent th a t  technological change will d isrupt existing equilibria even 
in relatively static environments is an appealing concept and merits further attention. 
Indeed the source of the relatively rapid changes in farmer environment in recent times is 
a t  least partly related to technological changes which have taken place in a context of 
dynamic change in 'the  wider economic environment itself.
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2 .2 .2 .2  E c o n o m ic  D isequi l ibr ia
Schultz (1975) argues that  a disequilibrium created in a stat ionary s ta te  (such as 
with new technology in t radi tional  agriculture) results in people responding to the 
economic incentives created by the new opportuni ties  to the best of their ability. He notes 
t h a t  received economic theory has not progressed far in explaining what  people in a 
disequilibrium situation would do to regain equilibrium. This is in fact, concealed in the 
implicit assumption tha t  people would regain an equilibrium instantaneously.  However, it 
is unlikely that  they will be able to do so, and even if they could, it may not be economic 
for them to make all the required reallocations of their resources instantaneously.  The 
regaining of an equilibrium takes time; the manner  in which people proceed over t ime 
depends on their efficiency in responding to a given disequilibrium and on the costs and 
returns  of the sequence of adjustments  available to them.
Further,  Schultz postulated tha t  there are economic incentives to reallocate 
resources under conditions of disequilibria; people respond to these incentives to the best 
of their abilities and observed differences in their performance in a part icular activity is 
an indicator of the differences in their ability to adjust.  In broad terms, the ability to 
optimize in a s ta te  of disequilibrium may be called entrepreneurship. Hence, differences 
among individuals in economic performance may be at t r ibuted to their entrepreneurial 
abilities.
2 .2 .2 .3  A d o p t i o n  o f  N e w  I n n o v a t io n s
With the advent  of the green revolution, a substantial l iterature has developed 
around the issues related as to how farmers and firms adopt new innovations. In general, 
they are consistent with the hypothesis tha t  individuals do not adjust  instantaneously to 
disequilibria. The early work in this area was carried out bv sociologists who discovered 
tha t  typically there is a time lag between the moment when an individual learns of the 
existence of an innovation and when he actually adopts  it. For example, Beal et al. 
(1957) described the thought  process of farmers leading to the eventual adoption of a 
technology from the time it becomes available in five different stages. In brief, they are: 
the stage of awareness when an individual is exposed to the fact that  a new technology
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exists; the stage of information when individuals search for information on the technology 
and relate it to their own experiences and environment; the application stage when a 
decision to practice the innovation is taken after weighing the pros and cons; the trial 
stage when the decisions related to how. when and where it is' going to be practiced is 
decided; and Finally the adopt ion stage where the trial is evaluated and a decision is taken 
to continually practice the innovation. Economists often a t t r ibu te  such time lags to risk 
aversion. However, risk aversion cannot  explain the existence of a time lag when the 
individuals are either risk neutral  or are risk taking (Lindner 1979).
Griliches (1957a) in a seminal paper on the economics of technological change, 
argued that  the process of innovation the process of adapting and dist ribut ing a 
part icular invention to different markets ,  and the rate a t  which it is accepted by 
entrepreneurs  are amenable to economic analysis. He related the observed lag in the 
development  of hybrid corn to different areas and the lag in the entry of seed producers 
into these areas on the basis of varying profitability of entry. Mansfield (1961) related the 
rate  of imitat ion of new innovations in an environment  of technological change in twelve 
US industries to the proport ion of firms already using an innovation, the profitability of 
doing so and the size of investment  required. Later, he (1971) found that  the level of 
education among corporate executives in the US was importan t  in determining the 
differences between firms in their research work and innovations. Lindner et al. (1982) 
conceptualized the t ime lags in innovation adoption as the discovery stage lag, the 
evaluation stage lag and the trial stage lag. In a study of trace element fertilizer adoption 
between farmers in South Australia,  they found that  differences in information 
availability (as indicated by various measures of distance between the farm and the 
location of innovation) and the level of education of farmers were important  in explaining 
interfarm differences.
Apart  from the above mentioned decision theoretic approaches to explain the 
adopt ion of innovations, a somewhat  different approach was developed by Welch (1978) 
to measure the ability to adjust  to disequilibria. This approach was based on Schultz's
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proposition tha t  the observed differences between individuals in their efficiency of 
performing certain tasks provide information on their ability related to the performance 
of th a t  particular task. Thus Welch (1978) identified two measures of ability to adjust to 
disequilibria related to technological change which he called worker ability and allocative 
ability. He a ttr ibu ted  the difference in allocative ability between individuals in the 
adoption of fertilizer to differences in their education. Given tha t  modern technological 
changes in agriculture appear in the form of packages of several innovations, this 
approach has the advantage tha t  the overall ability to adjust can be measured and 
explained by various factors. The concentration of adoption research on individual 
innovations rather than  on technological packages has been shown to be a major 
limitation of the existing literature on the adoption of innovations (Feder et al. 1985). 
Byerlee and de Polanco (1986) documented the patte rn  of technology adoption by farmers 
during a period of rapid technological change. They found th a t  farmers adopt the 
components of packages in a stepwise manner with those components giving the highest 
returns being adopted first.
Accordingly, measures of firm specific efficiency of Farrell (1957) may be used as 
indicators of technical and allocative ability of individual farmers. Thus rather than 
concentrate on specific innovation, the overall performance within a given enterprise (e.g., 
rice production) is taken as evidence of an individual's ability to adjust to disequilibria. 
The observed efficiency variations between individuals in an environment of 
disequilibrium can then be related to their differences in the ability to adjust.
2.2.2.4 A bility  to Adjust to D isequilibria and H um an Capital
The above approach to explain variable farmer performance can be based on the 
theory of human capital. Therefore, we look into human capital literature in an effort to 
identify possible determ inants  of differences in this ability to adjust. Human abilities are 
either acquired or innate. Human capital is defined as those acquired abilities which are 
valuable and can be augmented (Schultz 1981). Empirical research in this area is 
motivated by the fact tha t  if the specific a ! Hi ties related to adjustm ent for different types 
of disequilibria are identified and the way in which they can be imparted are known then
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it may be possible to increase or improve the abilities of selected target groups. Although 
the works of Schultz (1964, 1975) and Becker (1964) were most influential in popularizing 
human capital theory, it was Mincer (1958, 1970) who first put forward this theory. He 
a ttem pted  to develop a model in which the characteristic features of the personal 
distribution of income are explained entirely by differences between individuals in the 
am ount of labour training they received.
It is im portant to recognize tha t  the type of disequilibria encountered by a group of 
farmers may vary by time and by place. Therefore the particular type of disequilibria 
faced by a group of farmers should be clearly understood to discern the relevant forms of 
hum an capital which may determine the ability to adjust. Disequilibria may arise from 
new technologies, new markets, changes in economic incentives, broad changes in the 
mode of production and society, and environmental changes due to irrigation and land 
settlem ent etc. Often a change in one of these parameters may be accompanied by 
simultaneous changes in others, and one change may lead to a series of changes in the 
broad socio economic setting.
The introduction of the new rice technology has often been accompanied by 
irrigation and other infrastructural changes. The mode of production changes from 
subsistence or semi-subsistence to market oriented capitalist systems as the need for 
purchased inputs creates a need for sales of the produce. These create further changes in 
social relations, rural institutions etc. Settlement in new lands, for example, requires 
settlers to adjust to an environment which can be different from their previous 
environments in many ways. Adaptation becomes difficult when technological and 
physical environmental changes accompany or result in changes in the mode of 
production, which require skills and knowledge in responding to market signals. Such 
commercialization results in greater individualization (in comparison to subsistence 
economies) with an impact on many aspects of community life. For example, they can 
result in the loss of security provided by such institutions as the extended sytem and 
similar welfare cushions (Scott 1976). There is a considerable literature, largely in the
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area of social anthropology, on the success of traditional communities and other 
communities which have had some exposure to the forces of modernization within new 
lands settlements. Some of this work is briefly surveyed in section 1.2.6 below.
In our particular case, the adoption of the new cereal grain production technology' 
(green revolution) required farmers to make many new types of decisions a t  different 
stages in the crop season in a situation characterized by many of these broader changes. 
In a static  environment, necessary decisions in crop production as well as other economic 
activites are perfected over generations and are learned by practice. The new decisions 
include the selection of the most suitable variety from a range of new varieties depending 
on the season and the availability of water, the optimal method of crop establishment 
(e.g., whether to broadcast or transp lan t) ,  the timing of planting, the quantities, types 
and times of fertilizer application, methods of weed and pest control. These are all closely 
interrelated decisions. Godell et al. (1982) described the many complexities involved in 
the correct use of even a single management practice: proper pest m anagement requires 
the identification of major pests, choosing the appropriate  chemicals among the dozens of 
labels available in the m arket, calculating the correct dosage etc.. Given the location 
specificity of the technology and the farm-to-farm differences in soil quality, access to 
w ater and drainage, a general package may not perform equally well for all the farmers 
even in a small contiguous agro-climatic region. Even when the farmer has full 
information and ability to use the information, he may be constrained by various 
organizational factors (Godell 1984) as well as resource constraints.
The heterogeneity in farm environments results in variability in performance of a 
technological package even if it is identically practiced on all farms. As Farmer (1977) 
points out:
Macro-scale planning of agricultural development spreads far too coarse a net 
over the landscape, given the great variations between areas and, within areas, 
between villages....(p 198).
This requires farmers to adapt and tailor technological packges to suit their particular
e n v ir o n m e n ts .
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While much of empirical research into the economics of human capital have been 
conducted in the context of labour markets in developed countries, it is being increasingly 
utilized to explain agricultural productivity in developing countries. Education has been 
the most intensively studied form of human capital as it has been hypothesized to 
facilitate the acquisition of information related to technologies and markets and to help in 
the evaluation of benefit costs of a lternative courses of action. Jamison and Lau (1982) 
have reviewed eighteen studies with th irty  seven d a ta  sets on the role of education, both 
formal and informal (such as extension), on farm productivity. Fortnal education falls 
into Becker’s (1964) general training category while extension is more specific to 
particular crops a n d /o r  enterprises and may be treated  as “specific tra in ing” .
The ability to make good (profitable) decisions may also be affected by the 
experience of individuals in relation to specific enterprises and tasks as well as the 
knowledge obtained by experience and skills in relation to particular natural 
environments. This is called specific experience. Recently, Rosenzweig and Wolpin 
(1985) used the concept of land specific experience to explain some widely observed 
phenomena in agriculture in developing countries. They argued th a t  the predominance of 
inter-generational family transfer of land, “over use” of family labour, and scarcity of 
land sales in traditional agriculture can be explained on the basis of an optimal implicit 
contract between generations to maximize the gains from the knowledge obtained by land 
specific experience w ithout having to assume m arket imperfections. This knowledge, 
which raises profitability, is acquired over time bv those who cultivate the land in a 
particular farm. Such specific knowledge is productive because it enables the choice of 
best practices for the particular micro-environment of the farm and is particularly useful 
in years with adverse climatic conditions.
On the other hand, it has been argued th a t  the knowledge acquired through 
experience may be a liability during times of technological change. As Welch (1978) noted
The more rapid the change, the greater the rate of obsolesence and lower the 
stock of experience relevant to today (p 264).
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Thus experience, may have an ambiguous impact on the ability to adjust to 
disequilibria depending on the particular circumstances.
In general, the contribution of individual components of human capital to the 
ability to adjust is dependent on the types of human capital available, i.e., general and 
specific training and experience; as well as the nature of changes encountered by farmers 
in a given environment.
2.2 .3  The T heory o f X-EfTiciency
The theory of X-efficiency, developed by Leibenstein (1966), argues th a t  there are 
im portan t  non allocative inefficiencies resulting from non maximizing behaviour of firms 
and agents due to motivational factors as well as to imperfections in markets which 
prevent autom atic  equilibration in markets. Leibenstein (1966) a ttr ibu tes  varying ou tpu t 
levels obtained by seemingly identical firms at comparable input levels to the fact th a t  
“firms and economies do not operate on an outer bound production possibility surface 
consistent with their resources’’ .
The formal definitions of X-inefficiency and technical inefficiency (Farrell 1957) 
appear to be similar. Both inefficiencies refer to the inability of firms to operate on the 
outer bound production possibility frontier. This similarity has resulted in some 
researchers a ttem pting  to explain technical inefficiency as a result of X-inefficiency (e.g., 
Shapiro and Mueller 1977). However, Leibenstein (1973) argues tha t  technical 
inefficiency as defined in “standard  micro theorvr is an “undesirable simplification of the 
nature  of the firm’’ . He (1978) claims th a t  neo-classical “micro theory” is a special case 
relevant to competitive markets and profit maximizing firms, and a more general theory 
is required to fit economic realities of imperfect competition and non maximizing 
behaviour of firms.
Non maximizing behaviour is explained in terms of psychological costs of 
rationality , motivation, effort, organizational characteristics of firms etc. Entrepreneurs 
have an im portan t  economic role to play in an environment of imperfect markets. Firms
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have to perceive and identify profitabilities between existing alternat ive markets  and 
technologies as well in new innovations. The absence of markets  for certain goods and 
services or various imperfections in such markets  result in their having to marshal  these 
goods and services which are not readily available to everybody. Therefore, the major 
roles of the entrepreneur  according to Leibenstein (1978) are “input  completion"1 which 
involves making available inputs which improve the efficiency of existing methods of 
product ion or the introduction of new methods; and “gap filling11, required by impeded, 
incomplete or “dark” areas in the imperfect market environment  as against an unimpeded 
and “well lit” compet it ive market  set up.
The growing literature and empirical evidence on the existence and importance of 
technical inefficiency has been t reated as evidence in support  of the theory of X-efficiency 
(Leibenstein 1976, Fran tz  1985, Rozen 1985) although Leibenstein emphasizes tha t  the 
concept of technical inefficiency is within the domain of neo-classical economics and that  
X-efficiency is a much broader concept.
The concept of T.E. suggests that  the problem is a technical one and has to do 
with the techniques of an input  called management .  Under X.E. the basic 
problem is viewed as one tha t  is intr insic  to the nature of human organization, 
both organization within the firm and organization outside the firm. Thus the 
production process is viewed as quite differently under T.E.  than it is under the 
X.E. approach. Under T.E.  some firms are always assumed to be on the 
product ion frontier isoquant,  whereas under X.E. we should usually presume 
tha t  there probably are not  any firms on the production frontier... Two 
underlying neo-classical notions are retained in the notion of T.E.: the notion of 
maximizing decisions and the view of the firm as a unified and integrated 
decision-making unit  in the same sense in which an individual can be such a 
decision making unit.  My X-efficiency notion departs from both of these implicit 
assumptions. . .  I agree with Shapiro and Mueller that  T.E.  is an enigmatic 
concept if it is viewed within the framework of maximizing decisions. Ei ther the 
product ion function is underspecified, or it is a disequilibrium phenomenon. It 
does not fit easily into the framework of comparat ive statics if all inputs  are 
included. However, under X.E. theory the static equilibrium of the firm allows 
for variants  in ou tpu t  for the same set of given purchased inputs (Leibenstein 
1977, pp 312-13).
Stigler (1976) argued tha t  the inefficiency arising from the failure to a t t a in  the 
product ion frontier can be usefully assimilated into the t radi tional  theory of allocative 
inefficiency. He argued tha t  differences in output  are the results of differences in quality of
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inputs including entrepreneurship, and given the differences in inputs each firm will have 
a unique production function on which it operates. Therefore, all inefficiencies become 
allocative. Further, he states (Stigler 1976):
Motivation can be invoked to explain every unperformed task th a t  is 
physically possible, no m atte r  how unrewarding, (p 214).
While the X-efficiency approach provides further reasons for the existence of firm 
level differences in performance due to m arket imperfections and motivational 
considerations, whether such differences represent actual inefficiencies is not clear. For 
example, a utility maximizing firm, which a ttem p ts  to choose an optim um  between 
income and effort may use less effort and recieve lower profits than a profit maximizing 
firm (Corden 1970, M artin  1978 and 1983). Here, the lower profits and the implied 
allocative iefficiency of the former cannot be necessarily taken to be an inefficiency from a 
private point of view. T h a t  firm may be privately efficient. Second, the use of neo­
classical tools such as technical and allocative efficiency of the firm do not appear to be 
appropriate  within the X-efficiency framework wdiich claims to be a much broader concept 
of which the neo-classical model is a special case. Recently, it has been argued tha t  neo­
classical and X-efficiency approaches should and could be reconciled on the grounds of the 
desirability and the necessity to incorporate inherent motivational variability factors into 
an expanded conception of maximizing behaviour. Rozen (1985) states tha t  the 
recognition tha t  maximizing behaviour can be interpreted as reaching empirically 
determined performance standards still leaves intact the fundamental equilibrium concept 
of economics, while this need not lead to the autom atic  presumption tha t  firms always 
intend to do their best. Thus he argues th a t  the theory of X-efficiency does not reject the 
neo-classical ideal but provides explanations for variabilities in performance observed in 
the  real world. This line of argum ent supports the use of the neo-classical optimum as an 
ideal s tandard  for making comparisons against the real world which is characterized by 
X-inefficiency.
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2 . 2 .4  M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  E n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p
Observed efficiency differentials between firms have often been a ttr ibu ted  to 
differences in m anagement ability. However, it is often difficult to distinguish the 
difference between m anagement and entrepreneurial abilities of individuals as discussed in 
the previous section* . In developed market economies and in the modern sector of 
dualistic economies, a clearer distinction between entrepreneurship and m anagement may 
be distinguished. An entrepreneur may hire a manager to organize and coordinate his 
resources in production. A market for management exists where better managers are paid 
higher wages. The entrepreneur may decide in broad terms the markets to operate in, 
technologies to be adopted, the m anner of raising capital and particular strategies in 
production and m arketing to be employed. Given such broad policy framework, a 
m anager’s task is to run his enterprise in the most efficient manner.
E ntrepreneur/m anagers  are not uncommon even in modern enterprises (especially in 
small business, and in agriculture). In developing countries, small farm agriculture is 
dominated by such persons who perform both entrepreneurial and management functions 
simultaneously. In large enterprises within developed m arket economies the reward for 
entrepreneurship is profits while the reward for management is the associated wage. 
Profit of course is a residual after all other factor earnings are paid out of the gross 
revenue of a firm. In owner-managed farming both entrepreneurship and management 
functions are rewarded simultaneously by the residual income after payment of all other 
factor earnings. With certain tenancy arrangements, the management functions may be 
left in the hands of the tenant while the landlord retains entreprenurial functions. Even 
then, the reward for the te n a n t ’s managerial input is a residual after meeting other costs, 
including the owner’s share which is in whole or in part  land rent. In fact tenancy based 
on crop share results in a sharing of the risks associated with crop production. The risk
*See Casson 1981 for a general review of other theories of entrepeneurship not mentioned in this 
chapter. See also (Upton 1976) for a description of entrepreneurial functions in agriculture. In our 
view, the apparent differences between these alternative definitions rest on the particular 
characteristics of entrepreneurship emphasized by their authors when in reality, all these individual 
characteristics make up entrepreneurship.
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bearing of the tenant  makes him an entrepreneur  too from the point of view of those who 
relate entrepreneurship to risk bearing. Such complications, make the separation of 
entrepreneurial tasks from management  difficult in farming in developing economies.
It may, however, be argued that  a separation of the two functions for purely 
analytical reasons could be useful. For example, two farmers may be equally efficient as 
managers,  but may differ in their entrepreneurial skills or vice versa. Early adoption of a 
superior technology by a farmer may reflect higher entrepreneurial skill in comparison 
with another who adopts after many others have adopted and when the technology is 
proven beyond reasonable doubt .  The early adopters  therefore bear higher risks and face
greater uncertainty than the followers. It should be noted, however, that
9
entrepreneurship may consist of many other functions apart  from technology adoption. 
For example, entrepreneurs may decide to operate in entirely new markets.  Even if the 
early and the later adopters  are equal in their management  skills, the former will make 
greater profits owing to their use of the technology before the market adjusts to the new 
supply situation. This extra  income is the payment  for entrepreneurship,  for risk taking 
etc. On the other  hand two farmers with equal entrepreneurial ability may have different 
profits depending on their management  skills. Thus, two farmers who adopt  the same 
basic technology to the same degree may differ if they varied in their manner of input use 
(technical efficiency) and in the allocation of input  quanti ties in production (allocative 
efficiency).
Productivity differences between cross sectional observations of farmers using a 
given (broadly defined) technology wdth similar land in a dynamic environment  may be 
caused by differences in management  as well as entrepreneurship.  Entrepreneurs have no 
role to play in a stat ic environment  with no risk and uncertainty.  More enterprising 
farmers (e.g., risk takers and information searchers) may use newer and better 
innovations within a broad technology and may use inputs more efficiently as well. The 
demarcation between management  and entrepreneurship can be blurred in the case of 
farming in developing economies and there may be considerable overlap between the two.
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The two terms are often used interchangeably. Thus it is more useful to base an analysis 
of productivity differences between firms on the observable (measurable) components of 
efficiency, i.e., technical and allocative efficiency, rather than on entrepreneurship and 
management  which cannot be separated.
2.2 .5  Risk  and  U n c e r t a in t y
The relatively low levels of investment  in fertilizer and other  inputs by farmers in 
developing countries, and in general, the slow rate of adoption of new innovations have 
often been at t r ibuted to risk aversion. A wide range of interpretat ions have been given to 
risks and uncertainties in crop production using new technology. It has been argued that  
the alleged susceptibility of new varieties to pests and diseases and greater dependence on 
timely and adequate water resulted in increased year to year variability in yield and 
therefore led to underutilization of inputs by small farmers with low risk taking ability 
(Frankel 1971, Griffin 1974). Others  have argued that  the process of commercialization 
in rural communit ies and the resulting individualization weakens the t radi tional  welfare 
cushions and therefore increases the risks of small farmers (Scott, 1976).
Risk increases when the density function of returns is subjected to a mean 
preserving spread. Uncertainty refers to the s tate  of mind of the decision maker who 
perceives more than one possible consequence of a particular act. It is represented in 
decision theory as a probability distribution. Since risk is a parameter  of probability 
dist ribut ion (e.g., variance), risk is a property of uncertainty (Roumasset  1976).
Risk and uncertainty may explain farmer to farmer variations in input  use in 
addit ion to explaining general underuse of inputs.  Uncertainty leads to the introduction of 
subjective elements into decision making; not only consumption decisions but  also 
allocative decisions cannot  be made independently of the preferences of the decision maker 
in an uncertain environment  (Hirshliefer 1970). Therefore, decision making under 
uncertainty involves personal or subjective judgements  about  the chances associated with 
(a) the various feasible outcomes from any part icular action (risk perceptions), and (b) 
r isk  p r e f e r e n c e s  (whether risk taking, risk neutral or risk averse). Hence, the opt imum 
choice for one person may differ between farmers (Dillon 1977).
wAlthough a considerable body of literature has developed on risk there is no 
consensus as to how risk should be defined to represent adequately farmers'  a tt i tudes to 
outcome uncertainty.  Given the inadequacy of knowledge in the Held of risk perception, it 
is obvious tha t  understanding of farmers'  response to risk is equally limited (Huijsmans, 
1986). Much of the literature assumes risk aversion (with no a t tempt  to actually measure 
it) on the par t  of farmers and then simulates or predicts resulting behaviour given other 
assumptions or observed facts and data . This indirect or revealed preference approach has 
been criticised for the reason tha t  it may be feasible to formulate a utility function to 
a t t r ibute  any observed decision making behaviour to that  of utility maximization. Thus 
Roumasset  (1976) recommends that
When the temptat ion strikes to reconcile your view of the world with fact 
through an appeal to risk aversion, resist it, at least for a while. Try revising 
your view of the world first, (p 234).
Graaf  (1984) comments  on an a t t em pt  by Bliss and Stern (1982) to reconcile the 
observed deviation in input  use of a sample of Indian Farmers  from the profit maximizing 
levels by the aid of a utility maximizing model as follows:
Why an explanation along these lines is so remarkable is because it resorts to 
things we cannot  observe between field observations and received theory. In 
that  way almost any theory can be saved. Indeed, it is difficult to think of one 
that  would have to be rejected, (p 331).
On the other hand some researchers have gone to considerable lengths to measure 
risk at t i tudes of farmers (Binswanger and Sillers 1984, Roummasset 1973, Rosegrant 
1978). In his study of decision making in a Philippine village Huijsmans (1986) concludes 
tha t  it is dangerous to base risk analysis on superficial observations and generalize about  
the small farmers’ risk behaviour. He argues that  many practices and strategies of 
farmers erroneously at t r ibuted to risk averse behaviour in fact help to raise expected 
profits. Such strategies result from cautious opt imization over time together with 
adaptat ion to the household and external circumstances, search for improvements  and 
experimentat ion,  sequential choice procedures and risk control. Therefore, such strategies 
allow for an opt imum use of environmental  resources and are economically sound 
practices.
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Recent papers on the impact  of risk aversion using both these approaches appear  to 
move towards a consensus that  production risk does not have a substant ia l effect on input  
use (fertilizer) in irrigated rice growing environments (Roummasset 1973, Rosegrant and 
Herdt  1981) and also in favourable shallow rainfed rice growing areas (Smith and Umali, 
1985). According to Smith and Umali, although the random temporal variation in yield 
increased with increasing applications of fertilizer, in a favourable rainfed environment  in 
the Philippines, this rate of increase w'as insufficient to affect input  levels significantly. It 
has also been argued that  differences in risk at t i tudes (preferences) are not significant in 
explaining variations in allocative efficiency in the use of inputs among small farmers in 
similar environments,  a lthough risk aversion is an impor tan t  factor leading to 
underutilization of inputs  by farmers in general (Binswanger and Sillers 1983). This is due 
to the fact tha t  all farmers are generally moderately risk averse in spite of differences 
among them in terms of weal th,  farm size, age, sex, and tenure status.
Huijsmans (1986) argues that  risk perceptions (how the probability a t tached to a 
part icular  outcome is subjectively assessed) are impor tan t  in explaining the behaviour of 
individuals; risk perceptions may vary between individuals and, even for the same 
individual, they may vary for different activities and at  different points of time in a crop 
cycle. He shows the difficulties involved in the incorporation of risk perceptions in formal 
models due to these variations in risk perceptions in relation to time and activity for the 
same individual. Thus, even if risk preferences are similar among a group of farmers, their 
decisions will vary if their risk perceptions differ. Risk perceptions are shown to be related 
to factors such as resource endowments  of households which determine the capacity to 
absorb the risk, access to information, off farm sources of income etc..
Roumasset  (1979) argues that
it is useful to distinguish between s ituations where the decision maker has had 
substant ia l  experience regarding the various outcomes and situations where he 
has very limited information on which to base his subjective probabilities. Thus 
just  as risk can be regarded as a characteristic of uncertainty,  knowledge (i.e., 
how much the decision maker has learned about  the likelihood of various 
outcomes) is a second variable by which uncertainty can be characterised, (p 
49).
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further, he states th a t
Few economists would disagree with the contention tha t  representing a 
decision problem under uncertainty with a complete certainty model is likely to 
be misleading. (If many outcomes are possible, which is relevant to insert into 
full-certainty model?). It does not follow, however, tha t  risk and risk aversion 
must be incorporated into decision models to get useful results. Indeed, it is the 
contention here th a t  for many types of decision making in agriculture, 
uncertainty is im portan t but risk is not. (p 49).
Significantly, Schultz (1981) defined entrepreurial ability as
the ability to perceive, interpret and respond to new events in the context of 
risk, (p 25).
Thus differences in farmer performance in an uncertain or risky environment may be 
explained by the entrepreneurial ability of farmers which captures the capacity to respond 
successfully to risky situations.
2 .2 .6  A n  A n th r o p o lo g ica l  P e r s p e c t iv e
Anthropologists have taken a considerable interest in characteristics of stresses 
(physical as well as psychological) involved in dislocation and settlement of people, 
pa tterns of individual and group reactions and strategies in new settlements, similarities 
and differences in cases of involuntary migration and similarities and differences between 
involuntary and voluntary migration in new land settlements (Hansen and Oliver-Smith, 
1982).
Some of the major issues raised and analysed by anthropologists which may have 
im portan t economic implications are as follow's.
1. Newly settled people may suffer physically due to inadequate water supplies, 
housing, and health services etc., in new' settlements.
2. The need to adjust to a new physical environment as well as to a new 
community may create psychological stress due to the uncertainty of the 
future.
3. Physical and psychological stress may restrict the capacity for major 
innovations in the transition period in adjusting to the new environment 
(Scudder, 1973).
4. Such “stress” may be especially serious among groups of people with greater 
disparity between their own cultural background and the culture of the 
dom inant society (Berry and Annis. 1974).
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5. The need for negotiation with government  agencies which provide or are 
responsible for various services may create leadership problems.
6. Old skills (at tained prior to sett lement) may no longer be useful in the new 
environments.
7. Inequalities may increase in tha t  some individuals, in clinging to old pat terns  
no longer useful lose out  to those who take advantage of sudden new 
opportuni ties (Part rige,  et ah, 1982).
These theories and related empirical observations provide extra  insight into areas 
related to human capital such as experience and may be useful in explaining the observed 
differences in performance among different farmer types settled in new lands.
2.3  Social E ffic iency  in P r o d u c t io n  and  P r o jec t  A p pra isa l
Agricultural development  projects in developing countries are often characterised by 
the presence of a large number of farmers whose individual decisions and performances 
determine overall project success. These individual farmer decisions are taken on the 
basis of market signals received by them. Agricultural markets in developing countries are 
subject  to government  intervention and other  market  imperfections which distor t price 
signals and lead to divergences in private and social profitability of resource allocation. 
Much of the government  intervention in agricultural  markets  is justified by the need to 
correct natural  imperfections in certain markets;  for certain commodities they may be 
incompleteness or even completely absent.  Other reasons advanced for such interventions 
are based on considerations of public goods, increasing returns to scale and externalities 
etc. (Stiglitz 1987).
Further,  governments also intervene in agricultural markets with a range of often 
conflicting objectives such as consumer welfare protection, increasing farmer income, 
generating government  revenue, generating foreign exchange, food self sufficiency, price 
stabi li ty,  regional development  and the provision of adequate nutrition (Timmer 1975). 
T immer (1975) listed the means by which governments intervene in national agricultural 
sectors to influence production or consumption of commodities. They are 1. consumer 
programmes (including subsidies for food commodit ies or substitutes);  2. farm production
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programmes (cither intensification or diversification); 3. domestic marketing 
investments; 4. concessional foreign trade (including exchange rate biases); 5. direct 
taxation or other forms of fiscal transfers; and 6. price controls by legal fiat a nd /o r  
market operations, including (a) ceiling prices, (b) buffer stocks as stabilisers usually in 
conjunction with (a), (b), and 7. physical controls, including rationing and non-price 
collections and disbursements.
The literature which addresses issues related to efficiency and welfare implications 
of government interventions in markets are basically of two types. They are:
1. (a) Studies of efficiency implications of distorted trade regimes in given
industries or in economies, and
2. (b) Appraisal of projects in an environment of market distortions.
Both approaches are based on the neo-classical welfare economic theory which 
shows th a t  in the absence of any distortions in the economy, the social opportunity  costs 
of marketed goods and services would equal their m arket prices thereby ensuring efficient 
utilization of resources. While the former type of studies concentrate on the macro 
agricultural markets and the implications of distortions in them on public sector 
investment decisions, the latter  a t tem p t to search for the best investment opportunities in 
an environment characterised by distorted markets. This latter  approach, therefore, is an 
exploration of “second best’’ situations. If one accepts the fact tha t  governments need to 
raise revenue somehow, and th a t  available means are limited making distortionary 
interventions inevitable, then, even the former type of studies should be conducted within 
a second best framework (Stiglitz 1987). Im portantly , both these types of studies assume 
th a t  individual firms participating in markets are efficient. Inefficiency can only occur due 
to imperfect markets.
Project appraisals can be both ex-ante  and ex-post. Ex-post  analyses follow 
basically the same approach as th a t  used for ex-ante  appraisals to check whether a given 
project has achieved its targets in social benefit-cost terms. However, such studies
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typically assume th a t  individual farmers in a project are efficient, (Bell et al. 1982). The 
basis for the benefit cost calculations is usually a “representative"1 farmer or the entire 
project taken as one farm. Once all individuals are assumed to be efficient, a project with 
a large number of farmers is similar to one which has a single efficient decision maker for 
the whole project. Then, any deviations from the socially optim um  resource allocation 
have to be assigned to  market distortions. Further, any shortfalls in meeting project 
targets  in irrigation and land settlement schemes need to be treated as due to either 
exogenous shocks to the markets or incorrect planning assumptions or both. Given th a t  
m arket distortions are created to a tta in  a variety of objectives and cannot be easily 
removed, the ex-post appraisal of a project in this manner becomes a mere academic 
exercise with no practical use.
Page (1980) concludes his study of technical efficiency and economic performance of 
logging firms in Ghana with the following suggestion:
Heretofore project analyses have explored the sensitivity of social profitability 
calculations to assumed factor and product prices and to the level of capacity 
utilization, assuming constant levels of technical efficiency. Given the
sensitivity of economic performance to variations in technical efficiency, efforts 
should be directed as well toward determining the level and variability of 
technical efficiency in a project and to assesing sensitivity of project returns to 
changes in these parameters, (p 338).
While in ex-ante  project appraisal this may simply mean tha t  the sensitivity of the 
economic rate of return to variations in project ou tpu t at given levels of inputs should be 
examined, this approach can have far more interesting applications in ex-post appraisal. 
The former needs only the acceptance of the likelihood of technical inefficiency and 
sensitivity tests carried out at arbitrarily selected levels of efficiency, say at 75%, 50% 
and so on. In the latter  case, the determinants of efficiency variations can also be 
explored with a view to finding means of increasing efficiency.
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2.4  E m p i r i c a l  R e s e a r c h  on  t h e  V a r i a b i l i t y  in F a r m e r  P e r f o r m a n c e
There is an extensive literature consisting of a t tempts  to measure and explain 
observed differences in farmer performance in relation to various economic issues. Fare 
et.al. (1985) review some of the many areas of research in which the efficiency of the firm 
is explored. They are:
1. Average and best practice technologies  - Examples are Farrell (1957) and 
Salter (1966). These are a t t empts  to measure the extent to which an industry 
keeps up with the performance of its best practice firms.
2. Competi t ive pressure  - The quiet life hypothesis of Hicks (1935) suggests that  
the pursuit  of efficiency is an option for monopolistic firms rather  than being a 
necessity as for compet it ive firms. Studies of allocative inefficiency due to 
monopolies (Harberger 1954) and research related to Leibenstein's X-efficiency 
theory are examples.
3. Type o f  ownership  - These are studies which examine the hypothesis that  
public ownership of industries or firms is inherently less efficient than those 
under pr ivate ownership (Alchian 1965).
4. E f f i c i e n c y  and f i r m  size - These are studies which examine a hypothesized 
relationship between the firm size and some measure of efficiency which is 
unrelated to the type of ownership or market  power. Examples are Lau and 
Yotopoulos (1971), Bharadwaj (1974) and Sidhu (1974) who studied the 
relationship between farm size and productivity in Indian agriculture.
5. Regulatory e f f ect s  - A good example is a study by Averch and Johnson (1962) 
which showed tha t  the regulation of the effective rate of return of electricity 
industry had the side effect of the regulated industry becoming allocatively 
inefficent by selecting inefficiently large capital-labour and capital-fuel ratios.
6. The economics  o f  d i scr iminat ion  - Becker (1957) argued that ,  if an individual 
has a tas te  for discrimination against minorities, he must  act as if he is willing 
to pay for the opportuni ty  to avoid associating with tha t  minority, which may 
raise his costs and result in allocative inefficiency.
7. Land tenure in agriculture - The argument  of Adam Smith that crop sharing 
is an allocatively inefficient form of tenure under certain conditions resulted in 
a large and a rich l iterature on the related issues.
8. Surplus  labour and choice o f  technology in developing countries  - These are 
works which investigate the appropriateness of technology adopted wdthin an 
environment  of market  distortions due to government interventions or a lack 
of compet it ive pressure. Examples  are Sen (1966,1975) and Leibenstein (1978).
9. Uncertainty  - Uncertainty may lead to the use of relatively low risk inputs 
(and techniques) and low input  quantities. This is the subject of a relatively 
new but growing and already substant ial  body of l iterature. An example is 
given by Roumasset (1976).
10. Total factor productivi ty  growth - These are studies which at tempt  to 
decompose the effect of technological change and input growth in the increase 
in productivity.  An example is Nishirnizu and Page (1982).
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Until the popularisation of Farrell’s work by Timmer (1970), much of the analysis 
of efficiency of firms/farms was limited to comparisons of average efficiency between 
groups of farmers. The basis of such comparisons was the average production function 
estim ated from cross section da ta  by using the method of ordinary least squares (OLS). 
Average profit and cost functions have also been used in average efficiency comparisons 
by drawing on duality theory which shows th a t  any “well behaved’ cost or profit function 
corresponds to a neo-classical production function.
A major drawback of this average production (or cost or profit) function approach 
is th a t  the estimated production function coefficients do not correspond to the neo­
classical definition of a production function. Neo-classical theory of the firm defines a 
production function as a technological relationship which show's the maximum  output 
obtainable a t  given input levels. The production functions (and profit and cost functions) 
however, are based on the average ou tpu t obtained at given input levels.
Given an OLS estimate of a production function for a group of farmers, the only 
feasible test of an economic hypothesis is to check whether their input use on average 
corresponds to the level a t  which the marginal value product of inputs are equated to 
their marginal costs, i.e., whether the firms are on the average allocatively efficient. 
While the concept of averaging recognises the fact th a t  different firms may obtain varying 
ou tpu ts  for given input levels, apart from their application of different input levels, these 
implied technical efficiency differences cannot be measured with this method. Hence, in 
practice technical efficiency differences within a group of farmers are ignored. However, a 
comparison of average technical efficiencies of different farmer groups could be made. 
Similarly, the practice of testing for allocative efficiency of a group of farmers at the 
geometric mean of inputs applied could mean th a t  individuals in the group may have 
varying levels of allocative efficiency (Massel and Johnson 1968. Jones 1978, Rudra 1982). 
In other words, efficiency at the mean is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to 
ensure efficiency of each individual in a group. Further the comparison of the marginal 
value product to mean price and not the farmer specific price has been argued to be
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inconsistent with the assumption of perfectly competitive markets.  If markets  are perfect 
there is only one price. Hence the issue of a mean price does not arise (Junankar  1980a. 
1980b, 1982). Finally if farmers are maximizing profits, and markets  for all inputs and 
outputs  are competit ive,  then it is not feasible to es timate a production function with 
cross section da ta .  All farmers will use the identical input  levels and achieve the same 
output.
The recognition of the important  role of mangement  in production led to the 
development of a lternat ive methods for incorporting the influence of management  in 
production. Apart  from the need to est imate  the best practice output ,  another concern 
was the so-called “management  bias’’ which exists in production function coefficients 
estimated by OLS without  allowance for the influence of management  on output  
elasticities of inputs.  Griliches (1957b) showed tha t  the bias which results from the 
omission of management  from a product ion function depends on the relationship between 
the management  variable and other included variables. Thus the estimated coefficients 
will be biased upwards if a positive relationship exists, and downward if a negative 
relationship exists. Timmer (1970) suggested tha t  a positive relationsip will prevail for 
expected profit maximizing firms with a Cobb-Douglas production function.
The obvious solution to this problem was to specify the production function to 
include the influence of management  as a variable which may neutrally or otherwise shift 
the production function. However, in practice this was not always feasible due to the lack 
of a suitable measure of management .
A major issue related to the specification and estimation of production functions 
with a management  variable (even if it can be measured or adequately represented by 
some proxy) is the unrealistic assumption tha t  other inputs are independent of 
management  in determining output .  Otherwise the OLS estimates of the production
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function will be inconsistent clue to r n u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y . A good illustration of this 
problem is given by the results obtained by Shapiro and Muller (1977). Their estimates of 
OLS production functions with management  related variables suffered from a high level of 
rnulticollinearity.
Another impor tan t  objection to the inclusion of management  in a production 
function is given by Johnson (1964). He argued against  the t rea tment  of management  as a 
conventional factor of production.
..a decision to use more fertilizer does change ou tput  indirectly, it is the 
fertilizer, not the decision, which is a factor of production, (p 120).
. Further ,  according to him:
...technological advance, improvements in managerial capacity,  and 
improvements in the human agent involve the use of conventional kinds of 
inputs in conventional kinds of product ion processes and [that] the production 
economic ana lys t’s task is to estimate  the productivity of various amounts  and 
combinations of such inputs as are involved. At the same time, it is contended 
tha t  regarding technological advance, improvements in managerial capacity, and 
improvements in the human agent  in this way would free investigators to 
examine the processes of developing new technologies, improvements  in 
managerial capacity,  and improvements in the human agent without  the 
restrictions imposed by the rather mechanistic production function concept, (p 
124).
Samuelson (1947) also suggests that
only “inputs” be explicitly included in the production function, and tha t  this 
term be confined to denote measurable quanti ta t ive economic goods or services. 
(P 84).
An alternat ive means of allowing for management  is to use time series da ta  (data  
for two years or two seasons) of a sample of farms and obtain farm specific dummies 
through covariance analysis (Hoch 1962, Mundlak 1961). The farms are then ranked in
9
^Of course, rnulticollinearity is a common “ problem” when estimating Cobb-Douglas type  
production functions. As Doll (1974) has shown, an exact collinearity problem exists between the 
variable inputs of a Cobb-Douglas production function, first, if their use is proportional but not 
equal between all firms, and second, that a collinearity problem may exist between any variable 
input and any fixed input. Indeed, he shows that the presence of rnulticollinearity serves to verify 
that the true model for the data is Cobb-Douglas.
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terms of m anagement ability or technical efficiency according to the values of the 
coefficients of farm specific dummy variables. This approach has a serious limitation in 
th a t  it assumes th a t  technical efficiency remains constant over the time period under 
consideration. This may not be realistic for a dynamic situation characterised by 
technological change. Further, results thus obtained suffer from what Timmer (1970) calls 
“covariance analysis bias"’. The returns to scale of production functions estimated are 
often substantially lower than the estimates obtained through OLS while the technical 
efficiency variation as shown by the difference in m agnitude between firm specific dummy 
variables appears to be exaggerated. The inclusion of an om mitted variable in the 
production function is expected to increase returns to scale while reducing the output 
elasticities of individual inputs. Dawson and Lingard (1982) argued tha t  such a decrease 
in returns to scale may be explained by the fact th a t  in the OLS model the management 
input is not held constant, while in the Hoch-Mundlak model it is held constant. Holding 
one input constant while others are varied can result in reductions in returns to scale. 
However, Dawson and Lingard (1982), too, recognised th a t  the farm specific dummy may 
pick up the influence of other om m itted  variables and therefore exaggerate the true 
m agnitude of management. Finally obtaining da ta  for more than a single time period for 
a sample of farmers can be difficult.
The third approach is to estimate a frontier function of the type discussed by 
Farrell (1957). This is the approach adopted in this study and -is discussed in detail in 
the next chapter. A formal definition of a production frontier, and the a lternative means 
of estimating frontiers etc., are discussed in detail in the next chapter prior to the 
development of our approach to analyse the problem of interfarm variation in 
performance.
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C H A P T E R  3
F a r m e r  Eff ic iency  in P r o d u c t io n
3.1 C o n cep tu a l  M o d e l
In the introduction to this thesis it was argued tha t  differential performance of 
farmers under new technologies may have important  efficiency and equity implications. 
The review of l iterature undertaken in Chapter  2 yielded several alternat ive explanations 
for variable performance among similar firms in a given industry. They were:
1. differences among firms in their fixed factor endowments,  e.g., land quality 
differences and differences in human capital;
2. differences among firms in their ability to adjust to disequilibria:
3. differences in motivat ion or non maximizing behaviour;
4. market  imperfections which cause differences among firms in their access to 
resources, e.g., credit;
5. various risks and uncertainties related to the natural  environment , 
technologies, and markets.
Undoubtedly,  as discussed in the previous chapter,  all these factors are impor tan t  in 
the explanation of differential firm performance to varying degrees under different 
circumstances. Thus farmers with different endowments such as land and managerial 
ability will have different opt imum techniques and inpu t /ou tpu t  combinations. Therefore, 
even if farmers are profit maximizers operat ing in competitive markets  who adjust  
instantaneously to various disequilibria, they may have different opt imum techniques and 
inpu t /o u tp u t  combinations. On the other hand, considerations such as in the varying 
ability of individuals to adjust to disequilibria and the fixity of some factors in the short 
run, suggests that  not all farmers can or will adjust instantaneously to disequilibria.
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The introduction of a new and complex technology together with irrigation and 
other  economic and social infrastructure under Mahaweli Project set off complex forces of 
modernizat ion in the project area resulting in a series of interrelated disequilibria in a 
hi therto relatively s tat ic environment . The changes were in the technology, as well as in 
the natural  and socio-economic environment  resulting in the need for different degrees of 
adjustment  by individual settlers depending on their background. Prior to the project, 
this area was mostly covered in jungle with a few scat tered and isolated villages 
dependent on semi-subsistence farming. The inhabi tants  of these t radi tional  villages were 
subject to a major change in their mode of production with the requirements and the 
opportunit ies created by irrigation, new rice technology, access to markets and the 
pa t te rn  of land ownership1 brought  by the project. For those settlers who had previous 
exposure to the process of modernization and new technology (such as those selected from 
the Wet Zone of Sri Lanka) the change in the natural  environment  required major 
adjustments .
Individual settlers in the project were endowed with varying types and levels of 
human  capital,  though the project a t tempted  to create a degree of homogeneity with 
strict  settler selection criteria and the provision of apparently equal access to resources 
within the project. Natural ly,  the rate of adjustment  and the degree of success actually 
achieved varied between individuals and created concern about  the success of the project 
in terms of its product ivity and equity goals.
Given this background,  the concept of the “ability to adjust to disequilibria*1 
(Schultz 1975) has much relevance to the economic performance of farmers in Mahaweli 
Project . Testable hypotheses can be formulated on the basis that  the observed 
performance of individuals in particular activities are related to specific abilities. Thus
^Prior to the project, the traditional villagers owned both lowlands and wetlands which 
permitted them to be near self sufficient in their food requirements. By allocating only irrigable 
land for farming (the homestead is only .5 Ac. in extent and thus too small for a significant level of  
cultivation.)  the project imposed mono cropping of rice in the wet season and rice/chillie  
cultivation in the dry season.
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technical efficiency is a measure of a farmer's technical ability, while allocative efficiency 
is a  measure of his allocative ability. The measurement of these well defined abilities also 
averts the problems in defining and measuring entrepreneurship and m anagement 
discussed earlier.
We adopt a conceptual model which permits the identification of the role of farmer 
ability to adopt and efficiently practice the new technology at farm level. It would be 
expected th a t  differences in farmer ability to adjust to technological and environmental 
changes will be a major de term inant of differential performance at farm level in new land 
settlem ent schemes since access to major resources is relatively equal in these and the 
basic technology is adopted simultaneously by the farmers. The ability of an individual 
to perform a given task is best measured by his performance (Schultz 1975). There are no 
direct measures of such abilities. The theory of the firm provides suitable measure of 
performance in the form of “economic efficiency” of profit maximizing firms in 
competitive market environments. Following Farrell (1957) economic efficiency of a firm 
can be decomposed to obtain measures of technical and allocative efficiencies. Once the 
inherent fertility differences between farms and the purely random variations in output 
are accounted for, variations in farm outpu t are explained by the levels of measurable 
inputs applied (allocation of inputs) and the manner of applying those inputs (technical 
efficiency). The ultimate profit of a farmer depends on both the manner of input 
application as well as the level of inputs used given the prices for inputs and output.
In the following sections we define various measures of private efficiency of the firm 
and some measures of social efficiency followed by an elaboration of our empirical 
approach. The analysis of a dynamic process of ad justm ent using a static equilibrium 
model, i.e., efficiency measures based on the neo-classical theory of the firm, is open to 
criticism, although similar exercises have been conducted by other researchers (Shapiro 
and Muller 1977). Given time series data , a dynamic model can be derived with the cross 
section efficiency measures outlined in this chapter based on an “adjustm ent coefficient” 
following Huffman (1974, 1977). Such an extension is presented in the final section of this 
chapter.
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3 .1 .1  T e c h n o l o g y  a n d  F a r m e r  P e r f o r m a n c e
A technology in agriculture is usually defined to include a particular package of 
inputs,  e.g., the technology of growing high yielding varieties of rice (HYV's) with 
fertilizer etc.,. These inputs,  such as HYV seed and fertiziser, are responsive to the 
manner  in which they are applied, i.e. yields vary according to the practices associated 
with input  applications. For various reasons discussed earlier, farmers do not always 
adopt  the entire package of inputs and the associated “best practices” immediately after 
they become available and the rate of adoption varies between individuals. These 
practices relate to the opt imal  t iming and the method of application of the inputs. If 
farmers do adopt  the entire package of inputs and “best practices” , and apply equal 
quanti ties  of inputs,  then any differences in performance between them have to be 
at t r ibuted to environmental  differences between farms. In reality, farmers who cultivate 
the new high yielding varieties of crops vary substant ially in their timing of nursery 
establ ishment , date and depth of t ransplanting, t iming and dosages of fertiziser 
application etc., even when they apply similar quanti ties of measurable physical inputs. 
Varying ou tput  responses from given input  levels, even in identical natural environments, 
makes “technical efficiency” an impor tan t  component  of farmer performance.
A technology defined broadly to include such alternat ive practices may not yield a 
unique functional relationship of inputs and output .  Rather,  a range of such relationships 
may be observed, depending on the specific techniques or practices used in the application 
of inputs (i.e., the t iming and the manner  of application). However, a unique best 
practice input-output  correspondence, or in other words a production frontier, may be 
defined and identified as an envelope of the entire range of relationships for various 
techniques within a technology. All such relationships, other  than the best practice 
relationship, will then be inefficient relative to the frontier production function 
representing the best practice input-output  relationship.
It may be argued that  such differences in the timing and manner of application of 
inputs  imply differences in quality of inputs  and therefore, these varying outputs  are in
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fact, obtained from different inputs. In practice, it is hard to identify and measure such 
differences in the quality of inputs arising from the differences in the timing and the 
manner of application. Our definition of a technology with best and inferior practices, 
w'here the best practice frontier is an envelope for inferior functions, results in technical 
efficiency being a residual, i.e., the unexplained portion of the variability in output. 
Hence, the measurement problem of non measurable inputs  does not arise. Such a 
definition of the production function is supported by Johnson (1964) who advices the use 
of only “conventional inpu ts’’ and by Samuelson’s (1947) suggestion to use only 
“measurable quantita tive  economic goods or services” as inputs in a production function.
We shall assume th a t  the realistic potential of a new technology at any given time 
and place is indicated by the “best performance” achieved in a farming community"^ . In 
other words, “best farmers” achieve the highest possible outpu t at any given level of 
inputs (technical efficiency) and highest profits by applying optimum input levels 
(allocative efficiency). Since the process of learning new technologies takes time, the best 
practice frontier of a group of farmers will typically shift upwards over time. In this 
sense, the frontier observed within a community at a particular time may itself be inferior 
to the highest achievable best-practice frontier. However, the latter cannot be observed 
empirically. If available technology changes continually wi th new innovations appearing 
successively, farmers will be in a continuous process of adjustm ent. Hence, no farmer may 
ever achieve 100 percent economic efficiency. However, individual farmers will differ in 
their level of efficiency at any given time.
3 .1 .2  T h e  S t r u c t u r e  o f  T e c h n o lo g y
Although Farrell (1957) defined his technology as an outpu t correspondance (a unit 
isoquant as illustrated in the previous chapter), it is possible to define a technology either 
as an input correspondence or as an input-output correspondence. Farrell modelled his 
technology subject to restrictions of linear homogeneity and constant returns to scale. It
^This contrasts with the approach followed by Herdt and Mandac (1981) in which potential was 
set at the level achievable by researchers on farmers' land.
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has been observed tha t  the removal of these s trong technological assumptions will result 
in Farrell measures yielding different input and output  based efficiency rankings for a 
given firm (Fare and Lovell 1978). In recent years, a l iterature has developed which 
a t t empts  to formalize the s tructure  of underlying technology and to derive generalized 
measures of technical and allocative efficiency in order to allow for a wide variety of 
product ion functions with varying degrees of restrictiveness and to yield identical cost, 
output  and profit interpretat ions for given firms (see Schmidt 1985/86).
Fare et al. 1985 provide an exhaustive discussion of such formal definitions of 
efficiency and they a t t em pt  the...
development  of a taxonomy of efficiency which allows the decomposition of 
efficiency into a series of meaningful components (or sources) which are 
mutually exclusive or exhaustive, (p 188).
They define the components of efficiency as follows:
1. A producer is said to be technically efficient if production occurs on the 
boundary of the producer 's production possibility set, and technically 
inefficient if product ion occurs in the interior of the production possibilities 
set.
2. A technically efficient producer is said to be structurally efficient if production 
occurs in the uncongested or “economic*1 region of the boundary of the 
production possibilities set. Structural inefficiency can occur only if some non 
zero subvector of inputs and outputs is not freely disposable. If all inputs and 
outputs  are freely disposable, as is often assumed in production theory, 
st ructural  inefficiency cannot  occur.
3. A technically and s tructurally efficient producer is said to be allocatively 
efficient if production occurs in a subset of the uncongested boundary of the 
production possibilities set that  satisfies the producer's behavioural objective. 
The location of this subset is determined by the prices faced by the producer 
and by the producer’s behavioural goal.
4. A producer 's input-output  decision is said to be scale efficient if it corresponds 
to the inputs and outputs  that  would arise from a zero profit long run 
competitive equilibrium situation. They stress that  this inefficiency is social, 
and not necessarily private.
The components of efficiency measured in most studies fall into 1 and 3 above, 
which were introduced by Farrell. The other two concepts were introduced in the
msubsequent lite ra tu re , and as c la r if ie d  in  the  following discussion , th e ir  m easurem ent is 
dependen t on the  m anner in  w h ich  the techno logy  o f p ro d u c tio n  is charac te rized .
These basic types o f f irm  level e ffic iency can be defined in  te rm s o f ra d ia l measures 
o f e ffic ien cy ; h y p e rb o lic  g raph  measures o f e ffic ien cy ; and n o n -ra d ia l and n on -h ype rb o lic  
g raph  m easures o f e ffic iency .
R a d ia l measures o f e ffic iency  m ay be in p u t based or o u tp u t based. In p u t based 
measures are those w h ich  m easure the e ffic iency o f an in p u t ve c to r in  the  p ro d u c tio n  o f a 
g iven  o u tp u t v e c to r, us ing  the  in p u t correspondence to  represent the  techno logy . Since 
they  ho ld  o u tp u t to  be c o n s ta n t, these measures are a p p ro p r ia te  to  s itu a tio n s  in  w h ich  a 
f irm  takes its  o u tp u t as be ing  exogeneous as in  a cost m in im iz a tio n  c o n te x t. M easures 
w h ic h  take  in p u ts  to  be exogenous, as in  a revenue m a x im iz in g  c o n te x t are ca lled ra d ia l 
o u tp u t e ffic iency  measures. These measures are te rm e d  ra d ia l since the  search fo r sm alle r 
feasib le  in p u t vectors  (o r la rge r feasib le o u tp u t vec to rs ) is cons tra ined  to  p ro p o rt io n a lly  
s m a lle r feasib le  in p u t vec to rs  (o r p ro p o rt io n a lly  la rg e r o u tp u t vec to rs ) re la tiv e  to  w h ich  
the  e ffic iency  o f an observed in p u t (o r o u tp u t)  ve c to r can be ca lcu la te d .
H y p e rb o lic  g raph  e ffic iency  measures are a p p ro p r ia te  to  s itu a tio n s  in  w h ich  ne ithe r 
in p u ts  n o r o u tp u ts  are ta ken  to  be exogenous by the f irm , as in  the  case o f p ro f it  
m a x iz is a tio n . T hey  are ca lled  h y p e rb o lic  because they  seek the  m a x im u m  p ro p o rt io n a te  
change in  a ll va riab les  (decrease fo r in p u ts , increase fo r o u tp u ts )  cons is ten t w ith  the 
techn o lo gy  as represented by its  g raph .
N o n -ra d ia l and n o n -h yp e rb o lic  g raph  m easures have been developed to  handle  
s itu a tio n s  w here the  te chn o lo gy  is no t e x tre m e ly  w e ll behaved, in  o rde r to  avo id  ca llin g  
in e ff ic ie n t in p u t o u tp u t vec to rs  e ffic ie n t. R a d ia l and g raph  e ffic iency measures have the 
a p p ro p r ia te  isoq ua n t as the  reference set fo r e ffic iency measures, and a lth o u g h  isoquants 
in c lu d e  e ffic ie n t subsets, the  converse is n o t necessarily tru e . T h is  can lead to  an 
o v e rs ta te m e n t o f the  tru e  te chn ica l e ffic iency o f a ve c to r, in a w ide  v a r ie ty  o f s itu a tio n s
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characterized by technologies such as Front ief. variable elasticity of substi tut ion,  arid, 
apparently , all flexible functional forms.
Following Fare et al. (1985) and their notation, the three alternative 
representations of technology can be expressed as follows:
A production technology transforming factors of production (inputs) x = 
(xj,X2,...,x ) E R" into net outputs  u =  ( u j .u0....,un) E R™ is modelled by an input
correspondence u —► L(u) C R^  or inversely by an output  correspondence x —► P(x) C 
R™. For any u E R™, L(u) denotes the subset of all input vectors x E R1^ which yield at 
least u. Inversely, for any x in r ”_, P(x) denotes the subset of ou tput  vectors obtainable 
from x. The inverse relationship between L and P is given by
i E i ( u ) O u  EP[x).  (3.1)
If the correspondences L and P are to model a production technology, they must  
satisfy certain properties (axioms). It is assumed here that  the input correspondence L
ty
satisfies the following subset of axioms suggested by Shephard (1974)*"
L.l 0 £  L(u) for u > 0, and L(0) =  R^_,
L.2 If 11 u^ | J —► 4- oo. as 1 —► + oc, then D L(u') is empty.
L.3 If x E L(u), Ax E L(u) for A > 1.
L.4 L is a closed correspondence.
° B o l  (1986) gives tw o  ex a m p les  o f  tech n o log ies  w hich  satisfy  the fo l low ing properties but do not  
have a tech n ica l  efficiency m easure  with properties given b\ Fare and Lovell (1978).
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L.5 L(0u) C L(u) for 0 > 1.
L.l states tha t  semi positive output  cannot  be obtained from a null input vector 
(i.e., free production is excluded), and tha t  any non negative input yields at  least zero 
output.  L.2 s tates  tha t  finite inputs cannot  produce infinite outputs . L.3 states that  
proportional increases in inputs do not decrease outputs . This axiom is referred to as 
“weak disposability*1 of inputs. L.4 is a mathematical requirement imposed to enable 
definition of input  isoquants as subsets of the boundaries of the input sets L(u). It is 
equivalent to assuming tha t  the graph of the input and output  correspondences is closed 
(Shephard 1970). The graph is defined as:
G/?:=j( :r ,u.) :x£L(u),u£ fi™ j = j (x,u):u£ F(x).x£ j (3-2)
L.5 states tha t  a proportional increase in outputs cannot be obtained if inputs are 
reduced. This axiom is referred to as “weak disposability of outputs"*.
From the inverse relationship between the input and output  correspondences it 
follows that  there exists a set of axioms on P tha t  is equivalent to L.l to L.5. This set is:
P . l  P(0) =  { 0 },
P.2 P(x) is bounded for x £
P.3 P(Ax) D P(x) for A > 1,
P.4 P is a closed correspondence.
P.5 u £  P(x) O  On £  P(x) for 9 £  |0,1|
P . l  states that  the null input vector yields zero output;  P.2 s tates  that  finite input
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cannot  produce infinite output ;  P.3 “weak disposability of inputs'1; P.4 allows the 
definition of ou tput  isoquants as subsets of the boundaries of the output  sets P(x), and is 
equivalent  to the closure of the graph; and P.5 s ta tes “weak disposability of outputs '1.
Where more restrictive parameterizations of the technology (e.g., Cobb-Douglas 
form) are adopted, stronger axioms than L.3, L.5 and P.3, P.5 are needed. They are:
L.3.S y > x E L(u) ^  y E L(u)
L.5.S v > u L(v) C L(u),
or equivalently,
P.3.S.y > x =>► P(y) C P(x),
P.5.S.U < v £ P(x) => u £ P(x).
Propert ies L.3.S and P.3.S. strengthen L.3 and P.3 by imposing strong 
disposability of inputs,  while properties L.5.S and P.5.S. s trengthen L.5 and P.5 by 
imposing strong disposability of outputs.  Thus bv L.3.S and P.3.S an increase in inputs,  
including but not limited to a proportional increase, cannot lead to a reduction in output.  
By L.5.S and P.5.S. any reduction in outputs including but not limited to a proportional 
reduct ion,  remains producible with no change in inputs. Clearly, if inputs are strongly 
disposable they are also weakly disposable, although the converse is not true.
The strong disposability axiom excludes congestion in the technology and is often 
justified on socio economic grounds, provided inputs and outputs  can be fully adjusted. 
Thus,  if the option is available, producers simply dispose of congesting inputs or outputs . 
In this case, instead of assuming that  the technology only satisfies (L.1-L.5), an additional 
assumption is made, namely that  if an input vector x £  R is available, then each y £
R^_, y < x may also be used in production.
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Frequently, again on socio-economic grounds, it is assumed that  outputs are freely 
• (strongly) disposable. However, such an assumption is not always justified, since outputs 
may be “bads’’ , such as toxic chemical wastes, as well as “goods'1.
Two convexity assumptions are often made in the parametric frontier approach. 
They are:
L.6 L(u) is convex for all u £  R™,
L.7 The input correspondence is quasi-concave R™, 
or equivalently,
P.6 The output  correspondence is quasi-concave on R° .
P.7 P(x)  is convex for all x £  R^_.
Finally, an output  attainabi li ty  assumption is also made at  times. This is:
L.8 If  x £ L(u) for some u >  0, then the ray { Ax:A > 0 } intersects all L(0u) for 6
>  0 ,
or equivalently
P.8 I f  u £  P(x),  u > 0, then for each 0> 0 there is a  A > 0 such that  6u £  P(Ax).
By L.8 and P.8,if an input vector x can produce an output  vector u, then all 
proportional scalings of u can be produced by some proportional scaling of x.
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Based on the above axioms, the input isoquant,  Isoq L(u); the weak efficient subset, 
of L(u) WEff L(u); and the efficient subset of L(u), Eff L(u) may be defined. Measures of 
efficiency are defined as deviations from these efficient subsets.
In equation (3.2), the graph was defined in terms of either the input or equivalently 
in terms of the ou tput  correspondence. The graph must  satisfy the following axioms:
G R . l  0 £  GR, (O.u) E GR u — 0.
GR.2 (GR D I (x.u): x < x |  ) is bounded for each x E R^_,
GR.3 If (x,u) E GR then (Ax.u) E GR for A > 1.
GR.4 GR is a closed set,
GR.5 If (x,u) E GR then (x.0u) E GR for 1 > 9 > 0.
These properties are equivalent to (L.1-L.5). If in addition, inputs and outputs  are 
strongly disposable, then (and only then) we have
GR.6 (x,u) E GR =>■ (y,v) E GR for (y, -v) > (x, -u).
Given these properties, the graph isoquant is defined bv
IsoqGR:= j ( x ,u ) : (x ,u )E G / t>,(Ax,A"l u ) £ G / i >/orü< A< 1 j .  (3-3)
the weak efficient subset of GR is
W E f fG R : — j(x,u):(x,u)EG.ft(y.-t?) < (x,u)=>(y,-v) £ G i ? j .  (3-4)
the efficient subset of GR is
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Ef f G R:~ I ( i .u ) :(  j ,u )  EG /?.((/,-v) < ( x.-u) => G G R J . (3.5)
from these definitions it is clear that
E f f G R C W E f  fG RCIsoqG R  ' (3.6)
In the case of a technology parameterised by the Cobb-Douglas form all three 
subsets are equal since this form is homogeneous and satisfies strong input disposability, 
with no congestion and scale inefficiency. However, a technology may be parameterized 
with a less restrictive functional form which in turn may restore these inefficiencies.
This raises the major disadvantage of parametric measures of technical efficiency, 
where the assumed functional form may wrongly impose a technology different from the 
underlying technology and thus identify efficiency as inefficiency and vice versa.
The above measures of efficiency are price independent and the definition of price 
dependent efficiency measures requires their efficient sets to be identified. Therefore, the 
set of profit maximizing input-output vectors is defined as follows:
7r = .sup j ru -p x : (x ,u )  £ G .R  j
where u and x are output and input and r and p their prices respectively.
The set of profit maximizing input and ou tpu t vectors is given by
(3.7)
n M ( r ,p ) =  ^(x,u)£GR:ru-px=z(r ,p)  J (3.8)
3 .1 .3  M o d e ll in g  the T e c h n o lo g y  of  M a h a w e li  F arm ers
V\ e model the technology of Mahaweli farmers in the form of a production function, 
i.e., an input-output correspondence as both inputs and outpu ts  need not be taken as 
exogenous by Mahaweli farmers'* , by and large, they are not subject to outpu t or input
^While the extent of land cultivable by each farmer is fixed legally, an active land market exists 
in System H as discussed in the following chapter.
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regulation in the short run. It should be noted th a t  duality theory shows tha t  production 
param eters can be obtained for a technology either directly from a production function or 
indirectly through cost or profit funtions. Such indirect approaches are preferred to 
obtain production param eters in order to avoid the econometric problem of simultaneous 
equations bias (Lau and Yotopoulos 1971). It has been shown tha t ,  when farmers 
maximize profits, the ou tpu t atta ined is dependent on input quantities as well as the first 
order conditions for profit maximization. This invalidates the assumption required in 
regression analysis th a t  the independent variables (inputs) are independent of the error 
term. Thus consistent estimates of a production function cannot be obtained. However, 
as Zellner et al. (1966) have shown, the assumption tha t  farmers a t tem p t to maximize 
expected profits and th a t  expected ou tpu t may vary from the realized output removes 
this problem. The assumption tha t  farmers do maximize profits is not essential for our 
approach to explain inter-farm variations in performance. Allocative efficiency is used 
only as a s tandard  of measurement. Measured deviations from this optim um  may be 
explained by any one or all of the five factors listed in the beginning of this chapter for 
explaining variable performance of farmers.
The main arguments of cost and profit functions are prices. Therefore, the observed 
da ta  should contain price variations for the estimation of these functions. This 
requirement is hard to fulfil with cross section da ta , from a small and contiguous area 
such as our sample. On the other hand in a spatially widely distributed sample, transport 
costs may create price variations for commodities and inputs of the same quality. But 
when locations are dispersed widely, it is difficult to assume th a t  the environmental 
conditions affecting crop production are identical. In the absence of significant transport 
costs, price variations for commodities and inputs of same quality can be observed only 
with imperfect markets. Profit functions may be estimated within a background of 
imperfect markets only if farmers can be assumed to be price takers. If the relevant 
markets are characterized by rationing, interlinking, and non-market relations in 
production as are often argued to exist in less developed economies (Binswanger and 
Rosenzweig 1981, Bharadwaj 1974) then farm gate opportunity  costs may vary, but,
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observing all actual farm gate prices will be extremely difficult in practice. The observed 
m arket prices may not represent the opportunity  costs for the individuals. Most 
im portantly , the use of a competitive maximizing model for the explanation of farmer 
behaviour within such a background cannot be justified (Junankar 1980a, 1980b, 1982).
Given these reasons there is a strong case for expecting th a t  the estimates of cost 
and profit functions obtained from cross section da ta  from a small contiguous area, say 
one village or a handful of neighbouring villages, will be based on “spurious” variations in 
prices (Martin 1983, Quiggin and Bui-Lan 1984).
If it can be established tha t  farmers are price takers but experience farm specific 
variations due to exogenous factors such as discriminatory government subsidies, and tha t  
correct price da ta  can be obtained, the use of the competitive profit maximizing model 
can be justified. Even then, the manner of estimating profit frontiers introduces further 
problems. Profit functions are estimated in log linear form and therefore the dependent 
variable, profit has to be greater than zero. Thus farmers obtaining zero or negative 
profits have to be dropped from the sample. In a dynamic situation where farmers are 
adjusting to technological and environmental changes, farmers who aim at profit 
maximization may make both technical and allocative errors which can result in zero 
profits or losses in a particular time period. Zero profits are obtained when the total 
revenue (P^ .Q) equals total cost (P x .X) and negative profits when total revenue is less 
than  total cost (P^ .Q < P x .X , where Q is ou tput, X inputs and P prices). Thus the 
practice of dropping farmers who make zero or negative profits from a sample can lead to 
considerable bias and loss of information. Allowing profit maximizing farmers to vary 
from the maximum, but limiting this variation to a positive number greater than zero 
does not seem to have any particular economic justification.
The estimation of a frontier profit function rather than an average profit function 
with cross section d a ta  creates further problems. In order to obtain farm specific measures 
of technical and allocative efficiencies a suitable approach has to be developed to
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decompose the observed residuals from the fitted function into those due to technical, 
allocative and random causes. Such an approach has not been yet developed.
We may define the production funtion for an individual farmer as follows:
Q i ~ f ( x i ..... X niX n + l r .. .XkiX k+1. . . . X J  (3.9)
Where Q is output ,
1. Xj  to Xn are measurable inputs such as land, labour, and fertilizer,
2. Xn^ j  to X^ are non measurable inputs  such as management,  and
3. X^ + j to Xm are uncontrollable (exogenous) factors such as weather  which 
influence output .
If the entire group of variables X^ to X^ can be measured, a product ion function 
may be specified for estimat ion by the ordinary least squares method. Our interest in the 
study of differential performance of farmers in a dynamic setting with cross section da ta  
makes the frontier production function (FPF)  approach the best for the task. 
Theoretically this approach is more appealing as it corresponds to the accepted definition 
of a production function, i.e., it is a technological relationship between given inputs  and 
the maximum feasible o u tp u t5.
Accordingly, we have chosen the following stochastic frontier product ion function 
approach for our analysis.
Q=f(X)+U+V  (3.10)
with Q denoting ouput , X various measurable inputs,  U relative technical efficiency and V
JGiven two observations for each farm it is feasible to obtain measures of technical efficiency 
following Hoch-Mundlak approach discussed in the previous chapter. Although our field survey 
yielded two observations for each sample farmer, they were for two different seasons with varying  
environmental conditions which require markedly different types of technical abilities for high 
performance in crop cultivation. Further, some farmers cultivated different crops in the two  
seasons. Accordingly, the assumption of constant technical efficiency is not realistic for the two  
observations available for each farm.
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random exogenous shocks. This specification makes technical efficiency a random residual 
term which accounts for variations in output unexplained by X, and is realistic in a world 
where individual firms using a given technology are observed to be achieving varying 
output levels for a given level of measurable inputs. A substantia l literature has appeared 
in the recent years on this stochastic frontier production function (SFPF) model. A state- 
of-the-art review of this l iterature is given by Schmidt (1985/86).
3.2 P r iv a te  E ffic iency  o f  the  F ir m
Given a production frontier (the frontier production function estimation procedure 
is discussed in the latter  part  of this chapter) the private efficiency of farmer may be 
defined as explained below. We distinguish between private and social efficiency of 
farmers since government interventions in markets result in divergences between private 
and social profits.
3 .2 .1  T echn ica l E ffic iency
Technical inefficiency, the inability to operate on the best practice frontier (Qp in 
the Figure 3-1) for the single input single outpu t case may be illustrated as follows. At 
the input level 1^  if a farmer obtains only O j as against Op, he is technically inefficient to 
the extent of (Oj/Op)xlOO. Thus technical efficiency is a measure of the difference 
between actual ou tpu t and best practice output at a given level of measurable inputs. 
Where a farmer is operating on the frontier and O j=O p his technical efficiency is 100%. 
At the other extreme, if a farmer gets a zero ou tpu t for a positive level of inputs, i.e, 
O j= 0 ,  his technical efficiency is zero.
3.2 .2  A llo ca t iv e  E ffic iency
Differences in input quantities applied may also cause variations in ou tpu t observed 
among farmers. These differences may be measured as departures from the neo-classical 
optim um, i.e., a profit maximum by individual farmers. Alternative explanations for such 
departures from allocative efficiency were discussed previously. Allocative efficiency is the 
ability to the maximize profits given the production technology and markets prices. The 
frontier production function represents the best practice technology. Farmers are often 
selective in their adoption of various practices within a new technology and do not adopt
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the entire package. Then,  actual  ou tput  for a given level of inputs will depend on the 
part icular set of practices adopted which may be distinct from the best practice 
technology. Therefore, failure or success in maximizing profit is given by the ratio of 
actual to the maximum profit from the farmers own technology rather than the best 
practice technology, e.g., a t  B on Qj  where the price line P P 2  is tangent  to Qj in Figure 
3-1. Note tha t  line P P 2  is drawn parallel to the line PP ,  and therefore, both lines express 
the same input  output  price ratio. This definition of allocative efficiency was introduced 
by Herdt and Mandac (1981) and allows a farmer to be allocatively efficient while being 
technically inefficient. Farrell ' s (1957) measure of allocative efficiency compares the 
actual input  level of a farmer with the opt imum on the frontier unit isoquant 
(^product ion function), and identifies technically inefficient farmers as being allocatively 
inefficient as wellD . The allocatively efficient input  level I for the farmer specific 
production function, is allocatively inefficient for the frontier Qf.
Any farmer specific product ion function (Q^) can be obtained by a neutral 
t ransformation of the estimated production frontier by the level of technical efficiency of 
the farmer (see, Appendix I for details; also Ekana>ake 1987). Although it is reasonable 
to argue tha t  an inefficient farmer will operate on a production function located below 
tha t  of an efficient farmer, there is no apparent  necessity for the former to be a neutral 
t ransformation of the latter.  Clearly, a non neutral  t ransformation would be more 
realistic and thus represent an important  area for future methodological development. If 
the farmer is 100 per cent efficient technically, he operates on the best practice frontier 
and therefore his present practice production function and the best practice frontier are 
identical. Otherwise, his actual production function will lie below the frontier. The 
distance between the frontier and the actual present practice product ion function depends 
on the degree of technical inefficiency.
In the short run, farmers maximize profits with respect to their variable inputs
6See Schmidt (1985-86 pp 294-5).
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F i g u r e  3-1: Technical, allocative and economic efficiencies of the
f i rm/farm relative to a frontier production function
Output
given fixed inputs such as land ' .  Therefore, we obtain a measure of allocative efficiency of 
individual farmer by introducing an error term Kj to the first order conditions for a profit 
maximum. For a Cobb-Douglas technology this measure of allocative efficiency with 
respect to variable inputs is given by:
\ Q
X
where t =  l ,2,3,.. . . ,n
7
This definition of profit yields an allocative efficiency measure for a technology with constant or 
increasing returns to scale.
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Where, denotes price of ou tput,  Pj input prices and Xj variable input quantities. The 
error term K accounts for the failure to maximize profits, or allocative inefficiency. When 
K = l ,  a farmer is allocatively efficient. A measure of a failure to maximize profits can be 
obtained by comparing the maximum profit on the farmer specific production function 
and input and output prices, against the predicted profit given the farmer specific 
production function and the level of inputs actually used. The realized outpu t may be 
affected by purely random influences on outpu t and therefore such outpu t variations 
should not be a ttr ibu ted  to allocative efficiency of a  farmer. Profit used for our 
calculation is the ex-ante expected profit based on the outpu t as predicted by the 
estimated frontier rather than  the ex-post actual profit a t  realized output. The realized 
outpu t may be affected by purely random influences and therefore should not be 
a tt r ibu ted  to allocative efficiency of a farmer. Accordingly, our measure of allocative 
efficiency measures the failure to maximize expected profit by adjusting the input ou tput 
combination.
Where a farmer applies the profit maximizing level of inputs, his allocative 
efficiency is defined as 100 per cent. Allocative inefficiency may occur due to over 
allocation and /or under allocation of inputs in relation to the profit maximizing level. In 
extreme situations where the value of ou tpu t achieved by a farmer is less than the value 
of inputs applied, and 'results  in a negative profit, his allocative efficiency measure will be 
negative. Thus our measure of firm specific allocative efficiency may range from 100 to a 
negtive real number.
3 .2 .3  O vera ll  P r o d u c t iv e  Effic iency
The actual profit made by a farmer depends on his technical efficiency as well as 
allocative efficiency. This is measured bv the difference between profit a t full technical 
and allocative efficiency and profit at actual levels of technical and allocative efficiency. 
This is represented in Figure 3 - la s  the difference in profits at the input level 1^  on 
production function Qj and resulting outpu t Oj compared to the output Of on production 
frontier Qf. Economic efficiency and allocative efficiency measures are identical when a 
farmer is 100% technically efficient. In any lower level of technical efficiency, economic 
efficiency will be less than allocative efficiency (See Appendix I).
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3.3 Soc ia l  Eff ic iency of  t h e  F i r m
Measures of firm specific efficiency discussed above are based on private
profitability. Where market prices are distorted and diverge from scarcity values of
commodities, private profitability does not coincide with social profitability. In such
situations,  social profitability may be correctly measured as economic efficiency using 
& £
shadow prices (Pj and ) rather than distorted market prices (Pj and P^).
For the Cobb-Douglas case, deviations from a social profit maximum can be 
measured as follows:
A :Q
pi =pq y :(k i) (3.12)
*
where i= 1.2,3,....,n; and K ■ measures individual deviations from the opt imum. 
When K ■ =  1 the profit is maximized.
The simultaneous solution of the first order conditions of social profit maximum
together with the estimated production frontier yields the social profit maximizing output
and input  combination. These and the resulting profit level may be compared with
inputs, output ,  and profits expected by firms at their current (private) level of efficiency.
The ratio of potential to expected profits shows the success in maximizing social profits. 
3-1
F i g u r e ^  illustrates this concept of social efficiency. The new line PP* shows the shadow 
price ratio. The socially opt imum input output  combination occurs at the point of 
tangency between the line PP* and production frontier Qp The resulting output  O* and 
input  level I* may now be compared with Of and Ij which represents the private opt imum 
at  the actual market  price ratio PP.
3.4 The E m pirical M odel
The frontier production function may be obtained using several alternative 
methods.  One is to use data  obtained from on-farm trials by researchers to fit an average 
production function to obtain the maximum potential output  for given input levels and to
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trea t  this function as the frontier for farmers (Herdt and M andat 1981). However, such 
da ta  are usually not available. The more common approach is to use cross section da ta  
from a sample of farmers and to estimate a frontier production function using one of the 
following methods:
1. The non parametric programming approach - This is the approach used by 
Farrell (1957) where he constructed a piecewise linear technology through 
mathematical programming. FarrelFs technology was subject to linear 
homogeneity and constant returns to scale. Later, following Shepard (1970,
1974), much progress has been made in the definition of inefficiencies using 
less restrictive technologies (see, Fare et al. 1985). The adherents of this 
approach are critical of other approaches which impose various 
parameterizations (functional forms) on da ta  which may lead to wrong 
interpretations of efficiency if the underlying technology varies from the 
imposed technology. This approach is extremely flexible and yields input 
based, ou tput based and graph based measures of efficiency.
2. The parametric programming approach - This approach also uses a sequence 
of mathematical programming to define measures of efficiency relative to a 
particular parameterization of a technology. Thus the resulting frontier is 
parametric and smooth in contrast to the former piecewise linear technology. 
Examples are the use of Cobb-Douglas form by Aigner and Chu (1968) and 
Timmer (1970). The major drawback to both these programming approaches 
is th a t  they are entirely deterministic and thus do not account for statistical 
noise, measurement error, and exogenous shocks beyond the control of the 
farm. Accordingly, deterministic approaches are likely to yield biased 
estimates of inefficiency. Another parametric  deterministic approach is the 
Corrected Ordinary Least Squares method (COLS) applied by Greene (1980).
This approach although not a programming approach, suffers from the lack of 
accomodation for statistical noise, as do programming models.
3. The parametric statistical approach - This approach was originally introduced 
by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broek (1977) 
independently. The major advantage of this approach is its accomodation of 
stochastic variations in output. The weakness is the possibility of imposing 
an incorrect parameterization on a da ta  set thereby misrepresenting the 
frontier as well as the distribution of inefficiency.
In general, we have followed the parametric statistical approach of Aigner, Lovell, and
Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broek (1977). This is primarily due to concern
about the likelihood of overestimating inefficiency with the parametric approach.
However, a comparison of deterministic (COLS) and statistical approaches was carried
out with some of the da ta  to explore the relative performance of the two approaches
(Ekanayake and Jayasuriya 1987). The results of this analysis are given in Appendix II.
This comparison demonstrates the major shortcoming associated with deterministic
procedures when estimating firm specific technical efficiency. They generally tend to
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overest imate the average level of technical inefficiency and the extent  of this bias is 
unknown.  In contrast,  the SF model enables the separation of random “noise" from 
deviations arising from technical inefficiency. As such “noise" becomes smaller, these 
estimates  converge to those obtained from deterministic procedures. TE  measures 
calculated with deterministic procedures will exhibit variability when derived from data  
obtained through repeated sampling - such as sampling over time - even when there is no 
variation in true TE.
It has been pointed out  that  a major disadvantage of the stochastic method is that  
it is parametric; thus there is a possibility of erroneously assigning inefficiency to an 
efficient firm or vice versa depending on the disparity between the true underlying 
technical relationship and the assumed functional form. On this basis it has been claimed 
that  non-parametric-determinist ic approaches are superior (Fare et al. 1985). However, 
the superiority of non-parametr ic  deterministic approach in this respect is in doubt  due to 
its sensitivity to outliers. Accordingly, a technology identified with the non-parametric 
approach may also diverge from the true technology due to random variations of 
observations from the t rue frontier (available non-parametric approaches are 
deterministic).
Given our interest in the measurement  of true technical inefficiencies and relating 
these to human capital and other determinants , the stochastic frontier approach is 
superior to any deterministic method. Attempts  to explain “apparent  technical” and 
“apparen t” allocative inefficiencies obtained with the deterministic approach which 
contains random influences of unknown magnitude with systematic differences in farmer 
at t r ibutes  cannot be expected to be a rewarding exercise.
The statistical model of a production frontier may be written as follows:
Y ^ X f i + E ^  * =  1,2,3...., TV (3.13)
where
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Ej =Uj -V j, i - 1,2,3,...,N
Y•, X- and B are output, inputs and constants respectively.
9 9Let cr^ and cry be the variances of a technical inefficiency parameter “IF and
Q
statistical “noise” “V” 0 respectively,
and
2 2 , 2
= ff„ +°v
= c .2la 21  = i
9 9Let <ru and ay be the respective variances of the technical inefficiency parameter 
“IF and the statistical “noise” “V”.
then
a2 2v
and
2 rX=a 2
V
while
r=<7..2 /<r2
The parameter 7 was adopted by Battese and Corra (1977) for computational 
convenience as its value ranges from zero to one, whereas A can be any positive real 
number. Assuming that “U” and “V” are independent, “IF is normally distributed* 9 but 
truncated at the mean, and “V” is normally distributed, production frontiers can be
fi
Note that this term is absent in deterministic models.
9 Alternative specifications of “ U” have been used, and have been demonstrated to yield more or 
less identical results (see Coelli and Battese 1986, Stevenson 1980, and Waldman 1984).
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estimated using maximum likelihood methods (Aigner et. al 1977, Battese and Corra 
1977. Kalirajan and Flinn 1983). Maximization of the relevant likelihood function by 
numerical techniques, gives the maximum likelihood estimates of the production function
. 9parameters, the intercept, input coefficients, er“ and 7 or A. The details of the derivation 
of the likelihood function and the method of estimation of the frontier production function 
are given Appendix III.
Jondrow et al. (1982) showed that the conditional mean of Uj, given (UjTVj), is
0 0  a  \ E X
* ( w n - ) =  —  — } (3.»)
where Ej is the estimated residual for each farmer and f(.) and F(.) are the values 
of the standard normal density function and standard normal distribution function 
evaluated at the value of the following expression:
E-Xl
G
The conditional mean of Lh, given (U- - 1-  Vj) using the parameter 7 is : (1983)lü is 
as follows:
E(Ui/Ui+Vt)= - ° vUyi { /(•) 
a l l -F( . )
(3.15)
It is easily observed that the two formulas are identical except for the differences in 
parameterization and sign. The difference in the sign in the two formulas is due to the 
definition of U- as being non negative in Jondrow et al (1982) while it was defined to be 
non positive in Kalirajan and Flinn (1983).
Following this latter approach, firm-specific technical efficiency estimates are 
derived from the conditional distribution of U given (U-f V). The conditional means of Uj 
given (U j+V j),  are
^ T h e  formula published in Kalirajan and Flinn (1983) is erroneous but has been corrected in 
later publications (Kalirajan and Shand. 1986; also see Ekanayake and Jayasuriya 1987).
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nr r i m  r’ v< ru | /(■) / 7 \ i  21Wi/Ui+\)=  - —  - 7  ( — ) } (3.16)
Where Ej are the estimated residuals for each farmer and, f(.) and F(.) are the values of 
the s tandard normal density function and s tandard normal distribution function 
evaluated at the value of the following expression:
Ei
1 - V
. \ l / 2
3 .4 .0 .1  A M easu re  o f  F a r m er  Specific  T echn ica l E ffic iency
This formulation of the stochastic frontier can be written as follows and estimated 
in log linear form, e.g., in the Cobb-Douglas form.
V,•=(*, . B)eEi,t =  l,2,3 (3.17)
where
Ei = u i + Vi, i=l ,2,3, . . . ,N
Yj, Xj and B are output ,  inputs and constants respectively.
Technical efficiency according to this formulation is
(XlB)eU^
TE =------------ — —e~’ (3.18)
(-V.Ö)e'
where the denominator  represents output  at full technical efficiency and the 
numerator  is the actual ou tput  (technically inefficient). This yields a ratio of technical 
efficiency ranging between zero and one.
Schmidt  and Lovell (1979) and many others subsequently used an alternative
formulation:
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Yi ^ { X l B ) e Ei, t = 1,2.3,...,.V (3.19)
where
Ei = v i-Ui, i=  1,2,3,....N
and Yj, X- and B  are ou tput,  inputs and constants respectively.
The error structure in this formula is similar to the earlier model with “U” and “V” 
being independent, but “ Ur > 0 with a half normal distribution and “V” is normally 
distributed. Technical efficiency measure relevant to this formulation is as follows:
( X t B)eV-U
T E  = ------------7T=e (3.20)
( X t B)eV
3 .4 .0 .2  A M e a s u r e  o f  F a r m e r  Specific  A l lo c a t iv e  E ff ic iency
A measure of farmer specific allocative efficiency may be obtained by comparing the 
maximum  feasible profit for each farmer, with his expected profit a t the level of inputs 
actually used. Two measures of farmer specific allocative efficiency can be calculated: the 
maximum feasible profits can be obtained from the best-practice technology or the 
farmers own (possibly inefficient) technology. To isolate the “pure”1 allocative 
inefficiency we use the la t te r  measure, and the failure or success in maximizing profit is 
measured by the ratio of expected to the potential profit from the farmers own 
technology.
The farmers own technology (Qj) is obtained by a neutral transformation of the 
estimated frontier by his level of technical efficiency. The distance between the frontier 
and the actual present practice production function depends on the level of technical 
efficiency of each farmer. M athematically, this is obtained by replacing Uj- the random 
technical efficiency param eter in the estimated production frontier by the estimated
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technical efficiency of a fanner  while the other  coefficients remain at  the frontier values 
(See Appendix I for details.). Assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology, farmer specific 
present practice production function is given by: 
m n
t =  l
q i = i n n
j —m + 1
(3.21)
Where, Xj to X rn are variable inputs and Xm , j to Xn are fixed inputs. The A,bj, 
and bj are estimated coefficients of the frontier, and Uf is farm specific technical 
efficiency.
In the short run, farmers are likely to maximize profits with respect to their 
variable inputs (if they do maximize profits) given fixed inputs such as land. Therefore, 
allocative efficiency can be measured as follows by introducing and error term Kj to the 
first order conditions for a profit maximum with respect to variable inputs:
b{Q
P,= P qJ - l K t ) (3-22)
where i =  l ,2,3,....,n
where P q denotes price of output ,  P- input  prices and Xj variable input  quantities.  The 
error term K accounts for the failure to maximize profits, or allocative inefficiency. When 
K = l ,  allocative efficiency is achieved. A measure of this failure to maximize profits can be 
obtained by comparing the potential maximum profit at  the opt imum input  and output  
level obtained by simultaneously solving the farmer specific production function and the 
first order conditions for a profit maximum given input and output  prices, against the 
expected profit given at output  predicted by the farmer specific production function at  
the level of inputs he actually used.
83
3 .4 .0 .3  A M e a s u r e  o f  F a r m e r  Specific  E c o n o m ic  E ffic iency
The economic efficiency of a farmers is dependent on both his technical and 
allocative efficiencies. Therefore, this is measured as the ratio of his predicted profit at 
his own frontier with the levels of inputs actually used, compared against his maximum 
feasible profit. His maximum feasible profit is obtained by simultaneously solving the 
frontier function and the first order conditions for a profit maximum at given input and 
ou tpu t prices. The measures of economic and allocative efficiencies for a particular 
farmer will coincide only if he is 100 per cent technically efficient. Otherwise the two will 
differ.
3.5 E x te n d in g  the  S ta tic  A n a ly s is  o f  F irm  Level Effic iency  to S tu d y  the  
D y n a m ic s  o f  A d ju s tm e n t
The static productive efficiency model of the firm described in the foregoing sections 
cannot distinguish between immediate changes in efficiency in response to a disturbance 
in an existing equilibrium, and the changes in efficiency over time. The literature on the 
rate  of imitation of innovations (Griliches 1957) and adoption (Feder et al. 1987) shows 
th a t  new techniques are initially adopted by a few farmers, but are soon adopted by the 
others too. Overall, this pa ttern  takes the form of a sigmoid curve. Productive efficiency 
of farmers faced with technological change may also follow a similar pattern. Some 
farmers may be able to achieve high efficiency immediately after a change while the 
efficiency of others may increase over time, as they gain more and more experience of a 
technology.
According to Schultz (1975)
An equilibrium model, however, applied to cross-sectional da ta  of a given date 
is not sufficient in analysing the equilibrating capacities of farmers in dealing 
with new input opportunities. We want to know who is first and who is fastest 
in arriving at the new equilibrium. The ability to be among the first to act 
appropriately and to proceed most promptly in completing the reallocations has 
an economic value. To get a t  this component of adjustment requires an 
equilibrating model and da ta  of the behaviour, in this case, of farmers in 
adopting the more profitable new inputs, (p 842).
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Huffman (1974, 1977) used a stock adjustment model to study the role of education 
on changing allocative efficiency of American Corn Belt farmers over time in the use of 
nitrogenous fertilizer. Although he recognized its importance,  he did not study technical 
efficiency (which he called “worker effect^). Our static equilibrium model, on the other 
hand,  provides measures of technical efficiency and a measure of overall allocative 
efficiency as well measures of allocative efficiency for each input  if necessary. Thus our 
approach encompasses all the practices as well as inputs made available by the new 
technology.
Given panel da ta  it is then possible to exploit the adjustment model of Huffman to 
study the rate of ad justment  to the new technology over time by farmers and relate this 
to various farmer at t r ibutes  consisting of human as well as other conventional capital.
Ef Etn= B( E i - E ln)
Where,
B-=({Z). 0<B<1
and,
Et =  efficiency (technical or allocative) today
Efcn=  efficiency n years ago
*Efc =  1. which is the opt imum today.
Z is a vector of variables determining efficiency (technical/allocat ive/economic) 
such as various forms of human capital and conventional capital.
Using B  the adjustment  coefficient, the path of adjustment  in efficiency for each
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individual can be traced over time. While initial differences among settlers in technical 
and allocative efficiency may be determined by certain factors, the rate of change in these 
efficiencies over t ime may well be influenced by others. The lat ter may be identified by 
analysing the relationship between the adjustment  coefficient and factors hypothesized to 
be the determinants  of the rate of change in efficiency. This may lead to the identification 
of factors influencing the rate of change in farmer efficiency, some of which may be 
manipulable by policy. Past  experience, and farmer age may determine the rate of change 
in efficiency, but  they are not factors which can be manipulated by policy, while, formal 
and non formal education, alternat ive forms of agricultural extension, information 
services, and market intervention can be guided by policy.
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C H A P T E R  4
T h e  P r o j e c t  A r e a ,  a n d  t h e  S a m p l e
4 .1  T h e P ro jec t A rea
The construction work of the first stage of the Mahaweli project, the diversion weirs 
and the tunnels complexes a t Polgolla and Bowatenna (see Figure 4-1) commenced in 
1970. The construction activities of System H, the pilot phase of new land development 
under the project, commenced in 1972. This is an area of 35,000 hectares, within the 
Kala Oya River basin, in the North West of Sri Lanka. The agricultural development 
model for the new lands based on small irrigated family farms was to be tested out in 
System H prior to its adoption in the other areas to be developed under the project. 
Although land settlement is currently underway in Systems B and C, their settlers have 
not had sufficient time to adjust and establish themselves under the project. In the oldest 
of the settlem ents in System H, the farmers have been cultivating continuously for at 
least 8 - 1 0  years. In project appraisal and planning documents farmers were expected to 
take about 8 years to reach their full potential under the project. These areas of System H 
can, therefore, be expected to reflect the future performance of the project in terms of its 
agricultural and social goals during the year of the survey (1984/85).
N a tu r a l E n v iro n m en t
The major tasks of the project in System H were: (a) to provide irrigation for 
intensive year round cultivation of hitherto uncultivated or undercultivated lands under 
small family farms, and (b) to provide the necessary economic and social infrastructure. 
The importance of irrigation for intensive agriculture is explained by the natural 
environment of the project area which falls within the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka and suffers 
from a limited and unreliable rainfall. System H has a bimodal pattern  of the monthly 
rainfall distribution with two distinct dry periods, one short and the other prolonged,
F igure  4-1: Map of the Mahaweli Project
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similar to the other parts of the Dry Zone. The annual average rainfall is 1500mm. 
Nearly seventy percent of the total annual rainfall occurs in the period October - mid 
January , which is the “M aha” season and often referred to as the “w et” season. The 
remaining rainfall occurs in the period from mid March to mid May ; this is known as the 
“Yala” season and crops grown during this season are referred to as the “dry” season 
crops. The months of June, July, August and September comprise the dry season proper 
and have little or no rain.
The average annual tem perature is 26° C. The minimum tem perature varies 
between 20° C and 25° C over the year, while the maximum tem perature varies between 
27° C and 34° C. Daily tem perature  fluctuations exceeding 10° C occur only in the period 
from mid February to the end of April. This high tem perature  causes rapid loss of soil 
moisture from evaporation. Pan evaporation measured from a class A pan varies from 3.5 
m m /day  to 7 .5m m /day. The rate of evaporation is less than 5m m /day in the wet season 
(Nedeco 1983).
Prolonged periods of rainless days cause severe moisture stress in crops and result in 
to ta l or partial loss of harvest. Somasiri (1978) computed the probabilities of the 
occurence of 7 day and 10 day consecutive rainless periods in the area. He found th a t  the 
probability of 7 consecutive rainless days in the M aha season was about 50 per cent while 
the probability of 10 consecutive rainless days was about 25 per cent. In other words, 
rainless periods exceeding 10 consecutive days, which may lead to a major crop failure in 
the absence of irrigation, can be expected once in every four years during the Maha 
season. Thus even in Maha, the wet season, reliable irrigation is required for intensive 
agriculture a t  least on a supplementary basis. The dry season, of course, is dependent on 
irrigation as the primary water source with rain water as a supplement. In the Yala 
season, the probability of a 7 consecutive rainless day period is above 90 percent while the 
probability of a 10 consecutive rainless day period is above 75 percent. A safe crop can be 
expected only once in four years. Further, irrigation systems which have catchments 
within the Dry Zone are inadequate to meet the irrigation requirements of both seasons.
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The rains in the M aha season are mainly due to convectional thunderstorms, which are 
usually of high intensity with a high run off but are unreliable. Sometimes they fail and 
their time of arrival can vary from the first week of October to the third week although 
the probability of their commencement in the third week is high (70 per cent).
The source of water for the Mahaweli project is the Mahaweli “Ganga^ (River) 
which has its source and major catchment area in the Wet Zone of Sri Lanka which in 
most years gets plentiful rain. Thus the Project has a perennial source of water in 
contrast to the small irrigation schemes which depend on rainfall in the locality as their 
major source of water. Mahaweli Ganga is dammed at Polgolla near Kandy in the hill 
country of Sri Lanka (see Figure 4-1) and is diverted through a series of weirs and tunnels 
before the water reaches the main storage reservoirs in System H along a transbasin 
canal.
The physiography of the region is gently undulating to rolling, with 3 to 4 per cent 
slopes. The landscape is a composite of minor watersheds or micro catchment basins. The 
major soil types found in the region occur in a catenary sequence in this undulating 
landscape (Figure 4-2). The soils which occur in the convex upper slopes and mid slopes 
are well drained and imperfectly drained reddish brown earths (RBE) respectively. The 
soils found on the concave valleys and bottom  lands are low humic gley (LHG) soils 
which are poorly drained. About 60 per cent of the area in System H has RBE soils while 
about 40 per cent has LHG soils (Somasiri 1978).
Panabokke (1978) sta tes  tha t  RBE soils have the highest inherent productivity for 
rice, while Rasiah (1980) found that irrigated rice yields are more or less similar in RBE 
and LHG soils if RBE soils can be given a sufficient number of irrigations (up to 5 times 
th a t  for LHGs) to maintain the required level of soil moisture.
Owing to their poorly drained nature, only rice can be cultivated in LHGs. In the 
M aha season much of the imperfectly drained RBEs are also suitable only for rice.
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F ig u r e  4-2: Distribution of Soils in the Dry Zone Landscape
Reddish brown earths - Low humic gley
Imperfectly
drained Poorly dained
Natural drainage
However, well drained RBEs can be cultivated with other crops in the wet season. In the 
Yala season all RBEs are suitable for crops other than rice.
4 .1 .0 .1  P r e  project eco n o m y
The Dry Zone was a well developed agricultural area during the early history of Sri 
Lanka. The great ancient capital cities, Anuradhapura and later Polonnaruwa, were 
located in the Dry Zone which was the cradle of a highly developed civilization. This 
civilization, a “hydraulic” society, was based on irrigated agriculture (Wittfogel 1957; 
Leach 1959). Irrigation water was collected and stored in often interconnected reservoirs 
of varying sizes. Some of these reservoirs were capable of storing up to 100,000 acre feet of
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water,  while the majority were small village tanks capable of serving small village 
communities. During subsequent periods, the Dry Zone ceased to be the centre of 
agriculture in Sri Lanka for reasons which are not clearly understood to date, but are 
often at t r ibuted to foreign invasions from south India and to an increase in the incidence 
of malaria. The Wet Zone became the major population centre and, wdth the exception of 
Jaffna peninsula, much of the Dry Zone reverted to jungle. Malaria was brought under 
control during the last 40 years of Sri Lanka's modern history. This led to the 
rehabilitation of many of the ancient tanks and new' settlers were brought  into these 
areas. Some tradi tional  sett lements,  however, continued to exist. These traditional 
villages were based on small village tanks (reservoirs), had a semi subsistence economy 
and little contact  with the rest of the Sri Lankan economy.
The few sett lements which existed in System H prior to the project were of this 
t radi tional  type. These were based on small tanks built to irrigate a rice crop in the Maha 
season in valley bot toms with LHG soils. Leach (1980) described the organization and the 
economy of a tank based village in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka which provides a picture of 
t radi tional  villages which used to exist in the project area;
A village tank is created by damming up a natural  s tream and building a long 
earthwork wall to hold the water up behind it. The resulting reservoir when full 
is usually about  seven feet deep immediately behind the earthwork (bund). Very 
roughly, the full tank covers much the same area of ground as the land below it 
which it is capable of irrigating, (p 94).
... the basic scarce commodity [in these communities! is water. Economic and 
political influence throughout  the community is determined by the control of 
water.. .  (p 95).
The main source of cash income was shifting cultivation of the dry lands. In the 
M aha  season, rice was cultivated in the irrigable land under the reservoir for subsistence 
needs. According to Leach (1980)
While the irrigated lands are devoted exclusively to rice, the shifting 
cultivation areas can be used for a variety of alternat ive crops. Traditionally 
the most important  of these is a species of millet, known as kurakkan.  In years 
when there has been a rice crop failure, this may be a very important  standby 
i tem of diet. But  shifting cultivation can also be used for a number of important  
cash crops, such as gingellv and mustard,  (p 105).
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...He the traditional farmer! looks upon this shifting cultivation as his main 
means of earning a cash income, in contrast to his ordinary activities as a rice 
farmer, which provides him with a subsistence living, (pp 105-6).
A detailed picture of the socio economic characteristics of these farmers is provided 
by the Pre-project Socio Economic Survey undertaken by Mahaweli Development Board 
in 1971. Prior to the project, only 7,000 of the 32,000 hectares of cultivable land in the 
area was under cultivation. This area was cultivated by 8,000 families consisting of a 
to ta l population of some 50,000 people. More than 80 per cent of them were entirely 
dependent on farming for their sustenance. Only 34 per cent of the cultivated area was 
under paddy cultivation while the major part  of the land (55 per cent) was in chena 
cultivation (shifting/ slash and burn dry land cultivation). Since the early 1970s, the cash 
crops cultivated in the chenas included chillies in addition to traditional crops such as 
gingelly and m ustard. The cropping intensity of the entire cultivated area was less than 
100 per cent; though there were potentially tw'o cropping seasons, in practice the entire 
land was not fully cultivated even once a year. About one third of the families owned 
cattle or buffaloes; about 13 per cent had poultry while a few (1.5 per cent) had goats. 
Livestock and poultry raising were small scale activities and supplemented incomes from 
crop cultivation. The average land holdings per family were 1.8 acres (.32 ha.) of paddy 
land (irrigable lowlands) 1.2 acres (.49 ha.) upland, and 1.0 acre (.40 ha.) of Chena land.
Nearly 20 per cent of the heads of households had no formal education. About 45 
per cent of them had 1 to 5 years of formal schooling.
These farmers mainly cultivated traditional varieties of rice, which were established 
entirely by broadcast seeding. Weed control, apa rt  from impounding w'ater in paddy 
fields, was not practiced. Only 25 per cent of the farmers used any chemical fertilizer on 
their farms. The average input of fertilizer was less than 5 per cent of the recommended 
dosage. The average yield was only 30 bushels per acre (1.5 tonnes/Ha.) in Maha season. 
Rice cultivation was not normally feasible in the Yala season. The average farm family 
income was Rs. 1210 with an income of Rs.7 per workday per person. This indicated a
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relatively low standard of living since, the average rural household income in the whole 
island in the year 1970 was about Rs.3600. These purana villages had semi-subsistence 
type economies with very limited links with outside markets. According to the pre­
project "socio economic survey of the area (1971), less than 4 per cent of the total farm 
produce was sold in the market.
The poverty of the traditional settlers in the project area ( “P u rana ’’ villagers) and 
their “primitive” economy left a deep impression among the settlement planners. They 
were concerned about the ability of these farmers to adjust to the forces of modernization 
set off by the project. The final report of the pre-project socio-economic survey (MDB 
1975) describes the Purana  villager as follows:
While lack of water, education, transport and communications may have been 
some of the other factors it seems like psychological poverty tha t  has not made 
them  rebel against the environment. Why are the natives of the Raja Rata  not 
like the hardy southerners or the Northern Jaffna Tamils? Why have they been 
so docile to remain for centuries what they are today? With better food, 
housing, health and sanitation, education, transport and communications, it is 
left to be seen whether they will run better in the race against poverty. There is 
some doubt in our minds as to whether it will automatically happen. The way 
out as we see it is in planned cultural redirection through catalytic agents of 
cultural change, whom they could emulate. By this, we mean tha t  culturally 
advanced families should be selected and planted in between groups tha t  are not 
advanced. Such agents would exert magnetic fields of influence and help the 
demagnatised psyches to remagnatise after which the magnatised forces will be 
more effective. But, planting agents of cultural change alone may not bring 
about the desired changes unless legal and institutional arrangements are also 
made to avoid exploitation of other members of the community, (p 2).
4.1 .1  The P o st Project S ystem  H
Under the Mahaweli Project, the physical environment and the socio economic 
environment of System H underwent major changes. The forest which covered much of 
the 35,000 ha. area was cleared except for the occasional reserve along natural drainage 
ways. The majority of the traditional village tanks were breached and 70 kilometers of 
main channels, 56 kilometers of branch channels, and 313 kilometers of distributory 
channels were newly constructed. Ninety kilometers of new roads were built, together 
with new townships, storage and marketing facilities, schools, hospitals etc. The old land 
cultivated by pre-project inhabitants  of the area (Purana  villagers) was redeveloped, re- 
demarcated and incorporated into the new irrigation network so tha t  the old villages were 
indistinguishable from the newly created ones.
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4 . 1 .1 . 1  T h e  S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  I r r ig a t io n  S y s t e m
System H has five major reservoirs. Kandalama, Dambuluoya, Kalawewa, 
Rajangane and Angamuwa, which are supplied with water diverted from Mahaweli Ganga 
at Polgolla and Bowatenna in addition to water collected from their own local 
catchments. These reservoirs irrigate an area of 13,500 hectares in the Maha season. 
About 8,000 hectares of this are in the command area of Rajangane and Angamuwa 
reservoirs which were developed in the mid 1960s as a land settlement scheme. The 
irrigation distributory system below each reservoir in the new lands has been designed 
and constructed according to a s tandard  hierarchy of irrigation channels. Main and 
branch channels are designed to carry water on a continuous basis along the length of the 
project area. For example, the Left Bank main channel is 27 kilometers in length. The 
area is divided into a number of irrigation blocks which are between 300 to 500 ha. Each 
of these blocks are in turn irrigated by 2 - 4 distributory channels taking off from a main 
or branch channel. Both main and distributory channels are constructed along contours 
and are designed to irrigate the maximum possible area. While these contour channels run 
along ridges in the landscape, field channels taking off from the distributories run down 
the slopes towards valley bottoms. Farms are located on both sides of these field channels, 
on the average, numbering between 12 and 16 per field channel. Each farm is 2.5 acres in 
extent (1 ha. approx.). As described earlier, the soils found along the field channels, i.e., 
down the slope, vary from well drained to poorly drained. The natural drainage in the 
valley bottom s carry the excess water to the river which is the main drainage of the area, 
Kala Oya (see Figure 4-3).
The main and branch channels are in continuous use during the two crop seasons. 
These are large, sophisticated engineering works with many regulatory structures and 
serve as means for the transporta tion of water over long distances as well as for storage of 
water for diversion into the distributories. The distributories vary in length and capacity 
(60 to 850 litres per second) but typically they are between 1 - 2 kilo meters in length. In 
large blocks these channels may carry water continuously or in small blocks for up to 4 
days a week. System II has 43 blocks with an average irrigable area of 650 acres.
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F ig u r e  4 -3 : Schem atic  D ia g ra m  o f the Ir r ig a t io n  System  in
K a law e w a  L e ft B ank A rea  in  System  H
KALA OYA MAIN DFtAINAGE
302 \
KALAWEWA
RESERVOIRBRANCH CHANNEL NO. 1
^ 309
MULANATUWA
RESERVOIR
LEGEND
MAIN CANALS 
MAIN DRAINAGE CANALS 
D CHANNELS StUDIED 
DRAINAGE CHANNELS
MAHAKAt IINORUWA 
/  RESERVOIR
DIRECTION OF FLOW
In d iv id u a l b locks range between 400 to  1100 acres o f ir r ig a b le  area. Each b lock is 
ir r ig a te d  by one or m ore  d is t r ib u to rv  channels ta k in g  o ff fro m  a m ain  or b ranch  channel. 
Each d is t r ib u to rv  channe l has a n um be r o f fie ld  channels each o f w h ich  ir r ig a te  between 
10 - 16 fa rm s. F ie ld  channels are designed to  ca rry  a flo w  ra te  o f 28 litre s  per second (one 
cub ic  fo o t per second [c.f.s]) and have one fa rm  supp ly  gate ( tu rn o u t)  o f 0.5 c.f.s ca pa c ity  
fo r each fa rm  served by the  channel. A cco rd in g  to  the p ro je c t design, each fie ld  channel 
was to  be ke p t open fo r up to  fo u r consecutive  days o f the week w ith  a d ischarge o f 28 
litre s  per second to  feed every fo u r a llo tm e n ts  (4 ha.) per day a t the ra te  o f 63.5 m m  o f
w a te r fo r a week.
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Although the project plans envisaged adequate water for double cropping land in 
System H, this has not been realized for the following reasons:
1. First, the actual water used for given crops is about 20 per cent more than 
expected (Nedeco 1984). This may reflect inefficiency a t farm level as well as 
unanticipated rates of water loss in conveyance.
2. Second, the actual cropping pattern  deviated from the planned pattern . It 
was expected th a t  farms with well drained soils will be cultivated with upland 
rice (with dry sowing) as against the present practice of wet sowing under 
puddled conditions. Upland rice has a lower profit margin than lowland rice 
but consumes much less water. Research trials have shown that  upland rice 
yield is about 80 per cent of low land rice but the consumption of wrater by the 
former is about 20 per cent of the latter  (Gamage 1983). However, weed 
control is difficult with upland rice, and where water is free, the profit margin 
will be considerably lower than with lowland rice. Upland rice was never 
cultivated by project farmers for several reasons. In the first place, when 
water is available free of charge, the net profit to the farmer is greater with 
lowland rice. If farmers pay for the actual quantity  of water used, then the 
profit from upland rice is greater than from lowland rice in well drained soils. 
Second, the well drained soils are invariably located in the head reach of field 
channels and, therefore, these have better access to water. Third, Mahaweli 
farmers have had no experience in cultivating rice with in term ittent irrigation 
as required for upland rice culture.
3. Third, the duration of water issue per season turned out to be longer than 
originally expected. Farmers plant their crop in a staggered time sequence 
due to problems related to resource mobilization by individual farmers a t the 
beginning of the season. This leads to increased water losses in conveyance 
through seepage and percolation as well as by evaporation.
Efficient on-farm water management and improved system management have been
recognized as having significant potential for improved performance of irrigation projects
(Barker et al. 1985). The basic idea is th a t  the total area cultivated can be increased
either by bringing in new land or by increasing cropping intensity of existing project lands
while maintaining current levels of productivity through the reduction of water losses at
the system level and on farm. The determination of water use efficiency and the
exploration of possible means of improvement require a multi-disciplinary research
approach (W ater M anagement Synthesis Project 1982). These issues, although
im portan t,  are not addressed in this thesis. A substantial amount of research has been
undertaken in System H and elsewhere on these issues and we will draw on these
experiences and conclusions where necessary.
The entire area of System H is irrigated during the M aha season, but only a portion
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can be irrigated in the Yala season. During the Ylaha season, water is supplied on the 
basis of a rotation schedule so tha t  the first half (or a section) of the distributory channel 
( “head'1) gets water for a certain number of days after which the second half( the 
remaining section - “tail11) is supplied for the same number of days. In practice, farmers 
located in the head have much better access to water throughout the season while those 
in the tail have access to water only during their turn. Effectively, however, even less 
water is available to the la tte r  as some water is illegally taken by “head” farmers. There 
are no physical controls (such as gates) or effective institutional controls (such as ditch 
riders and water courts) to prevent the “head” farmers taking water out of turn.
During the Yala season, a number of distributory channels are selected for irrigation 
depending on the estimates of water available. Thus the area cultivated in the Yala 
season may vary. In 1985 this was 50 per cent in some areas while some other areas were 
not issued with any water. These selected distributories supply sufficient water to 
cultivate only half of their command area. The areas irrigated are ro tated so that no 
farmer has to forgo cultivation in two consecutive Yala seasons. Therefore, farmers 
owning land in the “tail” of such channels share the farms located in the “head” (which 
receive irrigation water) with their owners. The farmers who move to the head in the 
Y ala season do not get the same allotment in each Y ala season since the actual location 
irrigated is also ro tated  depending on the water availability in each season. Accordingly, 
the “ta il” farmers move to the “head” in the Yala season. This system of water and land 
sharing is an adapta tion  of a traditional practice in village tanks in the Dry Zone of Sri 
Lanka (Leach, 1980).
4.1.1.2 Settler Types
The post-project population of farm families is about 25,000 with a total farm 
population of more than 100,000. The non-farm population engaged in various services in 
the area would be approximately the same number. These settlers are drawn from 
different locations and thus have significantly different backgrounds. The major types are:
1. Pu rana  settlers (those who have traditionally lived in the area),
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2. Settlers selected from the Wet Zone, and
3. Others (those who have previously been squatters  on state  lands and farmers
from other Dry Zone areas).
The Purana  villagers and their economy were discussed in the previous section on 
the pre-project economy in system H. They were allocated newly developed land of 
equal size irrespective of the land area they owned prior to the project and were settled as 
closely as possible to the location of their original settlement and were paid compensation 
for the land they lost. Thus, while these farmers brought their experiences in the pre- 
project environment, social relationships and traditions to the new settlements, they faced 
a drastically different physical and economic environment in the project area.
The la tter  twm types of settlers were selected on the basis of pre-determined criteria 
which give preference to young, educated, married but unemployed and landless people 
with experience in agriculture. These criteria were not applied in respect of Purana 
villagers or those who were displaced by the project, i.e., whose lands were inundated by 
reservoirs, canals, roads etc.
Perhaps the culturally advanced people referred to in the pre-project report quoted 
earlier (MDB 1975) are those selected mainly from the Wet Zone of Sri Lanka and settled 
newly in the project area. The relative modernization of this group of farmers in terms of 
their technology is described by the findings of an agro-socio-economic survey carried out 
in 1971/72 (ART1 1975), a t  the same time as the Mahaweli pre-project surveys. Farmers 
in Kandy district (from where the majority of Wet Zone settlers of the selected sample 
area originated) cultivated mainly high yielding varieties of paddy (only 13 per cent 
cultivated traditional varieties in M aha season and 14 per cent in Yala season), more 
than 90 per cent transplanted their crop and more than 90 per cent applied chemical 
fertilizers. The average application of fertilizer was 40 per cent of the quantity 
recommended. More than 80 per cent of the farmers manually weeded their plots and the 
average yield in the M aha season was above 50 bushels per acre. In the Yala season, the 
average yield was above 40 bushels per acre.
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These Wet Zone farmers are generally known to be highly skilled in activities such 
as land levelling and bunding, which facilitate good on-farm water management. These 
skills reflect the accumulated experience of many generations of rice cultivation on 
terraced hill slopes with water tapped from small mountain streams. Further, the Wet 
Zone has long been subject to the forces of modernization. Since the mid-nineteenth 
century the inhabitants  of the Wet Zone were exposed to the market forces emanating 
originally from the plantations. For more than a century, transport, health services and 
most im portan tly , modern education were available in these areas.
The settlers of the th ird  category are mixed but many have been relatively more 
exposed to modernization than  Purana  settlers. Many of them had migrated from the 
Wet Zone on their initiative. Such “spontaneous71 settlers are often better endowed with 
human and other capital than  sponsored settlers. There also are some who had been 
selected from the second generation of settlers from other pre-Mahaweli Dry Zone land 
settlem ent schemes.
4.1 .1 .3  Crop G row ing E nvironm ents in S ystem  H
We may categorize the environment for crop production within System H into three 
major types. These are determined by a combination of season, location in the irrigation 
water distribution system and the soil type. This categorization is necessarily very broad. 
Individual farms within these may substantially vary in terms of their micro­
characteristics while different parts of a given farm may also exhibit substantial 
differences. However, such detailed differences are not easily identified (see Chang 1978). 
System H is one of the most intensively mapped areas in Sri Lanka. Yet the existing soil 
maps identify only the major soil differences discussed earlier.
1. M aha/head  This is a most favourable environment for new rice technology 
due to the the high degree of water control and the flexibility given by the 
favourable location in the irrigation system. Further, this season has a high 
and relatively stable pa ttern  of rainfall. Adequacy of irrigation water can 
reduce the impact of heterogeneity in soil characteristics between farms on 
rice cultivation. The major differences between the major soil types in System 
H are basically due to their drainage characteristics (Panabokke 1978, Alwis 
1982). These have been observed to perform equally well for the rice crop 
under conditions of unlimited irrigation, i.e.. if w'ell drained soils can be given 
up to five times the water applied to poorly drained soils (Rasaiah 1980).
100
2. Ata h a /ta il  This is a less favourable environment  than the Maha/head.  The 
level of control over irrigation water is low owing to the relatively 
unfavourable location along distributor) '  channels. This relative scarcity of 
water in this environment  may lead to more between-plot variation, or 
heterogeneity, in natural environment.  Farmers are required to devote more 
time and energy to adjust  their operations to a given water availability regime 
as wrell as to obtain water.  By contrast,  farmers in the former environment 
may adjust their water use to suit their needs, and so avoid significant water 
stress. In the lat ter  s ituation, the variety selected, manner of crop 
establ ishment , weed and pest control, the application of fertilizer and 
chemicals have to be determined to suit the availability of water in terms of 
t iming and volume.
. 3. Yala season  The rainfall pattern in this season is highly variable and the
availability of irrigation water is restricted. The availability of irrigation 
water in this season is dependent  on the quant ity saved from the Maha 
season. Its supply cannot  be varied during the season if the rainfall diverges 
from the expected pa t te rn at  the beginning of the season. Therefore, the crop 
share arrangement described earlier has been adopted for this season. This 
adds to uncertainty for “ta iP  farmers owing to their lack of familiarity with 
the micro-environmental conditions of plots of land cultivated by them. Even 
with the relative scarcity of water in this season, the only feasible crop in the 
poorly drained soils is rice. On the other hand, the restricted water 
availability does not permit the cultivation of rice in well drained soils. 
However, these soils are well suited to the cultivation of other  cash crops.
4 .1 .1 .4  P o s t  P ro jec t  E c o n o m y  in S y s te m  H
The post-project land use for agriculture has been determined to a large extent by 
the availability of water  and the soil type. In the Maha season, all project lands are 
cult ivated with rice. In the \  ala season, well drained soils are cultivated with non rice 
crops (mainly chillies) wdiile poorly drained soils are cultivated with rice. Unlike in the 
pre-project setting, farmers have no dry land for agriculture (except a half acre of 
homestead allotment  w’here a few perennial trees and a small patch of vegetables are 
typically grown). The new technologies for rice and chillies generate substantial 
marketable surpluses and are dependent  on purchased inputs such as fertilizer, pesticides, 
weedicides and hired labour (see Table 4-1). Thus post-project economy inSystemHis 
market oriented. The total  ou tput  of paddy and chillies, on the average farm exceeds the 
household consumption requirements of those two items and as a result more that  90 per 
cent of farm production is sold in the market.  The average per capita  consumption of rice 
in Sri Lanka is about 100 Kgs. per year (Ministry of Finance and Planning 1984).
All project farmers adopted new high yielding varieties of rice from the first season
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of cultivation after sett lement and used chemical fertilizer although the amounts  used 
varied. From the first season, average productivity increased to more than double the 
pre-project average. Even the Purana  farmers immediately adopted the new technology 
although the level of efficiency in input  use may not have been very high. Such rapid 
t ransit ions from tradi tional  to modern technology with the provision of new inputs have 
been similar to observations elsewhere (Marooka et al. 1979). This is consistent with the 
conventional wisdom in agricultural development  economics; t raditional farmers are 
rational economic beings, who when given new technology and improved access to factors 
of production,  will increase productivity. The breakdown of previous self sufficiency due 
to the change in land availability placed the farmers of System H firmly within a market  
setting. Unlike a t radi tional  setting where the only inputs were family labour and seed, 
the new technology is highly dependent  on purchased inputs in the form of seed, fertilizer, 
chemicals, and hired labour.
The farms are small in size and large in number so that  individual farmers are price 
takers in the relevant markets.  The land market  is regulated by law which prohibits 
t ransact ions such as mortgage, lease or outright  sale. However, illegal land t ransactions 
take place, and in some areas a trend towards increased operational size of farms has been 
observed (Krimmel 1986, Siriwardhana 1980). Water,  the other major factor of 
product ion, is not marketed,  but  is supplied in fixed quanti ties to farmers. They are 
charged on the basis of the area cultivated and not on a volumetric basis. Thus, a market 
for water does not exist and water availability is determined by the location of farms. As 
a result, the value of available water is capitalized into land values. Hired labour is an 
essential requirement  for farming in System H. The wages for hired labour do not appear 
to vary within the project area, and rates paid correspond closely to those paid for similar 
work elsewhere.
The major sources of draught power are water buffaloes and tractors. There is an 
active rental market for their services. Farm products are sold in the open market while 
inputs are also purchased in the open market.  Farm gate prices may sometimes vary
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depending on t ransport  costs, but  these costs are minimal since the project physical plan 
has been developed in a radial pattern around service and marketing centres to ensure 
tha t  distance is not a great  disadvantage to farmers (as observed in previous “ribbon^ 
type setlements).
The government  provides subsidized capital to farmers in the form of cultivation 
loans through commercial banks. This source is available to any farmer as long as he does 
not  default. As at  present bank credit is available only to a small percentage of farmers 
in the System H. In 1984/85 crop year, the total number  of farmers receiving bank loans 
for cultivation purposes was estimated to be less than  10% of the total  number 
(Pand i thara thne  1984). However, farmers obtain credit from non-institutional sources at 
varying rates of interest.  Bank interest rates for loans to farmers are regulated and 
repressed. Credit  rat ioning is therefore expected. Varying interest rates for different 
borrowers in the informal credit market may suggest market imperfections. However, as 
Stiglitz (1987) points out  such variation may be related to the differences in risk of loan 
default  among borrowers and does not necessarily indicate market imperfections. The 
varying interest rates charged by other sources in System H may,  therefore, be related to 
the varying risk of loan default depending on the repayment  capacity of individual 
borrowers and may not reflect market imperfections (see Stiglitz 1987).
4 .1 .2  T h e  N e w  R ice  T ec h n o lo g y
The term “new rice technology^ means the technology of rice cultivation using new 
high yielding varieties, inorganic fertilizers and other chemical inputs. The widespread 
adoption of this technology was expected to usher in the “green revolut ion^ This 
technology may be contrasted with the cultivation of tradi tional  varieties of rice with 
little or no application of chemicals. With the new technology, there is a multiplicity of 
techniques/pract ices  which can be used by farmers.
Many high yielding varieties of rice are now available for cultivation in a given 
location. For example, in Sri Lanka, a farmer in a major irrigation scheme in the Dry 
Zone has the choice of cult ivat ing a long ag< u variety (four to four and a half months) or
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a short aged variety (three months). HYVs are non photosensitive and mature after a 
fixed time period unlike the traditional varieties which m ature  at approximately the same 
time irrespective of the date of planting. Accordingly, farmers who wish to plant late in 
the season due to delayed rainfall or late arrival of irrigation water to the field can plant 
a short aged high yielding rice variety. Delayed planting of a long aged variety may lead 
to crop loss due to water stress a t  the tail end of a season. However, short aged varieties 
typically have a lower yield potential and losses due to departures from optimal timing of 
input applications are greater (Yoshida 1981).
New rice technology depends on the application of chemical fertilizer for high yields. 
Fertilizer promotes the growth of weeds as well as the rice crop. Hence weed control is an 
essential component of this technology. One way of weed control is to transplant the crop 
in a flooded field where the impounded water controls weed growth. Row transplanting 
also facilitates manual or mechanical weed control. However, a transplanted crop is 
susceptible to water stress in the initial period after transplanting. Hence the decision as 
to transplan t or broadcast seed has to be taken in the light of expected water availability. 
Herbicides are the only effective means of weed control in a broadcast seeded plot. Land 
preparation is the other major means of weed control. Land preparation may be 
undertaken with tractors, manually or with draught animals. There are alternative 
implements to be a ttached  to trac tors  or draught animals to suit particular soil 
conditions. Land preparation work and pre-emergent weedicides are substitutes to a 
certain extent.
The other major component of the new rice technology is pest control. Staggered 
planting (or direct seeding) of rice in irrigation systems results in staggered maturing of 
the crop and provides a continuous source of food for pests. As a result late maturing 
fields suffer most from pest damage. Even with staggered planting, traditional varieties 
m atured simultaneously. Further, the long fallow periods in the traditional setting (with 
only one season per year) controlled pests by depriving them of food for long periods. In 
modern irrigation schemes two rice crops a year are common. Traditional varieties, on
the other hand,  were resistant to the most common pests in given locations. Therefore, 
farmers experienced in the cultivation of t radi tional  varieties, but  newly introduced to 
H \  Vs are often unable to identify the pests which attack them. The available chemical 
t rea tments  are specific to different pests and have strict requirements in terms of the 
times of application, the stage of growth of plants and the pests, prevailing weather, the 
rate of dilution, the dosage, etc. The correct application of available t reatments  by one 
farmer alone may not be fruitful when neighbouring affected farmers do not treat  their
attack in the correct way (Godell 1982, 1984). This is one externality among many others
in a small farm environmnet . The complex nature  of chemical pest control is certainly 
responsible for the often observed ineffective use of pesticides (Abilay 1978).
The major  types of fertilizer, nitrogen, potassium and phosphorus, are packaged in 
different ways, and a rice crop requires different combinations of them applied in varying 
dosages corresponding to its growth stage. Apart from applying fertilizer at the correct 
time the farmer has to drain the field and ensure that  the field does not have standing 
water for a certain time period. Where irrigation water  is available on a strict rotation, 
correct t iming may be difficult since a farmer cannot allow the crop to suffer from water 
stress. Thus he may wait until the water from one rotat ion is fully absorbed before
applying the fertilizer or a chemical. When the next rotation comes the farmer has to
decide between skipping the rotat ion w'hich may subject the crop to water  stress, or else 
using water at  the risk of losing at  least a part  of the effect of the fertilizer or chemical 
applied. Unexpected rains often wash off fertilizer and chemicals applied. Then the 
farmer has to decide whether the crop requires an additional application, and if so. what  
the correct dosage is. Favourably located farmers can avoid these problems since they 
can organize water supply to meet their individual needs. Farmers  in.many locations have 
been observed to be inefficient in their timing of fertilizer application (Abilay et al. 
1984).
The output  response from given packages of inputs and practices will vary 
according to the availability of water (see Wickham and Sen 1978). The best package for
105
a given environment  will therefore depend on the availability of water.  Where water is 
not available on demand,  but  is supplied on a rotat ion schedule the farmer has to package 
his technology to suit an expected water availability regime which can be disrupted by 
the vagaries of rainfall. On the other hand, favourably located farmers may be able to 
vary the use of water according to the needs of a particular technological package.
4.2 The Sample
Project authorities  continuously monitor the performance of settlers by collecting 
da ta  on certain basic indicators. These are, cropping pattern,  average crop yields, issues 
of cultivation loans from commercial banks, issues of fertilizer from government  stores 
and water issues a t  critical points within the irrigation system. However, da ta  on farm 
specific input  use are not routinely collected. 7'herefore the da ta  required for this thesis 
had to be collected from a farm survey. To avoid the well known problem of recall lapse 
of small farmers (who rarely keep any records of their operations),  a multiple visit rather 
than a single visit survey was conducted. The financial resources available limited the 
feasible sample size to about  120 farmers located within a fairly small geographic area.
As the major focus in this thesis is on the success of adjustment  of farmers with 
varying backgrounds to the new technology in different cropping environments within the 
project an irrigation block was chosen as the sample area. This is the smallest contiguous 
area which contains these different environments.
The distributor}’ channels irrigating a block may be divided into head and tail 
reaches according to the demarcation of the area to be served by the first water rotation 
and the second. Field channels are constructed down the slopes as against distributories 
which are contour  channels, and therefore serve first the farms with well drained soils on 
convex upper slopes and then the farms with imperfect and poorly drained soils on lower 
slopes. Accordingly, one irrigation block contains all the major environmental  categories 
for agriculture in the project area.
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The different d istr ibutor)’ channels within a block do not have significant differences 
in access to water from the main channel. However, depending on the distance from the 
nearest regulatory reservoir, wrater availability between blocks may vary. The optimal 
distribution of water between blocks is an issue related to the efficiency of the overall 
system design and operation. Thus one criterion in the selection of the sample area 
(block) was to select a block which was midway from a regulatory reservoir and therefore 
unlikely to represent an extreme situation in terms of water availability.
Some of the blocks in System H have only one of three major settler types. 
Therefore the second criterion was to select a block which had all three settler types in 
substantia l numbers.
Although settlement in System H commenced in 1975, it continued till 1985. The 
study of very new settlers was not considered to be useful for studying the adjustment 
process over time. Hence the third criterion was to select a block with a t least 6 - 7  years 
of cultivation since original settlement. The pre-project plans expected the settlers to 
reach their full potential in about 8 years from the date of original settlement in the 
project.
On the basis of these criteria, block 313, the second block served by branch channel 
No. 2 in the command area of Kalawewa Left Bank Main Channel (see Figure 4-4) was 
chosen. This branch channel serves three blocks with Block 313 in the middle. This block 
has 436 settlers with significant populations of Wet Zone, Purana  and “other^ settlers. 
The settlem ent in the block took place in the year 1977. The block was stratified into 
head and tail areas as outlined earlier and a random sample of 63 farmers from the head 
and 61 farmers from the tail was obtained (Figure 4-5). Wet Zone farmers accounted for 
44 per cent of the sample while 34 per cent were Dry zone farmers and the rest were 
others. The field survey covered the M aha season in 1984/85 and the Yala season of 1985. 
The sample farmers were visited at least once a fortnight during this period and detailed 
records of farm activites were obtained. The questionnaire used is given in Appendix IV.
Figure  4 -4 :  Loca t ion  M a p  o f B lock 313 in K a law e w a  Left Bank Area
o f System H
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KALAWEWA R.B. MAIN CANAL
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F ig u re  4-5: The Map of F31ock 313
Soares: Mahaweli Development Board
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As explained earlier, all the sample farmers cultivated rice in the Maha season. In 
the Yala season, 37 farmers cultivated only chillies, 22 only paddy and the others grew 
both crops. Thus 87 farmers cultivated rice while 102 cultivated chillies. The average 
variable costs and returns obtained by the sample farmers are given in Table 4-1.
T a b le  4-1: Average costs and returns obtained by sample farmers from
alternative crops
Maha Season Yala season
Ric e Rice chillies
Head Tail All All
The number of farmers 63 61 87 102
Land (Ac.) 1.96 2.13 0.85 0.70
Costs of Inputs (Rs./Ac •)
Cost of seed 190.00 190.00 190.00 150.00
Pre Harvest Labour 940.56 796.81 923.43 2686.68
Harvest labour 725.99 749.38 878.52 1561.71
Draught power 448.30 428.50 211.71 53.00
Agro chemicals 108.33 131.91 164.72 509.62
Nitrogen 110.25 116.31 171.80 310.87
Other fertilizers 191.07 114.65 77.27 334.18
Total 2714.50 2527.56 2617.46 5602.01
Mean Output (Bu./Ac.) 70.55 45.63 47.70 430.40a/
Gross Revenue (Rs./Ac.)
4415.00 2855.52 2985.06 12279.31
Net Profit (Rs./Ac.) 1700.50 327.96 367.60 6677.30
a /  Kgs. of dried chillie per acre.
Note: The cost of family labour is valued at the market wage rate.
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The costs of cultivation of rice in the three environments are similar. However, the 
mean yield and the net profit in M aha/head  was significantly higher. Where water 
availability is similar across seasons (such as in experiment s ta tions), dry season rice 
crops yield more than wet season crops (see Yoshida 1981). This is explained by the 
longer sunshine periods experienced in the dry season owing to the low cloud cover. The 
contradictory observation for System II is clearly the result of the difference in water 
availability.
Chillie was the most profitable crop. However, the average cost of production was 
more than double th a t  for rice. Chillies can only be cultivated in the Yala season, and 
only in well drained soils of System H. All farmers in the sample who had well drained 
soils cultivated chillies in the Yala season.
4 .2 .1  R ice  C u lt iv a t io n  - R e c o m m e n d a t io n s  and P r a c t ic e s
Practices recommended for the cultivation of rice in System H in the two seasons 
are identical except for the duration of the variety cultivated. Owing to the restricted 
availability of water, short duration varieties are recommended (3-3.5 months) in the 
Yala season. The recommended dosage of fertilizer for short aged varieties is lower than 
th a t  for long aged varieties. Farmers are encouraged to transp lan t in both seasons, with 
basal and top dressings of fertilizer. Use of pesticides is encouraged only for the treatm ent 
of identified pest a ttacks and not as a preventive measure. Rather, the emphasis is on 
integrated pest m anagement techniques with use of chemicals strictly need-based. Weed 
control by impounding water on paddy fields is discouraged in both seasons in order to 
conserve scarce water.
A comparison of the major practices followed in the area by location and season 
(Table 4-2) shows tha t ,  in the Maha/ head. a majority of the farmers transplanted their 
rice crop, cultivated long and medium aged varieties and applied basal fertilizer. Fewer 
M aha/ta i l  farmers followed these practices. In the Y ala season, the proportion of farmers 
resorting to these practices was much lower again. Some practices such as the application 
of fertilizer top  dressings were common in all three environments.
I l l
Long aged varieties, with adequate water,  give higher yields owing to their longer 
vegetative growth phase which gives a longer time for recovery from various setbacks in 
the life cycle of the crop (De Dat ta  1981, Yoshida 1981). However, where water is scarce, 
short aged varieties may do better since their w-ater requirements are lower and since they 
can be planted or sown later in the season when the rainfall pat tern is better established. 
Transplanting is encouraged mainly for ease of weed control. However, where water is in 
short supply, t ransplanting may give adverse results if water stress occurs soon after 
t ransplant ing. Basal fertilizer is recommended prior to the establ ishment  of the crop, but 
it is commonly observed tha t  farmers in risky situations often do not apply it. This may 
perhaps be a reflection of farmers’ uncertainty about  crop performance prior to the 
establ ishment  of the crop (Binsw'anger, 1979). Another  possible explanation is the belief 
among some farmers tha t  basal fertilizer application leads to increased weed growth.
A smaller percentage of farmers in the Maha/head  applied weedicides than in the 
Maha / ta i l  and the Yala season which is probably due to the capacity to use impounded 
water  for weed control in the Maha/head .  The proportions of farmers applying pesticides 
differed little in the three environments. However, the degree of accuracy and detail 
regarding use of pesticides or herbicides which can be obtained from farm surveys is often 
low. Often farmers are unable to name the chemicals applied, and further,  they rarely 
adhere to the dosage requirements.
4 .2 .2  C h illie  c u l t iv a t io n  - R e c o m m e n d a t io n s  and P r a c t ic e s
The cultivation of chillies under gravity irrigation is new to Sri Lankan farmers. 
Chillies have traditionally been cultivated under rainfed conditions in the Chenas 
(shifting cultivation) in the Dry Zone while in Jaffna peninsula they are traditionally 
cultivated with irrigation from deep w'ells. There are two high yielding varieties of 
chillies bred at  M ihailluppallarna. the regional a .ricultural research s ta tion located near 
Systen H, which are recommended for the Dry Zone. Recommendat ions regarding 
methods of establ ishment , fertilizing and pest disease control of irrigated chillie crops
T a b le  4-2: Incidence of alternative cultural practices
in rice cultivation in Block 313 of System H: 
by season and by location in crop year 1984/85
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The number o f  farmers  
Maha Season Y a la  S ea so n
F!?ad Tail All
Practices (No) (7.) (No) (7.) (No) (!
Method of 
Establishment
Transplanting 41(70) 33(62) 15(17)
Broadcasting 19(30) 23(38) 72(83)
Variety
Long aged 22(35) 17(28) 5(06)
Mediuiii aged 20(32) 8(13) 33(38)
Short aged 21(33) 36(59) 49(56)
Basal fertilizer
Applied 31(48) 9(1) 7(08)
Not applied 32(52) 52(85) 80(82)
Weedicides
Applied 37(58) 54(88) 59(68)
Not applied 26(42) 7(12) 28(32)
Pesticides
Applied 48(75) 44(72) 64(73)
Not applied 15(25) 17(28) 23(27)
Total no. of 
farmers 63 61 87
have not. been developed to the same extent as for rice. Chillies are highly susceptible to 
pests and diseases, particularly lea! curl, and a wide variety of chemicals are being 
marketed for their treatment. Accordingly, ag~o chemicals account for a major part of the
total variable costs.
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Our field survey coincided with the first large scale chillie cultivation in Block 313. 
Accordingly, those farmers who grew chillies did so on an experimental  basis. The Purana 
farmers in the sample had previous experience in growing tradi tional  varieties of chillies 
under rainfed Chenas. However, the low input  (only seed and labour) chena cultivation 
approach is very different to the intensi e cultivation of crops under irrigation. Whether 
their previous experience was of any use in practising the new chillie technology emerged 
as an interesting issue.
All sample farmers cultivated new high yielding varieties of chillies and 
t ransplanted them. They all used topdressings of fertilizer, but  in varying quantities. 
Only 18 per cent of them applied any basal fertilizer. 1 hey all practiced manual  weeding 
and 3 per cent also used chemical weedicides. All the farmers used pesticides.
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C H A P T E R  5
The R esults of Farm er Efficiency A nalysis
5.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, the sample area has three different 
environments for crop production, vtV, Maha/head, Maha/tail, and the Yala season. The 
only crop grown in the first tw<J environments is rice. In the third, rice is grown on 
poorly drained soils and chillies are grown on well drained soils. There is no “head” and 
“tail” difference in the Yala season since all farmers cultivate land located in the “head” 
and therefore water is issued simultaneously to all field channels in that location. As the 
various inputs that comprise the new rice technology are expected to perform differently 
according to environments, three different frontier production functions [FPF] were 
estimated for rice, as well as a frontier production function for chillies. We will denote 
the FPFs Maha/head, Maha/tail, Yala/rice and Yala/chillie respectively. In this 
chapter, we present the estimates of the four FPFs. The technologies in the three rice 
growing environments, including returns to scale implied by the individual FPFs are 
compared and discussed. This is followed by an analysis of the differences in individual 
technical and allocative efficiency estimates for the four environments. Next, 
determinants of efficiency variation for each environment are examined. Finally, the 
overall economic efficiency of farmers is examined.
5.1.1 Algebraic Form ulation of Production Frontiers
All choices in production and the relevant economic decision rules of agents are 
subject to the technological relationship of transforming inputs to outputs. It is often 
convenient in economic analysis to characterize (parameterize) such technologies in the 
form of algebraic expressions. The advantages and disadvantages of such 
parameterization were discussed at length in Chapter 3. For this study, the advantages
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outweigh the disadvantages. The most widely used parameterization for agricultural 
production functions is the Cobb-Douglas form which is written as follows:
Y—A x l x 2 (5.1)
where, Y is output, x- inputs, bj input coefficients and A is intercept. The properties 
of this production function are:
1. strict concavity, given by 0 < bj < 1, 0 < bj T b2 < 1 and A > 0;
2. strict quasi-concavity, given by bj > 0 and A > 0;
3. homogeneity of degree (bj +  b^);
4. elasticity of Xj given by b-;
5. function coefficient E =  bj -f h9 gives returns to scale;
6. elasticity of substitution o =  1;
7. the function can be specified only with complementary factors;
8. isoquants have negative slopes, are convex to the origin; they converge when 
returns to scale are greater than one. they are equally spaced with constant 
returns to scale, and they diverge with decreasing returns to  scale; and
9. the function exhibits only stage two of the production process for each 
individual factor and with respect to scale given strict concavity, while it 
exhibits only stages one or two wdth respect to scale given strict quasi­
concavity.
The restrictions of constant unitary elasticity of substitution, and the inability to 
reflect all three stages of production have led to many alternative specifications of 
production technologies. The most commonly used alternatives are the Quadratic,  
Constant Elasticity of Substitution and Translog functions.
The Cobb-Douglas function can be shown to be a special case of CES and Translog 
functions. When the squared difference term in the CES is insignificant or when the 
quadratic term in the translog function is insignificant the technology is described by the 
Cobb-Douglas function.
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Many empirical studies have employed the Cobb-Douglas form of production 
function in spite of its restrictiveness (Anderson and Jodha 1973, Upton 1979), because of 
its well known advantages. First, it represents many of the desired economic properties, 
being well behaved, i.e., positive monotonocity (positive marginal products for each 
input) and strict quasi-concavity.1. Second, it is computationally easy to handle. Third, 
it has achieved widespread empirical support in agriculture and in other industries. 
Heady and Dillon (1969) showed that this form has provided adequate Fit for agricultural 
data more often than other functional forms. As shown above, the Cobb-Douglas form 
assumes that the elasticity of substitution between any pair of inputs is unity. Hayami 
(1970) used inter-country cross section data and found that his results were consistent 
with the assumption of unity elasticity of substitution. Lau and Yotopoulos (1971) and 
Sidhu (1974) fitted CES production functions to Indian agricultural data and found that 
the adequacy of the Cobb-Douglas functional form to represent the data cannot be 
rejected.^ .
We also attempted to fit the translog function to the data but there were major 
problems with high multicollinearity among the independent variables (as often found 
when using this form (e.g., Mefford 1986)), and generally insignificant interaction terms. 
Therefore we decided to use the Cobb-Douglas form in our study.
*The translog function does not satisfy strict quasi concavity globally. However, if wide enough 
regions of the input space (including the observed output and input levels) where these restrictions 
are satisfied, then the translog func&on is considered as well behaved. See Diewert and Wales 
(1987) for an attempt to develop methods for imposing global curvature conditions in the context 
of cost function estimation.
9 A problem with this functional form is that risk increases with increased outputs as shown by 
Just and Pope (1979).
o
°Similar observations have been made for other industries as well. Corbo and Meller (1979) 
fitted translog production functions to 44 four-digit ISIC Chilean manufacturing industries and 
found that for 39 of these industries, the null hypothesis that their production function is the 
Cobb-Douglas cannot be rejected. This is consistent with the findings of Griliches (1967) and 
Zarembeka (1970) in relation to the CES function.
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5 .1 .2  V a r ia b l e s
Cobb-Douglas production frontiers were specified for the three rice crops. Rice 
(unhusked) output in bushels was the dependent variable, and area cultivated in acres, 
the number of man-days of labour in pre-harvest operations and the quantity  of nitrogen 
applied in kilograms were the independent variables. Harvest and post harvest labour 
were excluded as determinants of ou tput since ou tpu t is expected to be determined solely 
by inputs applied prior to harvest. Massed and Jhonson (1968) argued tha t ,  where the 
return to harvesting was sufficiently high so th a t  nothing is left unharvested, harvesting 
will be perfectly complementary with, and will be determined by, the level of use of other 
inputs used in crop production. It would consequently be redundant to include harvesting 
in the production function as a separate input. Further, they show that  the inclusion of 
harvesting in the production function will result in an identification problem in 
estimation.
In other specifications, inputs such as pesticides, weedicides, potassium and 
phosphorus were also included as independent variables but were found to be 
insignificant. A soil type dummy was also included (well drained =  I and poorly drained 
— 0) in earlier specifications of the two FPFs for the M aha season, but was found to be 
insignificant. This is consistent with research findings reported earlier that ,  given 
adequate water, both types of soils have similar yield potential. The insignificance of the 
soil type in the determination of crop yield in the M aha season, therefore, suggests tha t  
there was in fact sufficient water for well drained soils to perform similarly to poorly 
drained soils. Both M aha/head  and M aha tail environments have the same proportion of 
well and poorly drained soils. Agronomic research has shown tha t  given sufficient water, 
well drained soils can give similar rice yields to those obtained on poorly drained soils 
(Rasaiah 1980). The issue of soil type differences does not arise in the Yala season. Only 
rice is cultivated on poorly drained lands and only chillie is cultivated on well drained 
soils.
Interactive processes of this nature in regression analyses have been labled data
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m ining  or sped f i ca t ion  searches.  As Johnston (1984) points out, a t one extreme it is 
alleged tha t  da ta  mining invalidates all the conventional significance levels while a t  the 
other extreme it is suggested tha t  if the set of models tried includes the “true” model, 
tha t  model will have the smallest residual variance, so th a t  specification search is a 
reasonable and sensible procedure. Although not taking any one of these extreme views 
we hold th a t  the interaction between theory and da ta  is both inevitable and, indeed 
desirable following Johnston ’s (1984) conclusion. The alternative specifications tried by 
us were based on the received knowledge in the estimation of agricultural production 
functions and were by no means an exhaustive mechanical search for “best” fit. 
Therefore, we report the significance levels and the standard  errors in the conventional 
manner.
Another interesting point related to the finding th a t  the soil type does not affect 
ou tpu t in the M aha season is th a t  this soil demarcation coincides with tha t  for “head” 
and “tail” along field channels. Field channels run down the slope feeding well drained 
soils in the upper slope and then irrigating poorly drained soils in the lower slopes and 
bottom  lands. Even if farmers in the head of a field channel use more of the water 
available from that  channel, those in the “tail” do not suffer from inadequacy of water 
since they benefit from seepage from the “head” farms. However, farms in the “tail” of 
field channels have less control over water than those a t the head. It should be noted tha t  
the “ta i l” of field channels represents an entirely different water availability regime than 
th a t  in the distributories. Our M aha/head  and M aha/ta i l  demarcation was based on the 
distributory channels and not field channels.
The Yala/chillies F P F  was specified with the dried chillie equivalent of total 
harvest (which may comprise both green and ripe chillies) as the dependent variable, and 
land area cultivated, nitrogen and pesticide costs w'ere included as independent variables. 
Pesticides are an im portant input in the cultivation of chillies and were used by all the 
farmers. However, a variety of pesticides are being used which have different dosages, 
mixes etc. Hence, it was not feasible, in practice, to specify the FPF  with separate
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continuous variables for each pesticide. Pre-harvest labour was not significant in a 
previous specification of the production frontier for chillies. This insignificance is the 
result of low variation in the use of pre-harvest labour per unit of land, and, of course, 
does not imply th a t  this essential input is not im portant in chillie production. This 
problem in the estimation of of the contribution of certain inputs in explaining output 
occurs when farmers use similar quantities of inputs.
The available classification of soils in System H into well and poorly drained classes 
is a very broad categorization of their characteristics, and it is likely tha t  there are wide 
and significant variations in soils among farms within this broad demarcation. These 
differences may relate to soil nutrients, drainage characteristics, salinity and iron toxicity 
etc., (W ater Management Synthesis Project 1982). The identification of the soil 
characteristics of individual plots is a very highly resource intensive activity in terms of 
relevant professional skills and equipment and even then does not guarantee that all 
relevant factors can be identified (Tassic et al. 1987). Although some a ttem pts  have been 
made to identify particular soil problems in selected locations, e.g., salinity, detailed 
mapping of all the im portan t variations of soils with productivity implications was 
precluded by resource constraints.
Irrigation water is an im portan t variable factor in the production of rice. Where 
the quantity  of water used can be measured this can be incorporated in the production 
function and the relationship between output and water use can be estimated (Hexern and 
Heady 1978). For example, Alaouze (1984) and Palanisamy and Easter (1983) have 
included water as an independent variable in a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
Although crop performance is heavily influenced by the timing and the volume of water 
used, the exact contribution of water to yield is determined by a complex relationship 
incorporating factors such as soil and atmospheric conditions (Small et al. 1981). 
M easurement of water applied by farmers to their crops was beyond the resources 
available for our field study. Therefore, we abstract from these problems by studying the 
performance of farmers w’ithin broadly identified water availability regimes.
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The use of statistically estimated production functions to study farmer behaviour 
raises several problems as pointed out by Graff (1984) in a review of a recent study on the 
economy of an Indian village (Bliss and Stern 1982). Many of the problems encountered 
by Bliss and Stern (1982) in estimating production functions are similar to those we have 
described earlier and are common to much research based on farm survey data. For 
example, while there appeared to be eighteen different variables determining output 
only four are selected through step-wise selection and a good fit is obtained. These 
exclude some variables which clearly are likely to be im portan t determ inants  of output in 
reality. However, multicollinearity and the problem of inadequate degrees of freedom 
given the small number of farms (47) forced such a selection of variables. The inclusion of 
non essential inputs in the production function is another problem they encountered. 
While such problems do not imply th a t  research of this nature should never be 
undertaken it is vital th a t  the researchers are aware of the limitations and are cautious in 
drawing inferences. The following extract from Graff (1984) is of great interest in this 
sense:
A peasant farmer is an entrepreneur. The constra in t a maximizing 
entrepreneur faces is a psychological one. It contains all the variables he believes 
to be relevant to his decision, not just  those on which there is sufficient 
information available to an outsider trying to estimate regression coefficients. 
The outsider may succeed in producing a production function th a t  is a pretty 
good predictor of ou tpu t,  but not much help when it comes to estimating costs. 
The reason lies close to the nature of peasant entrepreneurship. It is not a hired 
factor with a market wage the investigator can record. It is a variable input with 
which, quite possibly, high subjective costs may be associated a t the margin. 
These are self evident to the entrepreneur, but concealed from the investigator, 
whose statistical production function can never include them, no m atte r  how 
well it predicts ou tput,  (pp 333-4).
These considerations are particularly relevant to studies of efficiency and measures 
of technical efficiency obtained with estimated production frontiers should be cautiously 
interpreted. The estimated function may not incorporate major variables due to 
multicollinearity, due to lack of accuracy in the da ta  or to lack of adequate variation in 
the sample. Such omisions distort both technical and allocative efficiency measures.
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5.2  F r o n t i e r  P r o d u c t i o n  F u n c t i o n  E s t i m a t e s
The estimated FPF s given in the Table 5-1 show tha t  the input elasticities for rice 
in the three environments vary substantially. Likelihood ratio tests of homogeneity (see 
M addala 1977, p 180) of production functions were carried out for all the three 
environments together, for M aha/head  and M aha/ta i l ,  for M aha/head  and Yala and 
finally, M aha/ta i l  and Yala. The relevant likelihood ratios (between fully restricted and 
completely unrestricted models) were 3814.3, 25.5, 5026.1 and 4458.8 respectively and 
were found to be highly significant a t  the appropriate  degrees of freedom. The log 
likelihood function values for the fully restricted models were 3880, 37.8, 2553.6 and 
2293.1 while those for the completely unresticted models were as reported in Table 5-1. 
Location specific agronomic research is not available to explain the exact causes of such 
variable input responses in detail, however, the following tentative hypotheses are 
presented as likely explanators. It is likely tha t  these differences were caused by the 
variations in water availability which is the major difference between the three 
environments.
The coefficient for pre-harvest labour is similar in M aha/head  and Yala/rice 
environments, but is substantially lower in magnitude for M aha/ta i l  environment.
Agronomic research elsewhere has shown tha t  water availability affects yield 
response to applications of nitrogen (De D a tta  1981, Yoshida 1981). In general, when 
water control is optimal the yield response of high yielding varieties to nitrogen fertilizer 
is higher. This may explain the low output elasticity of nitrogen in the Yala season 
relative to the M aha season. A possible explanation of the lower output elasticity of 
nitrogen in the M aha/head  than  in the M aha/ta i l  is tha t  there is a higher rate of 
percolation in the former environment and the resulting nutrient losses through leaching 
are greater (W ater Management Synthesis Project 1982). since well drained soils have a 
high rate of water loss through percolation.
Though farmers in the sample used potassium and phosphorus in addition to
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T a b le  5-1: Maximum likelihood estimates of Cobb-Douglas
stochastic frontier production functions for crop year
1984/85.
Maha season Yala season
Rice Rice Chillies
Head Reach 
(n=63)
Tail Rea.ch 
(n=61) (n=87) (n=102)
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Intercept + 2.530 * * * 
(0.3116)
+3.075 *** 
(0.3318)
+2.620*** 
(0.5061)
+ 4.035* * * 
(0.6341)
Land +0.624 * ** 
(0.1176)
+0.760 *** 
(0.1863)
+0.252* * 
(0.1315)
+0.403* * * 
(0.1158)
Pre harvest 
labour +0.408 *** 
(0.0888)
+0.145 * 
(0.1074)
+0.489* * * 
(0.1414)
Nitrogen +0.120 *** 
(0.0391)
+0.262 * * * 
(0.0677)
+0.083
(0.0806)
+ 0.164* * 
(0.0921)
Pesticide 
cost (Rs.) +0.3263 * * * 
(0.1176)
<72 0.1183 0.6732 0.6419 0.8113
7 0.3575
(0.3228) 
Log likelihood 
function -0.0115
0.9753* * * 
(0.0200)
-25.0235
0.9283*** 
(0.0021)
-40.5824
0.9584* ** 
(0.0280)
-53.7626
Notes: figures within parentheses are standard errors of estimates.
*** significant at the 1 per cent level.
* * significant at the 5 per cent level.
* significant at the 10 per cent level
nitrogen as well as pesticides and weedicides in rice cultivation their coefficients were not 
statistically significant. One possibility is that the responses of these inputs varied greatly 
across the farms so that variations in their levels did not correspond to their impact on 
yields. However, agronomic evidence on this point is insufficient to draw a firm 
conclusion. Similar arguments may explain why coefficients of pesticides and herbicides 
were also insignificant, but for these, it is also possible that inefficiency in their use may 
have been so widespread that the estimated best practice frontier may be well below the
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technologically feasible frontier. As noted earlier, the estimated frontier corresponds to 
the best practices prevailing in the community at the time and not necessarily the best 
practices which may be technically feasible. This point is particularly important in the 
case of chillies where this was the first season that it was grown on a significant scale by 
the sample farmers.
I his is not the conventional yield gap study, i.e., the identification of farmer to 
researcher gap, but is rather an attempt to understand the inefficiencies related to, and 
the causes of, differential farmer performance. Given that the achievement of full 
efficiency under a new technology by small farmers through learning and adjustment 
takes time, the best practice performance of farmers is considered here as a realistic 
potential under farmer management at a given moment in time. There is an unavoidable 
period of adjustment for farmers from the time a technology becomes available, and an 
observed gap between researchers and best farmers will probably narrow' because farmers’ 
best practices are likely to improve over time.
5.2.1 E xistence o f Technical Inefficiency
In the Maha/head area, all variations in output from the frontier are due to purely
random factors for it was found that, 7, the ratio of output variation due to technical
inefficiency (U) relative to the total variation in output (U+V) was not statistically 
*
significant. In contrast, in the Maha/tail, this ratio was statistically significant. To the 
extent that the FPF incorporated all relevant variables (including farm specific factors), 
this suggests that considerable technical inefficiency exists in the Maha/tail. The average 
technical efficiency there was 50 per cent and 7 was .97 which was statistically significant 
at the 1 per cent level. In other words 97 per cent of the total variation in output from 
the frontier can be attributed to technical inefficiency.
The high level of technical inefficiency observed in the Maha/tail area is not
surprising. The available new rice product ion technology was developed for areas with an
adequate and timely supply of water. While these conditions prevail in the “head” of the
ir r igat ion  c h a n n e l ,  th e  “ t a i l” ex p er ie n c es  se v er e  w a te r  p rob lem s b oth  in te r m s  o f  q u a n t i ty  
* Kota that Lee and Cheshor (1986) have shown that 7 » 0 is a null hypothesis on the 
boundary cf the parameter space and the test of it is non standard.
Lee, Lung-fei, and Chesher, A, 1986, "Specification Testing when score Test 
Statistics are Identically Zero", Journal of Econometrics. 31, 129-149
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and quality (timeliness of availability). Uncertainties with regard to water availability 
require farmers to exercise considerable skills in their management decisions regarding the 
timing of input application and in the selection of the most appropriate  cultural practices. 
Farmers who are capable of adapting the available technology to their particular 
conditions obtain higher output.
Some of these alternative outcomes were discussed in the previous chapter. The 
higher (average) productivity in the “head” compared with the “tail” is consistent with 
the situation often observed in irrigation systems (see, for example, Bromley et al. 1980; 
Moore et al. 1983; Skold et al 1984). While the complete absence of variation in technical 
efficiency among farmers in M aha/head  (implied by the statistically insignificant 7 ) is 
somewhat unexpected, it is not implausible. A similar result has been reported by Huang 
and Bagi (1984) for Northwest India. This environment, which is homogenized to a large 
extent by water availability, is ideal for the practice of the available technology in the 
reccommended form and therefore does not impose heavy demands on management skills.
In the Yala season, substantial technical inefficiencies exist (Table 5-2). Average 
technical efficiency is 45 per cent for rice and 44 per cent for chillies. The 7 ratios are .92 
and .95 respectively and are significant a t  the 1 per cent level. The technologies of both 
Yala season rice cultivation and Yala season chillie cultivation under irrigation are not 
well defined. For instance, the existing recommendations for the cultivation of rice are 
identical for both seasons, which assumes that water availability would be similar in both 
seasons and is consistent with the pre-project expectations of the planners.
5 .2 .2  R etu rn s  to  Scale
Another im portan t  difference between the estimated frontiers is the difference in 
returns to scale. Although the function coefficient E , gives the returns to scale of the 
Cobb-Douglas production frontiers, statistical tests were carried out to determine whether 
the implied returns to scale were significantly different from constant returns to scale
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4 (see Jo hn s ton  1984, pp 204-7).
T he  hypo thes is  th a t co n s ta n t re tu rn s  to  scale exists in  M a h a /h e a d  is rejected a t 5 
per cent (F = 4 .6 7 ) , w h ile  th is  canno t be re jected in  M a h a / ta i l  (F = 0 .0 0 ) . In  the Y a la  
season, the  hypo thes is  o f co n s ta n t re tu rn s  to  scale is re jected  (F =  10.05) fo r rice b u t 
ca nn o t be re jected  fo r c h illie s  (F = 0 .S 9 4 ). T h is  suggests th a t  in  the  M a h a /h e a d ,
increas ing  re tu rn s  to  scale e x is t, w h ile  in  the M a h a /ta i l ,  co n s ta n t re tu rn s  to  scale p re va il, 
w h ile  in  '' ta la /r ic e  re tu rn s  to  scale are decreasing. C h illie  techno logy  is characte rized  by 
co n s ta n t re tu rn s  to  scale.
These Findings have im p o r ta n t im p lic a tio n s  fo r long te rm  e ffic iency and e qu ity . In 
the  case o f rice , as w a te r a v a ila b il i ty  decreases and the re fo re  raises the  im portance  o f 
m anagem en t (te ch n ica l e ffic ien cy ) in  the ach ievem en t o f best p ra c tice  techno logy , re tu rns  
to  scale appear to  decline . As the  s ign ificance  o f techn ica l e ffic iency  in  the  p ro du c tion  
techno logy  increases, fixed  m anageria l a b il ity  o f fa rm ers m ay ac t as a c o n s tra in t on the  
expansion  o f land  and o th e r in p u ts  used in rice  p ro d u c tio n . M an ag em en t a b ility  is 
de te rm ine d  by hum an  c a p ita l endow m ents o f fa rm e rs  and the re fo re  ca nn o t be increased 
like  o th e r phys ica l fa c to rs  o f p ro d u c tio n  in  the  s h o rt run . I t  is th u s  a fixed  fa c to r.
W here  a ll fa c to rs  o f p ro d u c tio n  are v a ria b le , econom ic th e o ry  suggests constan t 
re tu rn s  to  scale. H ow ever, w here one or m ore fac to rs  are fixed  in  the  sh o rt ru n , there w ill  
be an o p tim u m  scale o f o p e ra tio n . In th is  case, where m anagem en t is lik e ly  to  be the  
re le va n t fixed  fa c to r, when the  ac tua l scale o f o pe ra tion  is less th a n  the o p tim u m , and the  
fa rm e rs  have id le  m anagem ent c a p a b ilit ie s , increas ing  re tu rn s  to  scale w ill  be observed. 
A t  the  scale o f o pe ra tion  cons is ten t w ith  the m anagem ent a b il it ie s  o f fa rm ers , re tu rns  to  
scale w il l  be co n s ta n t, and w hen the scale o f o pe ra tion  is expanded beyond th is  o p tim u m  
level decreasing re tu rn s  w i l l  occur.
^ T h is  tes t was ca rr ie d  o u t w ith  the  O LS  regression since the  a v a ila b le  c o m p u te r so ftw a re  does 
no t a llo w  th is  tes t to  be done on th?  fro n t ie r .  H o w eve r, the  use o f O LS  is a p p ro p r ia te  as the slope 
c o e ffic ie n ts  o f  th e  O LS  and the  s to ch a s tic  f ro n t ie r  are no t expected to  d if fe r  s ig n if ic a n t ly .  N o te  
th a t  the  s to ch a s tic  f ro n t ie r  p ro d u c tio n  fu n c tio n  m ode l assumes s h o r tfa lls  fro m  the  f ro n t ie r  to  be the  
re s u lt o f  ra n d o m  e rro r te rm  U  ( t 5-ch n ic i;l in e ff ic ie n c y ) and the re fo re , is a n e u tra l tra n s fo rm a tio n  of
the OLS production function (Schmidt 1985-86).
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Accordingly, the optim um  scale of operation consistent with farmers’ management 
capabilities will vary with season and location. The optimum scale for an individual will 
also vary according to his stock of management. This latter point however, cannot be 
empirically established owing to our assumption tha t  the farmer specific production 
function is a neutral transformation of the frontier function for the entire sample. In 
general, however, this implies tha t  if management capacity is underutilized, farmers in a 
favourable environment will be able to expand their scale of operation profitably while 
those in less favourable environments will not be able to do so. In fact, those farmers in 
least favourable environments may already have exceeded their optim um  scale. Given 
th a t  individual endowments of skills are different and tha t  technologies vary between 
locations, the prevailing trend towards a reallocation of land which is different from the 
original equal allotment size is not surprising. Furthermore, our findings on differences in 
technical inefficiency and the returns to scale are consistent with a priori expectations 
based on theoretical grounds.
5.3 F arm  Specific T echnical Efficiency
Estim ates of firm specific technical efficiencies relative to the four frontiers reported 
in Table 5-1 are given in Table 5-2. These were obtained using the methodology outlined 
in the previous chapter. The average technical efficiency was. naturally, highest in 
M ah a /h ead  where there was no statistically significant technical inefficiency. Therefore, 
firm specific technical efficiency measures were not obtained for this location. In 
M a h a / ta i l ,  the mean technical efficiency was 50 per cent with a s tandard  deviation of 
18.87 per cent. In the Yala/rice environment, mean technical efficiency was 45 per cent 
with a s tandard  deviation of 19.7 per cent. In the Yala/chillie environment, the mean 
technical efficiency was 44 per cent with a s tandard  deviation of 18.95 per cent.
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Table 5-2: Frequency distributions of farm specific technical
efficiency
Maha/tail Yala/rice Yala/chi Hies
Range
0-10 1( 1.63) 1( 1.14) 5( 4.09)
11-20 3( 4.91) 3( 3.44) 3( 2.94)
21-30 2( 3.27) 15(17.24) 10( 9.80)
31-40 10(16.39) 30(34.48) 31(30.39)
41-50 21(34.42) 9(10.31) 23(22.54)
51-60 8(13.11) 11(12.64) 12(11 76)
61-70 8(13.11) 7 ( 3.0 4) 7( 6.86)
71-80 2 ( 3.27) 4( 4.59) 5( 4.90)
81-90 4( 6.55) C>( 6.83) 4 ( 3.92)
91-100 2( 3.27) 1( 1.14) 2( 1.96)
No. of 
cases 61 87 102
Note: figures within parentheses axe percentages.
5 .3 .1  F a c to rs  A ffec t in g  F arm -S p ec if ic  T ech n ica l  Effic iency
Variations in TE arise from different practices/techniques employed in using given 
inputs. Farmers may vary their techniques/practices because of their individual 
perceptions about the technology and because of differences in their ability to implement 
or practice the perceived technology. If all component techniques and practices are 
known, and their effectiveness can be measured, then measured differences in technical 
efficiency variation may be fully explained.
In the absence of information on such finer points of technology, it is possible to 
relate variations in technical efficiency to known techniques and farmer a ttr ibu tes  which 
are likely to determine technical efficiency, i.e., the effectiveness of input application. 
Here, these farmer a ttr ibu tes  stand as proxies for unmeasured differences in practices.
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Accordingly, various farmer a ttr ibu tes  such as education, age, previous experience in 
growing HYV’s (indicated by farmer background) and land specific experience of farmers 
were used as proxy variables in the following regression analyses of the determinants of 
technical efficiency variation. Direct measures of alternative techniques were also used as 
well as timing and quality differences in inputs where satisfactory measures and da ta  were 
available. Thus, variables such as variety were included as explanatory variables at this 
stage of the analysis; the rationale for this procedure was tha t  they are management 
variables th a t  could be chosen by the farmer. A potential problem here is tha t  of 
collinearity between farmer a ttr ibu tes  and practices, and resulting inconsistency of OLS 
estimates in regression analysis. However, examination of the correlation matrices of the 
regressions reported below did not reveal correlations between explanatory variables 
exceeding .30. It should be noted th a t  a similar potential for collinearity problems exists 
even if only practices were used to explain technical efficiency variations, i.e., good 
farmers may use all or most of the best practices. Indeed it is reasonable to expect good 
farmers to use most of the best practices together.
Technical efficiency (TE) variations have been explained in terms of explanatory 
variables using OLS estimates (Timmer, 1971; Page 1984). However, when TE is defined 
as the ratio of actual (adjusted for stochastic influences) to highest achievable output for 
a given level of inputs, it is bounded between zero and one and therefore is not normally 
distributed. As a result the OLS regression estimates with TE  as the dependent variable 
are inefficient and the predicted values of TE may fall outside the bounded interval. In 
addition, a non-normally distributed dependent variable results in a non-normal error 
term  and, therefore, prevents tests of significance and the making of confidence interval 
s ta tem ents  (Maddala 1977). Accordingly, w'e use a transformation of TE, where T = In 
[TE /  1 - TEj which assumes values between -oc and - -^oc, as the dependent variable in 
our regressions as r ported in Tables 5-3 to 5-5«
There are two problems that can arise when attem pting  to analyse the determinants 
of technical efficiency. Firstly, “pure” TE can be confounded with farm specific
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environmental factors in the measured I E; this is likely to be higher when micro 
environmental differences across farms are high. Thus we could expect th a t  this problem 
will be relatively less serious in the Maha/ head. Secondly, the determinants of individual 
TE  will be varied and complex. In a cross section study, the general factors influencing 
TE are likely to capture only a fractii n of the multitude of factors operating on an 
individual.
Regression analysis of the determinants of TE variation in the M aha/ta i l  with T as 
the dependent variable (Table 5-2) showed tha t  Wet Zone (Kandy District) farmers had 
significantly higher efficiencies than other". Their previous exposure to HYV’s (since the 
late 1960’s) and their experience with practices such as transplanting, manual weed 
control and chemical fertilizer application (ARTI 1974) were clearly useful in this 
environment. In addition, they were competent at land levelling, terracing and the 
construction of field bunds which are essential components of good water management. 
This expertise in water management was developed over generations of rice cultivation on 
terraced hill slopes with water tapped from small natural waterways.
Literacy, defined as a minimum of three years of formal schooling was found to be 
positively and significantly related to TE. This was based on the proposition tha t  literacy 
is more relevant in the determination of productivity in LDC agriculture than the total 
period of formal education (Jamison and Lau, 1982 and Lipton, 1985).
Farmers who have land specific experience (LSE) obtained by cultivating the same 
plot of land for a considerable period (at least five years) were found to be technically 
more efficient than others (see Roscnzweig and Wolpin, 1985; Ekanayake and Jayasuriya, 
1986).
The TE  of part  time farmers (those who do not engage in farming as their sole 
economic activity), was significantly lower than full time farmers. The need to allocate 
time and managerial effort between on farm and off farm activities may have been an 
im portan t factor here.
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The second group of technical efficiency determinants comprised the following 
agronomic practices:
1. establishment date of the rice crop (early establishment would help to avoid 
w'ater stress and the usual build up of pests towards the end of the season), 
and
2. weed and pest control ( lower pest and weed damage levels^ were taken as 
indicators of better management). We mentioned earlier tha t  pesticides and 
weedicides did not affect ou tpu t significantly when included as explanatory 
variables in the estimated production frontiers.
In addition, the farmers receiving bank loans were found to be more technically 
efficient. Access to capital can clearly aff ct allocative efficiency by enabling farmers to 
apply optimal quantity  of inputs. However, the timely availability of capital may also 
affect technical efficiency, since delays in obtaining credit may affect the timing of input 
application. In system H bank loans for cultivation purposes are provided in kind, at the 
required time, i.e., fertilizer and agro chemicals, and therefore, farmers receiving bank 
loans do not encounter input supply bottlenecks. Accordingly, the availability of bank 
loans facilitates the timely application of inputs and may explain the higher technical 
efficiency of farmers receiving credit. It is interesting to note tha t  the dummy for those 
farmers who were heavily indebted (in excess of Rs. 5000) and therefore had limited 
access to capital, had a negative (and significant) regression coefficient.
Regression analysis explaining variation in technical efficiency in the Yala/rice 
environment (Table 5-4) showed that Purana farmers were the most efficient of the three 
farmer categories in the area. This suggests tha t  Purana  farmers benefited from their 
greater experience and familiarity with the \  ala season environment, i.e., their greater 
environment-specific experience. Technical efficiency decreased with age. On the one 
hand, age may be related to the efficiency of tasks performed, and on the other, to 
adoption of new practices/te  hniques. Old age may reduce the efficiency of performing
5r .The farmers who manually weeded their fields appeared to have lower output for similar levels 
of other inputs as indicated by negative regression coefficients. This apparently surprising result 
may be explained by fact that the amount of weed control labour may actually be an indicator of 
the extent of weed infestation rather than that of an output increasing input.
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T a b le  5-3: OLS Estimates of determinants of technical efficiency
variation in M aha/tail  environment
Variable Coefficient
Intercept -0.2304
(0.3128)
Wet Zone farmers a/ +0.9270* * *
(0.2160)
Literacy a/ +0.7171***
(0.1897)
Part-time farmers a/ -0.4656* *
(0.2245)
LSE farmers a/ +0.4954* *
(0.247S)
Farmers receiving
bank loans a./ +0.7314**
(0.3369)
Heavily indebted
farmers a/ -0.4710
(0.3823)
Early established long
aged varieties a/ +0.7671
(0.6383)
Early established short
aged varieties a/ +0.4315***
(0.1640)
High pest damage a/ -0.8583* * *
(0.1800)
High weed damage a/ -0.3495*
(0.1919)
Manual weeding a/ -0.4068**
(0.1716)
R2= .60
F = 9.2395***
Notes: figures within parentheses are standard errors of estimates.  
*** significant at the 1 per cent level.
** significant at the 5 per cent level.
* significant at the 10 per cent level 
a /  dummy variable
certain tasks. Previous experience in cultivation with an old technology may make older 
farmers conservative in their adoption of new practices and therefore age may become a
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liability rather than an asset in learning and applying new practices, i.e., it may be hard 
to change traditional practices learned by experience.
As expected, farmers with land specific experience had higher technical efficiency. 
About half the farmers did not have such experience as they had moved from the tail to 
cultivate land in the head. Where land is heterogenous, the optimal set of management 
practices will vary between farms. Therefore, a farmer applying a known technology in a 
new farm (which has an unknown micro environment) is likely to be less efficient than 
another who applies it in a familiar environment.
In Yala, those who leased in land were more efficient. Surprisingly, farmers who 
received bank loans appeared to be less technically efficient. The literature on 
“X-efficiency and effort” (Corden 1976, M artin 1978) suggests th a t  subsidized industries 
may be affected by a reduction in the managerial effort applied to the firm depending on 
the income effect of a subsidy. Thus the impact of subsidies such as cultivation credit on 
technical efficiency can be ambiguous. They may increase or decrease technical efficiency 
depending on the relative strengths of their income and substitution effects.
Those who cultivated long aged varieties had positive technical efficiency while 
those who cultivated short aged varieties had a negative coefficent. Long aged varieties 
are normally expected to have a higher yield potential under farmer management. 
Howrever, under rainfed conditions short aged varieties are preferred to avoid moisture 
stress to the crop towards the end of the season. Under conditions of limited intermittent 
irrigation (as observed in Yala season), we would expect tha t  long aged varieties would 
have higher yields because as Senadhira (1980) points out, they are able to recover from 
periodic water stresses.
Overall, the total variation in technical efficiency explained by the regression (R z) 
for the Yala/rice environment was lower than tha t  for the M aha/ta i l .  This does not mean
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t h a t  the regression carried out  and the included variables were not important® . The 
regression was statistically significant as were some of the variables included (the relevant 
F and t statistics are given). It was pointed out at  the beginning of this section that  such 
low explanatory power of regressions of technical efficiency are to be expected.
T a b l e  5-4: OLS Estimates of determinants  of technical efficiency
variation in Yala/rice environment
Variable Coefficient
Intercept 1.2795* * * 
(0.4879)
Purana farmers a/ +0.5172 ** 
(0.2121)
Farmer age -0.0136* 
(0.0078)
LSE farmers a/ +0.5172***
(0.2121)
Leasers a/ +0.G491*
(0.3904)
Farmers receiving
bank loans a/ -1.1569*
(0.6495)
Water shortage -0.2713**
(0.1340)
Long aged varieties 0.8434**
Short aged varieties -0.3495*
(0.2055)
R2= .20
F = 3.7258***
Notes: figures within parentheses are standard errors of estimates.
*** significant at the 1 per cent level.
** significant at the 5 per cent level.
* significant at the 10 per cent level
a/dummy variable
The regression results for Yala/chillies was similar to Yala/rice in terms of the total 
variability explained. Again, omitted farm-specific environmental variables may have
®For a further elaboration of this point, see Rahm and Huffman (198-1. 1986).
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T a b le  5-5: OLS Estimates of determinants of technical efficiency
variation in Yala/ chillies environment
Variable Coefficient
Intercept -1.0533
(0.6G83)
Wet Zone farmers a/ +0.3265
(0.2322)
Purana farmers a/ +0.3901*
(0.2357)
Part-time farmers a/ 0.3070
(0.2326)
LSE farmers a/ -0.4220**
(0.1874)
Farmers receiving
bank loans a/ +0.6678**
(0.4144)
Farmers reporting high 
pest damage a/ +0.6249***
(0.2011)
High weed damage a/ -0.3671* * * 
(0.1242)
Water shortage a/ -0.3580* * 
(0.3125)
R2= .18
F=3.8374***
Notes: figures within parentheses are standard errors of estimates.
*** significant at the 1 per cent level.
** significant at the 5 per cent level.
* significant at the 10 per cent level
a/ dummy variable
been partly responsible for this. As in the Yala/rice situation, Purana  farmers were found 
to be the most efficient. In the case of chillies, they appear to have benefitted from their 
previous experience in chillie cultivation and from their familiarity with the environment, 
although the technology they used previously was substantially different, being based on 
traditional varieties and under rainfed conditions. Farmers receiving bank loans had high 
technical efficiency. In the case of chillies, which is more capital intensive than rice, bank 
loans raises TE. The average cost of production of chillies in the sample area was double 
th a t  of rice (Table 4-1).
135
Further, and as expected, farmers reporting high weed damage and high water 
stress were technically inefficient. However, farmers who reported high pest damage were 
technically efficient. One reasonable explanation for this surprising result is tha t  good 
farmers may have been able to identify pest damage. Certain types of pest a ttacks are 
known to be difficult to identify (Godcll et al. 1982). Another unexpected result is the 
negative coefficient for land specific experience, which does not seem to have a reasonable 
explanation. However, as we have noted earlier most of these farmers were cultivating 
chillies on a significant scale on irrigable land for the first time. Their previous 
experience was with cultivating rice, a crop which is differs greatly in management 
requirements from chillies. T ha t  experience, m fact, may have acted to prevent them  from
learning the very different set of practices required for chillie cultivation on tha t  land. 
Field observations indicated tha t  most of these farmers who had been used to the very 
high water requirements for rice on well drained soils tended to over-irrigate chillies.
Land specific experience should be distinguished from environment specific 
experience associated with Purana farmers. A Purana  farmer may not necessarily have 
the latter  since he may be located in the tail and is required to move to a farm located in 
the head during the Yala season.
5.4 Farm  Specific A llocative Efficiency
In the previous section, it was argued that the accuracy of a farmer s perception of a 
given technology and his ability and capability to practice it determines his technical 
efficiency. The correct perception of the parameters of a technology (i.e.. the marginal 
productivities of various inputs when combined with alternative practices) and the ability 
to implement tha t  technology effectively are prerequisites for allocative efficiency. 
However, a profit maximizing farmer also needs ability to seek and decode market 
information so th a t  he can equate marginal value products of inputs with their marginal 
costs. Thus education, experience and access to market information may determine 
allocative efficiency too, apart from their influence n technical efficiency. The role of 
education in seeking market information and decoding them in the determinativ t of
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allocative efficiency is obvious and needs no elaboration. Long experience in operating in 
particular markets, e.g., the market for rice or chillies, may provide additional insights. 
Similarly, those who have general experience in operating within a market economy may 
have an advantage in efficient allocation of resources over those who have had little 
previous exposure to markets, f ina lly , some farmers may experience particular 
constraints in their access to resources which may prevent them applying an allocativelv 
efficient level of inputs.
T a b le  5-6: Frequency distributions of farm specific allocative
efficiencies
Maha/head Maha/Tai1 Yala/rice Yala/chillies
Range *
< 0 0 6( 9.83) 3( 3.44) 1( 0.98)
0-10 1( 1.58) 0 0 1( 0.98)
11-20 0 0 0 18(17.64)
21-30 0 1( 1.63) 0 33(32.35)
31-40 1( 1.58) 2( 3.27) 2( 2.29) 26(25.49)
41-50 2( 3.17) 11(18.03) 10(11.49) 16(15.68)
51-60 2( 3.17) 19(31.14) 7( 8.04) 4( 3.92)
61-70 8(12.69) 14(22.95) 8( 9.19) 1( 0.98)
71-80 12(19.04) 7(11.47) 14(16.09) 1( 0.98)
81-90 25(39.68) 1( 1.63) 12(13.79) 0
91-100 12(19.04) 0 31(35.63) 1( 0.98)
No. of 
cases 63 61 87 102
Note: figures within parentheses are percentages.
The calculation of allocative efficiency ( \  F) of individual farmers at farm gate 
prices is cliffi 'ult owing to the problems in identifying farm specific opportunity costs as 
discussed in C hapter 3. We thus derive farm specific measures based on market prices
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which we will call “apparent  allocative fficiency*. Unlike technical efficiency, allocative 
elficiency (as defined in Chapter 3) may take negative values if farmers overallocate 
inputs and therefore a comparison of mean values for each location cannot be meaningful. 
However, the distributions of firm specific efficiency given in Table 5-5 provide an 
understanding of the nature of distributions.
In the M aha/head , 75 per cent of the farmers were more than 80 per cent 
allocatively efficient, whereas in the M aha/ta i l ,  75 per cent of the farmers were less than 
40 per cent allocatively efficient. In the Yala season/rice 75 per cent were above 70 per 
cent allocatively efficient while for Yala season/chillies 75 per cent of the farmers were 
less than  40 per cent allocatively efficient.
5.4 .1  T ech n ica l  E ffic iency  as a D e te rm in a n t  o f  A l lo ca t iv e  Effic iency
The preceding discussion showed that  a farmer's perception of a technology is an 
im portan t determ inant of both his technical and allocative efficiency. If individual 
farmers know the param eters of their production functions and markets with certainty, 
and aim to maximize profits, they can achieve both technical and allocative efficiency. To 
the extent th a t  their knowledge of the technology is imperfect there is likely to be both 
technical and allocative inefficiency, i.e., the efficiencies are likely to be positively 
correlated.
Given tha t  inefficiency is related to the dynamics of technological change, such a 
positive correlation between efficiencies may be expected to prevail over time, i.e., with 
increasing familiarity with a new technology, technically efficient farmers will be 
allocatively efficient. However, such a correlation need not necessarily exist in static 
measures of firm specific efficiency within a dynamic situation, i.e., where farmers are in 
the process of adjusting to various disequilibria. For example, those farmers who adopt 
new practices immediately after their introduction will appear to be technically more 
efficient than  others. The former group however, may be allocatively inefficient since they 
may be uncertain about the performance of these practices and thus are unable to judge 
a p p r o p r ia te  input leve ls  and th u s  m a x im iz e  pre-fits. F u r th er ,  they m ay n ot  attem pt to
138
maximize profits if they are aware of this imperfection in their perception of the 
technology with these new practices. The latter  group, on the other hand, may achieve 
allocative efficiency since they are applying familiar practices.
For decades economists have Leen aware of this positive correlation between 
technical and allocative efficiencies, and were concerned about the resulting simultaneity 
bias in single equation estimates of production functions (Hoch 1958). One way of 
avoiding this bias and the resulting inconsistency of production function estimates is to 
assume th a t  farmers maximize the m athematical expectation of profits given the 
stochastic nature of ou tpu t in agriculture (Zehner et al. 1966). The other method is
to follow' the duality approach by estim ating profit or cost functions.
Schmidt and Lovell (1980) introduced a method of testing for significant positive 
correlation between technical and allocative efficiencies of a sample of firms and also a 
method to allow for this correlation in obtaining consistent production frontier estimates. 
I heir estimates of the frontier function under the standard  assumption of uncorrelated 
efficiencies and under their “generalized'1 model, which allows for positive correlation of 
efficiencies, were found to be strongly similar, in spite of the presence of a statistically 
significant positive correlation between the efficiencies. Thus they conclude that...
1 his strong similarity in the two sets of estimates of frontier technology is 
comforting. It suggests th a t  the way in which we model inefficiency relative to a 
stochastic frontier, and the nature of efficiency we find, has no appreciable effect 
on our inferences concerning the shape and the placement of tha t  frontier, (p
At the time the Schmidt and Lovell (1980) paper appeared there was no means of 
obtaining firm specific technical efficiency estimates relative to a stochastic frontier 
{unction. Hence a special test to deteimine the existence of correlation between 
efficiencies was icquired. However, a method of obtaining firm specific technical efficiency 
measures is now avail .tele and therefore, the relationship between the two efficiencies can 
be identified through regression analysis.
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Despite the long standing awareness of correlated efficiencies, surprisingly little 
attention has been given to this in the empirical literature on firm efficiency. A notable 
exception is Page (1980). He estimated a deterministic production frontier and obtained 
Farrell-type measures of technical and price (allocative) efficiency for three industries in 
Ghana and found a significant positive correlation between the two efficiencies of firms in 
the logging industry. However, he, too, recognized that the relationship between these 
may be more complex and that such positive correlations may not necessarily be observed 
empirically. He stated that:
Correlation analysis of the indices of technical and price efficiency supports 
such an interpretation for logging where the two indices are significantly and 
positively correlated, suggesting that managers who are technically inefficient 
may also be unaware of opportunity costs and alternative techniques [input 
output combinations}. But the relationship between the choice of technique and 
technical efficiency may be more complex. Variations in capital intensity may 
reflect different relative factor prices faced by individual firms. Capital intensive 
firms should be those with access to the most highly subsidized segments of the 
capital market. Such subsidies may have an income effect tending to reduce the 
amount of managerial effort supplied to the firm, and may, therefore, lower the 
level of technical efficiency, (p 337).
The nature of the relationship between technical and allocative efficiencies is 
examined here by regression analysis with the former as the independent variable7 . Our 
AAE is not normally distributed. Therefore, as in the case of TE, we obtain ’A’ a measure 
of AAE, where A = In [l /  1 - AEj, which can assume values ranging from -oo to -i-oo 
(A=0 when no profits are made). Tables 5-9 to 5-12 present regressions for each 
environment in the study area.
1. Maha, head farmers were bo*h technically and allocatively highly efficient. The 
available technology was developed for such a' favourable environment where conditions 
are quite homogeneous. Here, farmers are able to implement the technological package 
with minimum demands on their human capital. The new technology needs minimal
7Note that Schmidt and Lovell (1980) and Page (1980) used Farrell’s (1957) definition of 
allocative efficiency. Our approach differs from this as outlined in Chapter 3. A problem with the 
former definition is that technically inefficient farmers are allocatively inefficient as well by 
definition. An empirical illustration of this point is given in section 5.5. Also see Ekanayake (1987) 
and Ekanayake and Shand (1987)
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ad justm ent to farm conditions. Regression analysis of the efficiency relationship is not 
feasible due to the invariance in technical efficiency among farmers in this location.
2. On the average, M aha/ta i l  farmers are both technically and allocatively less 
efficient. There is, however, a strong positive correlation between the two efficiencies as 
seen in Regression 1 for the tail ( fa b le  5-11). Another regression specifying a quadratic 
relationship between technical and allocative efficiencies (Regression 2, Table 5-11) gave a 
better fit, but the m agnitude of the coefficient of the squared term  was negligible. This 
suggests th a t  both technical and allocative inefficiencies are related to the existing levels 
of understanding of the technology.
3. There was a generally high degree of technical and allocative inefficiency in the 
Yala/rice environment, but no significant linear relationship was found between these 
efficiencies. The relationship, in fact, varied among different farmer groups (Table 5-7). 
First, there was a small group of farmers who were technically highly efficient but were 
only moderately efficient allocatively. Second, a large majority of farmers were only 
moderately efficient technically, but were highly allocatively efficient. Third, a few 
farmers had both very low technical and allocative efficiencies.
Here, a regression specifying a quadratic  relationship between technical efficiency 
and allocative efficiency showed tha t  the intercept and the two independent variables TE 
(technical efficiency) and TE^ (technical efficiency squared) were significant at the 1 per 
cent level with the expected signs, i.e., TE  positive and TE^ negative (Regression 1 Table 
5-12).
The observed quadratic  relationship between technical and allocative efficiencies 
suggests th a t  technically highly efficient farmers were allocatively inefficient. This may be 
explained either by a lack ol adequate knowledge or perception of the parameters of the 
technology for maximizing profits or by specific constraints on the application of correct 
input levels, e.g. capital. The latter explanation, however, lacks credibility in this crop
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year, for the Yala season followed a good M aha season with high yields and the capital 
requirements in the Yala season were relatively low owing to the smaller area cultivated 
by each farmer. Further, it is hard to Find specific resource constraints which only affect 
technically efficient farmers.
The former explanation seems to be the more realistic. Detailed recommendations 
do not exist to guide farmers in cultivating rice in the Yala season. The lack of special 
recommendations and therefore of a  specific set of practices for the Yala season follows 
from the project planning expectations of similar water availability for both Maha and 
Y ala seasons. In practice, however, the two seasons represent very different environments 
for rice cultivation. Therefore, farmers are left to experiment and learn the appropriate 
technology by experience. In this context, a majority of farmers chose to apply a low 
levels of inputs although all the farmers cultivated modern rice varieties (Table 4-2). For 
example, 72 percent of the farmers broadcast seeded instead of transplanting, while only 7 
percent applied basal fertilizer. Only 5 percent of the farmers cultivated long aged 
varieties. We used discriminant function analysis to explore the characteristics of the 
farmers grouped by the two a ttr ibu tes  TE  and AE. The farmers were grouped into two. 
The first group comprised farmers wdth TE > 65 percent and moderate AE and the 
remainder were allocated into the second group. The estimated discriminant function, 
using the SPSS (1975) package, is presented in Table 5-8. The major discriminating 
variables in order of their relative contribution to the discriminant function were choice of 
variety, establishment method and the use of basal fertilizer. The discriminant function 
was able to correctly classify 84 per cent of the cases between the two groups. As shown 
in Table 4-2, the cultivation of long and medium aged rice varieties, transplanting and 
the use of basal fertilizer are more typical of M aha season practices.
Discriminant function analysis was again used to explore the difference in 
characteristics of farmers who transplan t long and medium aged varieties of rice in the 
\ ala season and others. The standardised discriminant function showed that  the most
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T a b le  5-7: Relationships between allocative efficiency and technical
efficiency in the Yala/rice environment
TE Range No.of farmers Tech. Efficiency Alio. Efficiency
mean std. dev mean std.dev
> 65% 16 7 8 . G 10.2 50.4 10.1
< 65% < 68 38.5 10.8 84.1 14.7
Note: Three farmers in the sample had negative allocative efficiencies 
and were omitted ficm this analysis.
T a b le  5-8: Standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients
for Yala/rice farmers with 
TE  > 65 per cent and others
Variable Coefficient
Long aged varieties 
Medium aged varieties 
Use of basal fertilizer 
Transplanting
1.1160 
0.4511 
-0.4952 
0.3455
im portant variable influencing group membership was being a Wet Zone farmer (Table 
5-9). This finding tha t  Wet Zone farmers were closely associated with those practices 
found to be efficient in the Yala season suggests th a t  their previous experience in the use 
of such practices may have influenced their choice of transplanting as the appropriate 
establishment method. On the other hand, the more cautious approach of the Purana 
villagers in their selection of practices, i.e., broadcast seeding and the use of short aged 
rice varieties to avoid potential damage from water stress, may be due to their long 
experience of the variability in the Dry Zone rainfall pattern  and their relatively short 
exposure to the new rice technology.
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T a b le  5-9: Standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients
for Yala/rice farmers transplanting long or medium aged 
varieties and other farmers
Variable Coefficient
Wet Zone farmers 0.9723
Purana farmers 0.1161
Farmer age 0.1396
Literacy 0.1836
Off farm income -0.1242
Farmers here, even after eight years of settlement, were still experimenting with 
practices based on their previous experience in similar activities or environments and 
their familiarity with certain techniques. They were, therefore, unlikely to have fully 
perceived the true input ou tpu t relationships resulting from their actions in the new 
environments. As their perceptions more closely reflect actual outcomes of their practices 
with greater experience, the magnitude of resulting allocative errors would decrease.
Treating technical efficiency as a neutral transformer of the F P F , farmer specific 
production functions are derived. Then allocative efficiency for a technically efficient 
farmer requires higher input levels than for a relatively inefficient farmer. During a 
process of experimentation and learning by doing, farmers may not expect high technical 
efficiencies and are likely to to err more in their allocative decisions by under-using 
inputs.
It is tem pting to a t t r ibu te  the apparent allocative inefficiency of technically efficient 
farmers to a higher perceived ri -k and a resulting risk minimization strategy. However, it 
should be noted th a t  even in the absence of such perceived risk and an associated
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allocative strategy, farmers who experiment with new technologies and achieve good 
results and therefore become relatively technically efficient can be allocatively inefficient 
if their ex-ante perception of the technology deviates from its “true ’’ ex-post outcome. As 
such, the observed divergence may be a ttr ibu ted  to human error in resource allocation. 
Greater experience will tend to reduce divergences from allocative efficiency due to such 
errors.
4. In the Yala/chillie environment the relationship between technical and allocative 
efficiencies was negative and significant (Regression 1 Table 5-13). As mentioned earlier, 
this was the first season when farmers in the study area cultivatsd chillies on this scale 
and under irrigation. rI his crop too suffered from a lack of detailed recommendations even 
more than  in the case of the \  a la /rice  crop. Here, too, farmers were experimenting and it 
is unlikely th a t  they correctly perceived the outcomes of their practices. Probably, the 
same reasons given above for Yala/rice environment explain the allocative inefficiency of 
these technically efficient farmers.
As farmers gain more experience, the differences between their perceptions and 
actual outcomes may converge over time and allocative efficiencies of farmers for the two 
Yala season crops is likely to improve.
5.4.2 Other Factors Affecting Farm -Specific A llocative Efficiency
Farmers in the M aha/head  had high AAE. More than three fourths of these 
farmers had AAE greater than  70 per cent . Regression analysis showed that older 
farmers had higher AAE (Table 5-10) in this environment. This suggests tha t  greater 
farming experience raises allocative efficiency. Second, AAE was positively related to the 
quantity  of family labour used p e r 'u n i t  of land, which could suggest factor market 
imperfections a n d /o r  quality differences between types of labour.
AAEs varied more among M aha/ta i l  farmers than among M aha/head  farmers 
(Table 5-6). Regression of A on a series of hypothesized determ inants (Table 5-11) 
showed farmer age to have a positive relationship with AAE in the “ta il” , too. However,
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Table 5-10: OLS Estimates of the determ inants of variation 
in allocative (fficiency in Maha/'head environment
Maha/head
Vaxiable coefficient
Intercept 0.9265* * * 
(0.2916)
Technical efficiency
Literacy a/ -0.2181 
(0.1988)
Age a/ 0.0111**
(0.0052)
Leasers
Use of family labour
0.3274
(0.2681)
(Man days/Acre) 0.0215*** 
(0.0080)
R*= .21
F = 5.0479***
Notes: figures within parentheses are standard errors of estimates.
*** significant at the 1 per cent level.
** significant at the 5 per cent level.
* significant at the 10 per cent level
a/ dummy variable
the coefficient for the quantity  of family labour used per acre was negative and was thus 
different from th a t  in the “head” . Such a negative relationship may occur due to 
“overuse” of family labour owing to a lower opportunity cost of family labour or to a 
perceived higher productivity of family labour. Technical efficiency was positively and 
significantly correlated with AAE: therefore, it was expected th a t  some of the 
determ inants of TE had a similar relationship with AAE, too (regression 2 in Table 5-11).
In the Yala/rice environment (Table 5-12) apart from technical efficiency, other 
significant variables explaining AAE variation were use of bank loans which had a 
positive coefficient and the rate of interest paid for loans which had the expected negative
coefficient.
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T a b le  5 -11: OLS Estimates of the determinants of variation
in allocative efficiency M aha/tail  environment
Regression 1
Variable
Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4
coefficient
Intercept 0.2*81*
(0.1581)
-0.5524** * 
(0.2030)
0.2225 
(0.1870)
-0.0689
(0.1934)
Technical
efficiency 0.0100** * 
(0.0032)
0.0523* * * 
(0.0082)
0.0042*
(0.0025)
Technical
efficiency squared 
Literacy a/ 0.2997* 
(0.1590)
-0.0004* * * 
(0.00007)
-0.0791 
(0.1057)
Age 0.0093
(o.ooso)
0.0248* * * 
(0.0040)
0.0230* * * 
(0.0034)
Farmers from Wet Zone a/ 0.0218 
(0.1394)
Purana farmers a/ -0.0126 
(0.1213)
LSE farmers a/ 0.0772
(0.1585)
Bank loans a/ 0.3876**
(0.1971)
Fart time farmers a/ -0.2749**
(0.1425)
Use of family labour 
(Man days/Acre)
-0.0262***
(0.0063)
-0.0161*** 
(0.0056)
r 2= . 13 .41 .52 .50
F = 9.724* * * 21.909*** 9.062*** 20.672***
Notes: figures within parentheses are standard errors of estimates.
*** significant at the 1 per cent level. 
** significant at the 5 per cent level. 
* significant at the 10 per cent level 
a/ dummy variable
In the Yala/chillie environment (Table 5-13) Wet Zone farmers were found to be 
allocatively inefficient. This is consistent with their lack of experience in chillie 
cultivation as well as their lack of familiarity with the \  ala season environment. 
Surprisingly, literacy had a negative relationship w Th AAE.
147
T a b le  5-12: OLS Estimates of the determinants of variation
in allocative efficiency in Yala/rice environment
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Variable coefficient
Intercept 0.6175
(0.8744)
2.4287*** 
(0.8744)
2.5534**
(1.1976)
Technical efficiency 0.0918*** 
(0.0363)
0.0447
(0.0403)
Technical efficiency 
Squared -0.0011***
(0.0003)
0.0007**
(0.0003)
Age -0.0126
(0.0133)
0.0187
(0.0123)
Purana farmers a/ 0.2489
(0.3528)
0.3018
(0.3240)
Part time farmers a/ 0.5465
(0.3837)
0.4524
(0.3389)
LSE farmers a/ -0.5558
(0.3455)
0.2971
(0.3108)
Bank loans a/ 2.3338* * 
(1.1777)
1.7920*
(1.0454)
Rate of interest -0.0454**
(0.0229)
-0.0517**
(0.0233)
Amount borrowed 0.0003 
(0.0002)
0.0002
(0.0002)
r2=
F=
.22
13.3989* * *
.09
2.1630* *
.29
4.9405* * *
Notes: figures within parentheses are standard errors of estimates.
*** significant at the 1 per cent level. 
** significant at the 5 per cent level. 
* significant at the 10 per cent level 
a/ dummy variable
5.5 F a rm  Specific  E con om ic  E ffic ien cy
The distributions of farm specific economic efficiencies for each environment are 
given in Table 5-14. As explained in Chapter 3, economic and allocative efficiency 
measures were identical for the M ah a/h f ad. since firms are technically efficient here. In 
the other three environments, economic efficiencies are well below their respective
T a b le  5-13: OLS Estimates of the determinants of variation
in allocative elficiency in Yala/chillies environment
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- Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Variable coefficient
Intercept 0.7869***
(0.0633)
0.5637* * * 
(0.0636)
0.9350* * * 
(0.0773)
Technical efficiency -0.0086* * * 
(0.0013)
-0.0085 * * * 
(0.0012)
Literacy d/ -0.1441** 
(0.0683)
-0.1647*** 
(0.0572)
Farmers from Wet Zone d/ -0.1342* * 
(0.0597)
-0.0757
(0.0507)
R2 = .29 .07 .35
F= 43.0570* * * 4.7728*** 19.1471***
Notes: figures within parentheses are standard errors of estimates.
*** significant at the 1 per cent level.
** significant at the 5 per cent level.
* significant at the 10 per cent level
a/ dummy variable
allocative efficiencies in percentage terms. This is expected as economic efficiency is a 
combination of both technical and allocative efficiencies of firms. There was a high 
correlation between these economic efficiency measures and the technical efficiency 
measures for each farm (Table 5-15). As our economic efficiency concept is similar to the 
allocative efficiency concept used by Farrell (1957) as shown in Chapter 3. the tw'o 
efficiencies are positively correlated. These results also suggest th a t  once farmers a tta in  
full technical efficiency most of their economic inefficiency will tend to disappear.
5.6 C onclusions
Our results are, by and large, consistent with the hypothesis tha t  farmers vary in 
their ability to adjust succesfully to new technology and different environments and that 
human capital accumulated over their life time is a major determ inant of such ability. 
From their first season in the project. Mahaweli farmers all adopted the new high yielding 
rice var ie t ies .  In the Yala season, they chose the appropriate  cropping pattern, i .e . ,
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T a b le  5-14: Frequency distributions of farm specific economic
efficiencies
Maha/head Maha/tail Yala/rice Yala/chillies
Range
0 < 0 6( 9.S3) 3 ( 3.44) 1( 0.98)
0-10 1( 1.58) 8(13.11) 47(54.02) 101(99.02)
11-20 0 27(44.26) 22(25.28) 0
21-30 0 14(22.95) 10(11.49) 0
31-40 1( 1.58) 3( 4.92) 5( 5.74) 0
41-50 2( 3.17) 3( 4.92) 0 0
51-60 2( 3.17) 0 0 0
61-70 8(12.69) 0 0 0
71-80 12(19.04) 0 0 0
81-90 25(39.68) 0 0 0
91-100 12(19.04) 0 0 0
No. of 
cases 63 61 87 102
Note: figures within parentheses are percentages, 
a/ There is no significant technical inefficiency here.
T a b le  5-15: The Relationship Between Firm Specific Economic Efficiencies
and Technical Efficiencies
Coefficients Maha/head Maha/Tail Yala/rice Yala/chillies
Constant — 0.1138 * * * 
(0.0212)
0.1592* * * 
(0.0029)
0.0666* * * 
(0.0016)
IE 0.0065 * * * 
(0.0004)
0.1141*** 
(0.0029)
0.0248* * * 
(0.0016)
It2 = . 80 .94 .70
F= 249.6333 ** 1'57.7797*** 239.2523***
chillies in well drained soils and iice in poorly drained soils which demonstrated their 
sensitivity to costs and returns from alternative cropping patterns. This showed that even
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traditional farmers respond to new opportunities for improving their economic status and 
tha t  they will rapidly adopt new technology and new crops when they perceive 
substantial increases in profits.
Estim ated differences in the levels of technical inefficiency in the three rice 
environments were consistent with the relative favourability of each for the available 
technology in terms of the availability of water. In the most favourable environment 
(M aha/head) technical inefficiency was not significant. The levels of the significance of 
technical inefficiency were consistent with the estimates of returns to scale for each 
location.
In a dynamic setting where farmers are involved in a process of adjustment, full 
(100 per cent) technical and allocative efficiencies are not expected in the short run even 
when they are profit maximizers operating in a competitive market environment. Full 
efficiency is a characteristic of static environments. Where the environment for rice 
cultivation was most favourable and the technology needed no significant farm specific 
adjustm ent, farmers were technically and allocatively highly efficient. By the time our 
study was undertaken some eight years after settlement, the farmers in this most 
favourable environment were already well adjusted to the new environment. This 
suggests th a t  adjustm ent is likely to be rapid under such favourable conditions and 
variation among farmers diminishes rapidly. The rate of adjustm ent may have varied 
here in the initial stages, although at present there is relatively little variation. In less 
favourable environments, as expected, farmer efficiencies were much lower. The available 
technology needed farm specific adjustments and therefore the performance of individual 
farmers were influenced by their personal capacities as influenced by literacy, age, 
environment-specific experience, land specific-experience, access to capital and certain 
cultural practices.
In the Yala season, when variation; in micro environment across farms are expected 
to be most pronounced, a t tem p ts  to relate inefficiencies to human capital and other
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determinants were less successful than in the Nlaha season. Estimates of efficiencies in 
this situation were probably confounded with the effects of omitted-farm-specific variables 
whose impact was greater in this water scarce environment. Such deviations from the 
frontier caused by environmental factors cannot be explained by human capital 
endowments. Estimates of firm specific allocative efficiency are also affected if the 
relevant frontier production function suffers from an omitted variable bias.
The most important variable explaining allocative efficiency variation was technical 
efficiency. Where farmers are price takers, and future prices are known with certainty, 
allocative efficiency is dependent on the farmer’s knowledge of his technology, i.e., the 
production elasticities of inputs. In a relatively favourable environment, with a well 
defined technology, farmers who have a good perception of the technology will be 
technically efficient and are likely to be allocatively efficient as well. This is illustrated in 
the two Maha season environments by the positive relation between the two efficiencies.
In the Yala season, the technology is not well defined. There are no detailed 
recommendations to guide farmers in rice or chillie cultivation, so each farmer has to 
learn the best optimal package of practices through experience. —Therefore, it would be 
difficult for farmers to be able to assess accurately the outcomes of their actions in terms 
of various practices and inputs in this season which in turn makes it difficult for them 
(even if they wanted) to maximize profits. In this situation, they are forced to experiment 
with alternative techniques and practices and they do so with varying levels of success. 
The lack of an accurate perception of the output response of inputs and practices at this 
stage of experimentation prevents them from achieving allocative efficiency. Farmers 
who “accidently” achieve high technical efficiency are likely to err in the determination of 
allocatively efficient input levels than others, since at higher levels of technical efficiency, 
allocative efficiency requires higher levels of conventional inputs. Therefore the two 
efficiencies are likely to be negatively related. This was actually observed in the Yala
season.
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C H A P T E R  6
Socia l  Eff ic iency  A n a ly s is
The foregoing analysis revealed substantial inefficiencies in current resource 
allocation by individual farmers within Mahaweli project a t  prevailing m arket prices. 
These prevailing prices reflect the influence of government interventions in markets as 
well as other imperfections in markets. In a recent theoretical work Stiglitz (1987) 
describes government intervention in agricultural markets as follows:
They [governments] subsidize farmers (mostly in developed countries); they 
tax farmers (mostly in developing countries); they try to stabilize prices; they 
impose import tariffs and quotas; they restrict production: they provide food 
subsidies for urban areas; they support the use of fertilizer; they build irrigation 
systems; they offer extension services; they try to control marketing; and they 
provide credit often below market rates.
He lists the following “ legitimate reasons” for such government intervention.
1. Incomplete marke ts  in insurance fu tures  and credit which may require 
government sponsored insurance and credit programmes,
2. Public goods and increasing returns  which may justify investment in 
irrigation,
3. Imperfect  in fo r m a t io n  and therefore extension services,
4. External i t ies  (e.g., the successful adoption of a new technology by one farmer 
may convey valuable information to his neighbours, thus subsidies may be 
justified), and
5. Income dis tribut ion  i.e., the concern with the distribution of income 
generated by free markets.
However, he cautions that such market failures do not justify government 
intervention, rather they identify potential areas for intervention since the causes of 
market failure may affect government remedies in the same way they affect markets, e.g.,
\
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imperfect information in relation to credit markets. There is a subsidized credit scheme 
for rice and other crops operating through commercial banks in Sri Lanka. This scheme is 
also tied to a compulsory crop insurance scheme, i.e., all those who obtain cultivation 
loans from commercial banks are insured. However, in practice these schemes affect very 
few of the farmers in the island. In the sample only 5 per cent of the farmers obtained 
bank loans in the wet season while only 2.4 percent obtained bank loans in the dry season. 
In 1977, when the present agricultural credit system was created by writing off all the 
debts of farmers to previous schemes, the majority of the farmers in System H obtained 
bank credit which was given at an interest rate of 9 per cent per annum. In 1984/85 crop 
year the total number of farmers receiving this subsidized credit was estimated to be less 
than  10 per cent in the whole of System H (P and itha ra tna  1984). This failure of the 
government subsidized credit scheme is related to the familiar problem of loan recovery. 
Accordingly, non-institutional sources of credit dominate rural lending at apparently 
exorbitant rates of interest. However, the failure of the subsidized credit schemes seems 
to suggest the high open m arket interest rates are related to information costs and to high 
lender risks. Given the insignificance of subsidized credit in the sample, it is ignored in 
our social efficiency analysis.
The im portan t subsidies are those for fertilizer and irrigation water. In Sri Lanka, 
irrigation water from government built schemes is supplied almost free of charge*. As 
such the loss or gain to the society owing to firm level inefficiencies may not be reflected 
accurately in efficiency calculations reported in previous chapters, which are based on 
actual market prices. In addition, distorted markets may result in social inefficiencies in 
production even if individual farmers are privately allocatively efficient. Policy guidelines 
designed to increase efficiency at farm level which do not take such distortions into 
account may be inappropriate  and may decrease efficiency from a social viewpoint. For 
example, measures leading to increased allocative efficiency at farm level by encouraging 
farmers to increase the use of inputs may lead to overuse of subsidized inputs and thus 
incur social losses.
*There is a water charge based on the area cultivated, but. in practice, this is not strictly 
enforced.
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Therefore, we introduce shadow prices to the private efficiency analysis of previous 
chapters and obtain measures of the social benefits and costs of private farmer 
inefficiencies and market imperfections.
6.1  Sources  o f  Socia l Ineff ic iency  in P r o d u c t io n
We define three types of social inefficiency based on the model of farmer private 
efficiency and his social efficiency introduced in Chapter 3.
1. Social cost of technical inefficiency (STIE)- This is defined as the value of 
ou tpu t loss to the society due to technical inefficiency a t shadow prices.
2. Social cost of allocative inefficiency (SA1E)- this is defined as the the loss of 
profit to the society owing to allocative inefficiency a t  farm level. This is 
calculated as the difference between profits (calculated at shadow prices) 
obtained at the actual in p u t/o u tp u t  combination and those at the private 
profit maximizing inp u t/o u tp u t  combination at market prices.
3. Social cost of price distortions (SPD)- this is defined as the difference in 
profits (calculated at shadow' prices) to the society obtained at in p u t/o u tp u t  
combinations corresponding to 100 per cent technical and allocative efficiency 
(=economic efficiency) at shadow prices and at market prices. To the extent 
th a t  market prices diverge from shadow prices, resource allocation even a t  100 
per cent private efficiency will deviate from the optimum resulting in a loss to 
the society, i.e., the inputs used and outputs  obtained will differ from the 
situation with prices at the scarcity values of goods and services. Therefore 
SPD may be taken as a measure of loss to the society in crop production 
under a distorted price regime.
We may write these three measures as follows:
ST1E=(Q j - (6.1)
where. Qf is the frontier ou tput at a given level of inputs; Qj is the technically 
• • *
inefficient output for th a t  level of inputs; and P q the shadow price of the product (say, 
rice). This measures the social loss due to technical inefficiency at any given level of 
inputs, and not necessarily at the allocatively efficient level of inputs. The most 
meaningful application of this measure is to the current mean level of inputs in the 
sample which may or may not be allocatively efficient.
S A I E = ( p ; Qopt-E P  X opt).(Pq‘Qact.E P  X act) ( 6 . 2 )
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where, Qopt is the optim um  (profit maximizing) output and Xopt the corresponding 
inputs a t  market prices; Qact the actual ou tput and X act the actual inputs. The optim um  
in p u t /o u tp u t  combination at market prices is obtained by simultaneously solving the first 
order conditions a t market prices as shown in Appendix II. and P are shadow
outpu t and input prices.
SPD=(Pq‘Q sha<r^ P  x shai) - ( p ; Qopt-EP x opt) (6 .3)
where, Qsha(j and j  are optimum outpu t and input levels at shadow prices; 
* *
Qopt, X P q and P are as defined above.
These measures can provide useful directions for government policy. This is 
im portan t  because policy measures to reduce these individual sources of inefficiency may 
be different. For example, where farmers are economically efficient as private individuals, 
efficiency gains are possible only through reductions in market distortions. This requires 
policy intervention a t  national level and thus affects the entire economy. Governments 
are not often free to remove distortions when they have been introduced to achieve 
several, often conflicting, objectives. For example, the removal of a fertilizer subsidy may 
have an adverse impact on national food production goals and income distribution goals.
On the other hand, distortions caused by m arket failures are not easily corrected. 
Distribution of irrigation wrater is a good example (Bromley 1980). Irrigation water has 
certain public good characteristics which could result in a market outcome which is 
socially inefficient even if a market can function effectively. Generally it is difficult to 
develop an efficiently functioning market in irrigation water as the measurement of water 
used by an individual is difficult: measuring devices are expensive and are unreliable. 
There are externalities, i.e., one individual's production (or utility) function is affected by 
ano ther’s use of water. Enforcement of water use guidelines is also difficult and the free 
rider problem can be serious. Distortions resulting from such market failures cannot be 
corrected as easily as changing market prices through taxes and subsidies.
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On the other hand, t he reduction in firm level technical inefficiency requires specific 
measures at farm or project level rather than at national level, directed towards better 
farmer education, extension and information services for improved efficiency in the use of 
available resources. Su£h measures may also result in improved allocative efficiency since 
farmers need to know the parameters of their technology to be able to equate marginal 
cost of inputs with their marginal returns. Allocative inefficiency among profit 
maximizing farmers may be caused by imperfect knowledge of their technology and 
markets, as well as by resource constraints. Allocative inefficiency caused by resource 
constraints may be corrected through interventions and measures which improve access to 
resources. These may be in the form of credit facilities, improved access to water, 
cooperative trac tor  services, better transport etc.
We can also perform Benefit-Cost calculations to assist choice between alternative 
means of improving technical or allocative efficiency at firm level. The importance of such 
Benefit Cost analysis in the provision of better access to resources needs no elaboration. 
However, measures for improving technical efficiency will incur social costs even though 
increased technical efficiency at farm level requires no additional inputs. For example, the 
training of more efficient farmers has social costs even if the farmer himself receives the 
training free of charge"2. We do not a ttem pt to make such benefit-cost calculations in this 
thesis due to lack of cost d a ta  on particular measures for increasing farmer efficiency.
6.2 Shadow  Pricing
The process of shadow pricing presupposes a well defined social welfare function and 
a precise description of the economy (a general equilibrium model). Given these, shadow 
prices which reflect the change in welfare resulting from any marginal change in the 
availability of commodities and factors of production may be derived by the solution of 
the relevant constrained optimization problem.
2 . . . .  .
It is possible that increased technical efficiency even at farm level can be achieved only by some 
investment in knowledge by the farmer: the technical inefficiency as defined in this study does not 
include this cost.
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Given the social welfare function which describes the preferences of a planner or a 
government, shadow- prices can be obtained with a model which describes the impact of a 
project on the entire economy by a with and without project comparison. This allows the 
identification of welfare improving projects and 'or alternative forms of government 
intervention. However, various simplifying assumptions are often used to provide rules of 
thum b in shadow pricing since it is generally difficult to describe fully or simulate the 
working of the entire economy.
The theoretical literature on project appraisal and shadow pricing has evolved 
considerably since the early landmarks of the OECD Manual (Little and Mirlees 1968), 
UNIDO guidelines (Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen 1972) and the highly influential work for 
developing countries by Little and Mirrlees (1974). Despite the many subsequent 
contributions to the field of shadow pricing the Little and Mirrlees approach dominates 
practical applications of shadow pricing for project appraisal in developing countries. In 
particular, the World Bank and other international agencies as well as national planning 
agencies such as those in Sri Lanka use this approach.
Shadow prices can also be employed for the evaluation of welfare implications of 
government activities in the areas of trade, taxation, public good provision etc.,, (e.g. 
Timm er, 1975; Pearson et al. 1981; Timmer, et al 1983). When considered in a welfare 
context, shadow prices need to take into account all the repercussions of a 
project/governm ent policy in an economy*".
The Little and Mirrlees (1974) [L-.V1] approach derives shadow prices by relating 
goods and services to, their internationally traded prices. This approach is also applied to 
tradeable but not actually traded goods as well. Goods and services which cannot be 
traded are shadow priced by their marginal costs. These costs are estimated by breaking
3An example of the magnitude of the tasks involved in identifying the direct and indirect impact 
of a project on an economy is illustrated by Bell et al. (1982) in their study of the Muda Irrigation 
Scheme in Northwest Malaysia.
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down the physical components of the goods into unskilled labour, skilled labour, 
t radeables  and residuals. These components are then valued in terms of uncommited 
foreign exchange in the hands of the government,  the numeraire in this approach. The 
skilled labour component  is multiplied by a s tandard conversion factor which is an 
average tariff value to obtain its t radeable value. The unskilled labour is converted into a 
t radeable value using an accounting ratio. The residuals are excluded from the shadow 
value by t reat ing these as representing taxes etc. Thus Little and Mirrlees disaggregate 
all non t raded goods into their foreign exchange equivalents.
The principle of shadow pricing t raded goods at  their border price is generally 
accepted irrespective of the approach taken to define shadow prices. However, there is 
much controversy over the derivation of shadow prices for non t raded tradeables as well 
as non t radeables4. In this s tudy, while recognizing the various criticisms, we follow the 
L-M approach as elaborated by Squire and van der Tak (1975) and use shadow prices
est imated by others using this approach. As is well known, shadow pricing can be very
«
demanding in informational requirements. Further,  the use of shadow price definitions 
which are widely used in the appraisal of various components of the Mahaweli Project has 
the added at t ract ion of being consistent with other  studies and would facilitate easy 
comparison. The numeraire of the L-M approach (uncommitted foreign exchange in the 
hands of the government) is especially relevant to the Mahaweli Project since the major 
objective of the project was import  substi tut ion of food and energy.
Traded goods were priced at  their border values and the prices of non traded goods 
were adjusted to border values using a s tandard conversion factor and a shadow wage 
rate. We also estimated a shadow price for irrigation water based on the principle of 
opportuni ty  cost.
4 Warr (1982) discusses the informational constraints for estimating shadow prices for non traded 
com m odities and demonstrates, using a general equilibrium model, that potential welfare gains 
from correct shadow prices can be eroded by quite small errors in the estimated shadow prices.
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6 . 2 .1  T h e  S t a n d a r d  C o n v e r s i o n  F a c t o r
In actual project appraisal it is not usually feasible to obtain shadow prices for all 
commodities. In such cases a general conversion factor^ is obtained for the conversion of 
domestic market prices into their border price equivalents for all those commodities for 
which individual shadow prices cannot be obtained. The simplest way of calculating such 
a s tandard  conversion factor is to use the “trade da ta  approach'1. The formula used is:
M + X
SCF  =  ---------------------------------------
where,
M =  c.i.f. value of imports
X =  f.o.b. value of exports
t =  average tax on imports
t =  average tax on exports
The practical advantages of this approach are: (a) it mainly requires readily
available aggregate trade data , and (b) it is computationally not highly demanding. 
Simplicity in this formulation is obtained as a result of several assumptions. They are: (a) 
the country does not have monopoly power in trade, (b) marginal changes in expenditure 
on non tradeables can be neglected, (c) income effects can be ignored or th a t  all income 
elasticities on spending are roughly equal to one, (d) the proportion of imports and 
exports adequately represent the importance of traded goods in non traded production 
and consumption, and (e) quantita tive  restrictions on trade can be ignored as being 
relatively small.
^The SCF is closely related to the concept of Shadow Exchange Rate in UNIDO (1972) 
methodology as suggested by Little and Mirrlees (1974). Dasgupta (1972) and Lai (1974). The 
relationship between the two is given by: SCF=Official exchange rate shadow exchange rate.
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These assumptions are quite reasonable for Sri Lanka, for it is a fairly open 
economy with few quant i ta t ive t rade restrictions and it is a small country with no 
monopoly power in t rade in any commodity.  In 1977, the Sri Lankan government  adopted 
a  policy commit ted to t rade liberalization and it replaced most quant i ta t ive  trade 
restrictions by tariffs (Cuthbertson and Athukorala  1986). By 1985 it maintained an 
exchange system virtually free of restrictions on transact ions (G.G.Johnson et.al.,  1985). 
Agrawala (1983) showed that ,  amongst  31 developing nations Sri Lanka had a relatively 
low trade distortion level. The s tandard conversion factor used by the World Bank in the 
most recent project appraisals in Sri lanka was 0.85 (World Bank 1984).
6 .2 .2  S h a d o w  W a g e  R a t e
Herath (1983) calculated a shadow wage rate for agricultural labour using the L-M 
procedure0. The formula used was:
SWR=c-l /s(c-m)  (6-5)
where, c=marke t  wage rate; in=marginal  product  in subsistence agriculture; 
s=va lue  of savings relative to consumption;
and,
s = [ l  +  l/2(r-i)]-^ (6-6)
where, r=social return to investment: i=consumption rate of interest; and T = th e  
t ime period after which savings and consumption are equally valuable.
Herath 's  estimation yielded a conversion factor for agricultural labour of 0.77. The 
most recent est imate  by the World Bank for Sri Lanka is a factor of 0.8 for the conversion 
of the market  wage rate into the shadow price (World Bank 1984).
°W arr (1985) criticised this approach on the grounds that if intergenerational savings is a public 
good, the incorporation of a “premium on saving’’ into the calculation of the shadow price of 
labour in an effort to raise aggregate savings is self defeating.
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6 . 2 .3  S h a d o w  P r i c e  o f  I r r ig a t io n  W a t e r
Ex-ante appraisals of irrigation projects typically do not usually estimate shadow 
prices for irrigation water. Rather, such studies estimate the rate of return for 
investments in irrigation. Our analysis is neither an ex-ante appraisal nor an ex-post 
evaluation. We are interested in the social costs of various types of inefficiencies (defined 
earlier) in the use of resources in current production. Thus the investment costs are 
“sunk*1 and are irrelevant as far as the efficiency of current resource use is concerned. 
The current issue is the optimal allocation of scarce irrigation water among competing 
uses.
The absence of a m arket for irrigation water makes the efficient allocation of this 
scarce resource dependent on various bureaucratic and institutional means (Bromley 
1980). At the time of the field study in System H the emphasis was on regulatory means 
of w'ater allocation by determining cropping patterns and areas to be cultivated together 
with the enforcement of a water rotation system with little or no farmer involvement. 
Research on efficient irrigation water allocation among small farmers elsewhere has shown 
th a t  farmer organisations can play an im portant role (Mass and Anderson 1980). The 
absence of such organizations in System H may be partly explained by its relatively 
recent origin as a settlement and the diversity of the backgrounds of the settlers. 
Traditional settlements in Sri Lanka and in other countries have well defined systems of 
water rights and institutions to handle the allocation of water (Leach, 1980). Official 
a t tem p ts  to promote these have not met with notable success in System H.
The absence of a market does not mean th a t  w'ater is a free good to society. The 
supply of water for agriculture has an opportunity cost where it can be used productively 
in alternative enterprises and where the operation and management of irrigation systems 
are costly.
Irrigation water is supplied to System H by means of a diversion weir built across a 
major river (Mahaweli River) and a storage reservoir built at the head of System H. In
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the wet season the local catchment of the reservoir gets substantial rainfall, and diversion 
water is required only for supplementing water from the local catchment of the reservoir. 
In the dry season, however, the reservoir is almost entirely dependent on diversions from 
the river.
There are two alternative uses for water at the point of diversion. One is to divert 
it to the reservoir for irrigation, while the other is to send it down the river to generate 
hydro-power. In the wet season, water is abundant and these two uses do not compete. In 
the dry season when water is scarce, there is competition between these two alternatives. 
The water diverted to the reservoir in the wet season can either be used in the wet season 
or may be saved for use in the dry season.
Ideally, if information on the the alternative uses of water, and their marginal
productivities and other information regarding storage costs etc., are available the
shadow price of water may be derived by solving an optimization problem subject to
constraints imposed by factors such as reservoir capacity, suitability of available land for
different crops. As mentioned earlier due to da ta  inadequacy it was not possible to
estimate the marginal productivity of irrigation water in System H. We assume that  in
the wet season it is possible to use as much water as is desired for both irrigation and
hydro power and still have a full reservoir at the end of the season for dry season
cultivation. Therefore, the cost of irrigation w^ter is its marginal supply cost. This is
I
derived by dividing the total cost incurred in the project for supplying the total quantity 
of water bv the area irrigated, which implies that the marginal cost of supplying w'ater to 
individual farms from the reservoir is constant.
The operations and maintenence (O&M) cost in System H was Rs 2516 per hectare 
per year at 1983 financial prices according to the records of the project manager, which is 
equivalent to Rs. 2755 a t  1984 prices when adjusted for inflation by the consumer price 
index. Despite certain weaknesses the cost of living index is considered appropriate  here 
as more than 90 per cent of the O&M costs comprise wages. These wages are paid for
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skilled labour and thus reflect the economic values, since skilled labour is assumed to be 
priced correctly.
Thus the 0&:M cost of supplying irrigation water per acre of land in the M aha 
season is Rs.557.00. However, the cost per acre in the Yala season is double this, since 
only half the area is irrigated, while the overheads of maintaining the canal system are 
similar. In addition, the shadow price of water in the Yala season should include the 
opportunity  cost of not using the water for hydro power generation.
In the Yala season, since water has to be diverted from the river even if the 
reservoir is full at the beginning of the season (the reservoir capacity is limited to one 
third of the water required in System H), the marginal cost of diverted water is the value 
of electricity generation forgone by the diversion plus the cost of supplying water from the 
reservoir to the farmers.
A recent study commissioned by the government of Sri Lanka (ACRES 1984) 
estimated the 1984 economic price of hydro electric energy to be Rs. 1.13 per Kilo W att  
hour at the official exchange rate, b^.sed on da ta  from the latest addition to the Mahaweli 
power grid (Rantembe Project). This study also estimated the energy equivalent of 1 
million cubic meters (mcm) of water diverted to System H to be 0.55 Giga w att  hours. 
Assuming constant marginal costs, the shadow price of 1 mcm of water diverted to 
System H in the dry season works out to be Rs. 622,000 or Rs.0.62 per cubic meter of 
water.
6 .2 .4  O ther S h a d o w  P rices
The derivation of other shadow prices used in the analysis were based on their 
border prices and are given in Tables 6-1 to 6-3. Table 6-1 compares market prices of the 
relevant commodities in 1984 against their shadow prices. It is interesting to note tha t  
market prices of rice and chillies do not vary much from their shadow prices while 
nitrogen and irrigation water have the greatest price divergences. These latter represent 
substantial subsidies in favour of Mahaweli farmers. The subsidy for nitrogen is a
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national subsidy while th a t  for water is specific for the project. The prices of draught 
power and agro-chemicals are assumed to be undistorted.
T ab le  6-1: Shadow price of rice
Average import price of rice to Sri Lanka in 1984
according to the Central Bank (Rs./metric ton) = 4876.00
Shore handling and harbour dues according to
Nedeco 1984 was (Rs./metric ton) = 160.00
Converted from husked to unhusked
rice equivalent at 0.7 (Rs./metric ton) = 3525.20
Less, milling, storing, fumigation and transport costs
as per Nedeco 1984 (Rs./metric ton) = 633.00
Shadow price of rice at farm gate (Rs/metric ton) = 2892.00
(Rs/bushel) = 60.35ft tt
T ab le  6-2: Shadow price of dried chillies
The import price of dried chillies to Sri Lanka in
1984 as reported by ARTI, 1985 (Rs/metric ton) = 29370.92
Therefore, the import price per Kg. = 2 9 . 3 7
Less, packaging and transport to project area at the
rate of Rs. 0.80 per Kg (Ministry of Finance and
Planning 1984), the shadow farm gate price (Rs./Kg.) = 28.53
6 .3  A n a ly s is
A comparison of private and social profits under four different scenarios are given in 
Tables 6-5 to 6-8. These were computed on the basis of the production frontier estimates 
given in Chapter 5 and the shadow prices discussed earlier. The production functions for 
rice had land, pre-harvest labour and nitrogen as variable inputs while the frontier for
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Table 6-3: Shadow price of nitrogen
Market price of Urea in 1984 
in the project area (Rs./metric ton)
The subsidy (Rs./metric ton) 
according to Nedeco (1984)
The actual domestic cost (Rs./metric ton)
Nitrogen content of urea fertilizer by weight
The shadow price of nitrogeri (Rs./Kg)
t t t t t ♦
= 3000.00
= 2050.00
= 5050.00
= .46
= 5050/(.46x1000)
= 10.97
Table 6-4: Comparison of market prices in 1984 with shadow prices
Commodity Market Price Shadow Price
Rice (Rs./bushel) a/ 62.58 60.35
Dried chillies (Rs./Kg.) 29.88 28.53
Nitrogen (Rs./Kg.) 6.52 10.97
Agricultural labour (Rs./man 
in the wet season
day)
28.58 22.86
Agricultural labour in the dry
season (Rs./man day) 29.55 23.64
Irrigation water wet season (Rs./Ac.) 50.00 557.69
Irrigation water dry season 
(a) cost of supply (Rs./Ac.) 100.00 1115.38
(b) cost of diverted water (Rs./Cu. m.) 0.62
All other costs axe converted to shadow values using a standard 
conversion factor of 0.85. 
a/ Unhusked rice or paddy.
chillies had land, nitrogen and pesticide cost as variable inputs. Farmers in reality use 
many other inputs such as draught power, other fertilizers, agro chemicals and harvesting 
labour in crop production. Although these are often left out of estimated statistical 
production functions for reasons mentioned earlier (see Chapter 4) these inputs influence 
the profits to the farmers and to the society. The profits of farmers are determined by the 
gross revenue and actual costs incurred in production and not only by those inputs w'hich
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are specified in the production function (Graff 1981). Therefore, we have allowed for 
these inputs in our calculations, as shown in Table 6-5.
There was no variation in technical efficiency and relatively low variation in
allocative efficiency among farmers cultivating rice in the Head in Maha season. However,
I
a wide range of technical and allocative efficiencies wfas observed among farmers in the 
Tail in M aha season and among all farmers growing rice and chillies in the Yala season.
Table 6-7 shows tha t  at the current levels of technical efficiency and the mean levels 
of input use, the crop with the highest private profit was chillies in the Yala season 
followed by rice in the head in the M aha season, rice in the Yala season and rice in the 
tail in the M aha season. However, social profits diverged from private profits and socially 
the most profitable was chillies in the Yala season followed by rice in M aha/head . The 
Yala/rice crop resulted in a net loss to the society which was larger than the profit per 
acre from M aha season rice and Yala season chillies together. Rice in M aha/ta i l  was near 
the break-even point in social terms, i.e., near zero profit.
Increasing farm level technical efficiency to 100 per cent at current input levels 
could substantially increase private and social profits. However, the Yala/rice crop 
continues to make negative profits at shadow prices (Table 6-8). Similarly, private and 
social profits will increase if farm level allocative efficiencies was increased to 100 per cent 
while technical efficiency remained at the current level (Table 6-9). Even here, Yala/rice 
yields negative social profits.
The fact tha t  w'ater is scarce and has a high social opportunity cost in the Yala 
season makes rice cultivation in this season socially undesirable. However, only about 
half the extent of the land in the project area is technically suitable for the cultivation of 
chillies. As such, farmers who have land suitable only for rice continue to cultivate it 
since water is available free of charge and therefore they can make private profits. The 
fact tha t  farmers share land in the dry season points to the possibility of sharing well
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drained lands among the farmers leaving poorly drained lands out of cultivation. 
Although this will reduce the qxtent cultivated by each farmer, the profits will be 
comparable to those obtained in the wet season owing to the higher profits from chillies.
As explained in our description of the project area, the well and poorly drained 
lands are distributed a t a more or less constant ratio along distributory channels from 
head to tail. Accordingly, if all the farmers served by a distributory channel are to 
cultivate well drained lands then, even if they share such land, the entire distributory 
channel should be in operation. Under the present arrangement only the head area is 
given water. Therefore, the economics of such an approach will depend on the associated 
water losses and other technical parameters. The longer the channel length, the greater 
are the conveyance losses involved. In the wet season, only rice can be cultivated under 
farm conditions in the area. This is both privately and socially profitable.
The following table summarizes the findings of the social efficiency analysis 
conducted using the model discussed earlier. While social costs of farm level inefficiencies 
are substantia l, the cost to the society due to price distortions and the resulting 
misallocation of resources are relatively low. In fact, if farmers were 100 per cent efficient 
both technically and allocatively (privately) the average loss in social profit due to 
resource misallocation resulting from price distortions is only 12 per cent of the potential 
social profit.
T a b le  6-5: Social costs of farm level inefficiencies and price
distortions in Rs./Ac.
The Type 
of inefficiency
Wet Season 
rice
Dry
rice
season
Chillies
Head Tail All All
STIE 0 2720 3509 15628
SAIE 3477 98 150 19045
SPD 440 201 765 14138
m (8) (17) (12) (11)
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The relatively high social cost of farm level inefficiencies in comparison with those 
due to price distortions has important  implications. It indicates a potential for improved 
performance at farm and project level even if the policy framework related to markets  is 
unchanged.  The difficulty of removing policy induced distortions and the potential costs 
of such corrective action was pointed out earlier. Controversies related to rural credit, 
insurance and irrigation water are good examples.
Further,  this suggests tha t  the ex-post appraisal of agricultural projects should look 
into firm level inefficiencies in addition to market  imperfections and their influence on 
resource allocation within such projects. This is especially important  in the case of 
projects which involve sett lement  in new lands and technology transfer, where human 
capital has a major  role in the determination of farmer adjustment  to these disequilibria, 
and significant farm level inefficiencies can be present. In such instances, project planning 
needs to addressing the potential need for assistance to the farmers for rapid and 
successful adjustment  to the changes. Such measures are likely to increase project costs 
unless a reallocation of existing resources with efficiency gains is feasible. In the absence 
of such measures the inevitable delays in farmer adjustment  will lower project returns in 
the early stages which will therefore lower overall project benefits.
I
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T a b le  6-6: Mean levels of inputs used and outputs achieved per crop
per location and per season
Wet Season Dry season
Rice Rice chillies
Head Tail All All
Land (Ac.) 1.96 2.18 0.85 0.70
Pre Harvest Labour Md.s 64.52 60.80 26.57 63.65
Nitrogen (Kgs.) 33.15 38.90 22.40 33.38
Other costs (Rs./Ac.)
Cost of seed 190.00 190.00 190.00 150.00
Harvest labour 725.99 749.38 878.52 1561.71
Draught power 448.30 428.50 211.71 53.00
Agro chemicals 108.33 131.91 164.72 509.62
Other fertilizers 191.07 114.65 77.27 334.18
Total 1663.69 1614.44 1305.78 2608.51
Mean water requirement 
Ex-sluice (meters)** 1.43 1.43 2.10 1.90
Mean Output (Bu./Ac.) 70.55 45.63 47.70 430.40a/
a /  Kgs. of dried chillies per acre.
** Estimate is based on Nedeco 1983 and 1984 and is not the actual.
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Table 6-7: Comparison of private and social profits obtained for crops
at current input  and output  levels by location and by season
(in Rs./Ac)
Maha season Yala season
Rice Rice Chillies
Head Tail all all
P S P S P S P S
Gross Revenue 4415 4257 2855 2753 2985 2878 12860 12279
Variable Costs
Pre haxvest 
labour 960 768 797 637 878 703 2687 2150
Nitrogen 110 185 116 195 172 289 311 533
Fixed Costs 
Other costs 1664 1415 1614 1372 1306 1099 2609 '2218
Water 50 557 50 557 100 6386 100 5882
Total cost 2784 2925 2577 2761 2456 8477 5707 10783
Profit 1631 1332 278 -8 529 -5596 7153 1496
Note: P denotes private costs a t  market prices while S denotes social 
costs a t  shadow prices given in Table 6-4.
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T a b le  6-8: Comparison of potential private and social profits with
current input levels at 100 per cent technical efficiency, by 
location and by season (in Rs./Ac)
Maha s e a s o n Y a la  s e a s o n
R ice R ic e C h i l l i e s
Head T a i l a l l a l l
P S P S P S P S
G ro ss  Revenue 4415 4257 5675 5473 6627 6390 29227 27907
T o t a l  c o s t  a / 2784 2925 2577 2761 2456 8477 5707 10783
P r o f i t 1631 1332 3098 2712 4171 - 2087 23520 17124
Note: P denotes private costs at market prices while S denotes social
costs at shadow prices given in Table 6 -4 .
a /  these are the same as in Table 7.
T a b le  6-9: Comparison of potential private and social profits of crops
at current level of firm specific technical efficiency and 100% 
allocative efficiency by location and by season (in Rs./Ac)
Maha s e a s o n  Y a la  s e a s o n
R ice R ice C h i l l i e s
Head ( T a i l a l l a l l
P S P S P S P S
G ro ss  Revenue 15549 14995 4954 4778 4703 4536 68815 65455
V a r i a b l e  c o s t 8210 8214 2016 2759 2690 2497 33676 36814
O th e r  c o s t s 1664 1415 1614 1372 1306 1099 2609 2218
W ater 50 557 50 557 100 6386 100 5882
P r o f i t 5625 4809 1274 90 607 -5446 32430 20541
Note: P denotes private costs a t  market prices while S denotes 
social costs a t  shadow prices given in Table 6-4.
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T a b le  6-10: Comparison of potential social profits of crops at 100/o
technical and allocative efficiency at farm level at market prices 
and at shadow prices by location and by season (in Rs./Ac)
Maha season Yala season
Rice Rice Chillies
Head Tail all all
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Gross Revenue 14995 15300 15245 12480 29270 32530 328005 265417
Variable cost 8214 8079 8802 5079 16112 18607 206780 130054
Other costs 1415 1415 1372 1372 1099 1099 2218 2218
Water 557 557 557 557 6386 6386 5882 5882
Profit 4809 5249 4514 5472 5673 6438 113125 127263
1/2 92 82 .88 89
Note: 1 denotes shadow costs and revenue at optimum input ou tpu t 
levels a t  a t  market prices while 2 denotes shadow costs and 
revenue at optim um  input ou tput levels a t  shadow prices. Note also 
th a t  the social cost of water and other costs do not vary since
their use is considered fixed.
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C H A P T E R  7
F a rm  in co m es  and  eq u ity
In this chapter we examine the performance of System H in achieving its objectives 
of (a) providing an adequate s tandard  of living for the settlers through high farm 
incomes, and (b) ensuring equity. This is followed by an analysis of the causes of low 
average farm incomes and high inequality. Finally, implications for System H as well as 
for other future land settlements are discussed.
The Mahaweli Development Project was initiated as a means of achieving broad 
goals of increasing agricultural production and hydro-power generation, of increasing 
employment and income levels and of achieving a more equitable income distribution. 
According to the “Five Year P lan’’ for national development in operation when System H 
was planned, 40 per cent of the households in Sri Lanka were earning less than Rs. 200.00 
per month and another 40 per cent were earning between Rs. 200 - 400. One of the stated 
objectives of the plan was to increase incomes while ensuring equity (Ministry of Planning 
and Employment 1971).
The design of the Mahaweli Project with small equal sized farms reflected these 
jo in t goals of increasing incomes and equity. This was strengthened by the tradition of 
allocating equal sized allotments in s ta te  sponsored land settlements in Sri Lanka. The 
development of land for irrigation and the supply of irrigation water was thought to 
provide a “more or less equal opportun ity” for income generation. The plan recognized 
the fact th a t  the different soil types in the project area were suited to different crops, but 
the possibility th a t  their profits may be different was apparently not considered.
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7.1 Farm Incomes
The mean annual income of pre-project households in System H was Rs. 1200.00. 
(Table 7-1). The final feasibility report for System H (Sogreah 1972) considered an 
annual income of Rs.3600.00 per farm family as an adequate level. The feasibility studies 
showed this income was a tta inable  with the planned cropping patterns, cropping 
intensities and estimated costs and returns of these enterprises. The project documents, 
however, do not explain why this income level was accepted as the desired goal. Income 
d a ta  in the Five Year Plan (Ministry of Planning and Employment 1971) suggest tha t  
this figure was around the mean household income in Sri Lanka at the time of project 
appraisal. It corresponds closely to^  the mean income per income receiver in Sri Lanka in 
1973 (Central Bank), which was Rs. 311.00 per m onth (Table 7-2).
T ab le  7-1: Distribution of agricultural income per farm prior
to the project (in 1971)
Range Percentage of families
Less than 1000 Rs. 45.5
1000 - 1500 26.4
1500 - 2000 10.1
2000 - 3000 11.0
3000 - 5000 5.6
More than 5000 1.4
Average Rs. 1210.00
Farm  household income for the sample was calculated using survey da ta  on area 
cultivated under each crop, crop yields and inputs used, together with the off farm 
incomes reported by each farm household. Net farm income in crop production was 
calculated allowing only for hired labour amongst other items in the cost of production. 
Thus net farm income reported consists of profits and wages earned both on and off farm 
by family labour (Table 7-3)1 .
All farmers obtained positive profits when the cost of family labour was ignored. However, we 
costed family labour at market wage rates in our allocative efficiency calculations. Thus some  
farmers were found to earn negative profits.
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T a b le  7-2: Gini coefficients based on one month income of income
receivers in Sri Lanka
Sector Gini
1973
Coefficient 
1978/79 1981/82
BY SECTOR:
Urban 0.40 0.51 0.54
Rural 0.37 0.49 0.49
Estate 0.37 0.32 0.52
BY ZONE:
Zone 1 0.43 0.46 0.47
Zone 2 0.35 0.54 0.51
Zone 3 0.33 0.51 0.48
Zone 4 0.39 0.48 0.54
Zone 5 0.39 0.59 0.59
All Island 0.41 0.49 0.52
Mean income Rs ./month 311.00 ' 921.00 1635.00
The performance of the project in 1984/85 crop year in terms of average incomes 
cannot be directly compared with the target set in 1972 owing to inflation. There are 
three available indicators of inflation for Sri Lanka(Tab1e7-4). Official inflation indices 
are often thought to underestimate true inflation and therefore should be used with 
caution. The implicit GN P deflator of the Central Bank was used here to adjust the 
target income of Rs. 3600 per farm to 1984/85 prices. The wholesale price index is not 
available for the entire period while the Colombo Consumers Price Index may be even less 
appropriate  for small farmers living in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka.
An income of Rs. 3600 in 1972 is equal to a nominal income of Rs.21.876 in 1984/85 
prices. The observed average farm income was Rs. 17763 in 1984/85 crop year. 
Therefore, the mean to ta l income of sample farmers was only 81 per cent of the target
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T a b le  7-3: Distribution of household income among sample farmers
arranged in deciles of total income
Decile Average
Total
Income
Average
Wet/rice
Income
Average 
Dry/rice 
Income
Average
Chillie
Income
Average
Off-farm
Income
1 2395.18 801.85 320.50 538.96 733.87
2 6613.03 2460.08 1175.64 1824.09 1153.22
3 11203.69 4096.20 2328.25 3513.12 1266.12
4 12576.73 5982.82 1448.26 3476.30 1669.35
5 16628.86 4591.53 1602.28 6749.57 3685.48
6 17558.05 5826.53 1851.27 8255.29 1625.00
7 22756.44 4365.16 1728.25 11166.26 5496.77
8 24026.79 6848.06 1731.29 11350.67 4096.77
9 30016.42 8013.38 2795.62 11021.94 8185.48
10 33858.45 5377.98 1749.13 15570.05 11161.29
Mean 17763.36 4836.35 1673.04 7346.62 3907.33
Gini Coefficient 
.3058 .2279 . 1961 . 3289 .4444
income while the mean income excluding off farm income was only 63 per cent. It should 
be noted th a t  the estimated target farm income did not allow for any off-farm income.
The official poverty line of the government (Ministry of Plan Implementation 1982) 
is a monthly income of Rs 400 per household. Households below this poverty line are 
eligible for a food subsidy scheme made available through food stamps. The definition of 
poverty and identification of a poverty line are controversial issues. The literature on 
income distribution and poverty offers many different measures of poverty which often 
yield varying rankings for the same da ta  (Mellor and Desai 1985). The official poverty 
line is based on the adequacy of income for sufficient household food and nutrition. In 
1984/85 prices, the official poverty line amounts to Rs. 580.00 per month or Rs. 6960 per 
year. About 20 per cent of sample farmers were below this level of income in 1984/85.
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T a b le  7-4: Measures of inflation in Sri Lanka.
Yeax Colombo consumers 
Price Index 
1952=100
Implicit GNP 
deflator 
1970=100
Wholesale Price 
Index of Central Bank 
1974=100
1971 2.6 3.0 n . a
1972 6.3 4.8 n . a
1973 9.7 16.7 n . a
1974 12.3 26.2 n . a
1975 6.7 7.5 3.4
1976 1.2 6.4 8.2
1977 1.2 18.1 20.9
1978 12.1 7.9 15.8
1979 10.8 15.9 9.5
1980 26.1 18.2 33.7
1981 18.0 20.4 17.0
1982 10.8 10.2 5.5
1983 14.0 16.1 25.0
1984 13.15 a/
a /  The average of the previous two years. The official estimates are not 
yet available.
The mean monthly income per income receiver on the island in 1981/82 (when the
o
latest consumer finance survey was carried out) was Rs. 1635.00 . which was four times 
the poverty line income. The equivalent of the 1981/82 average income per income earner 
in 1984/85 prices is Rs. 2368 per month and Rs. 28,416 per year. This is substantially 
higher than  the 1984/85 value of the original target farm income of Rs. 3600 per month 
and reflects a real increase in mean incomes in Sri Lanka since 1972. The project
o
Income distribution d a ta  are available in the form of income per income earner and 
consumption expenditure per spending unit. Lee (1977) argued that consumption expenditure da ta  
are more indicative of income distribution while Laxman (1980) preferred the former. Following 
Laxm an (1980) we use income d a ta  for our analysis, so an income earner is considered to be 
comparable to a farm household in System H.
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performance appears to be even more disappointing by this standard . The mean sample 
farm income is only 62 per cent of the mean income of income receivers in Sri Lanka in 
1981/82. If off farm incomes are ignored, this ratio falls to 49 per cent. However, the real 
agricultural income per farm has approximately doubled under the project. The income 
from chillies is responsible for this increase. W ithout chillies project farm income from 
agriculture is marginally lower than the pre-project situation.
7.1 .1  D e te r m in a n ts  o f  Low F a r m  In com es
This low average farm income in terms of project objectives is caused by three 
major factors.
1. low average productive efficiency
2. low cropping intensity
3. a decreasing profit margin from rice cultivation, since the time of project
appraisal.
The magnitudes and the determinants of low average technical and allocative 
efficiency among farmers in System H were discussed at length in Chapter 5 and therefore 
are not repeated here. Potential private and social gains in increasing technical and 
allocative efficiencies were given in Tables 6-7 to 6-10 in Chapter 6. These show that 
substantia l increases in profits are obtained by increasing efficiency at farm level.
It was noted th a t  the actual cropping intensity in System H was about 150 per cent 
against a target of 200 per cent. Thus water management at a higher level of efficiency 
may result in increased cropping intensity and therefore in increased farm incomes. 
Studies of irrigation system efficiency have indicated a potential for improved efficiency at 
system level through channel lining, better structures as well as synchronized planting 
(Nedeco 1985). Similarly efficient on-farm water management can contribute 
substantially to the overall efficiency in water use (W ater M anagement Synthesis Project 
1984, 1985).
The third point was discussed in Chapter 1. Many researchers have noted th a t  the
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profit margin from rice cultivation to farmers in Sri Lanka has dropped during the last 
decade (Ekanayake 1982, Wickremesekara 1984). Falling real prices of rice and the 
increasing costs are partly responsible for this. The commodity price forecasts of the 
World Bank (1986) indicate tha t  this may be a continuing trend.
7.2 E q u i ty
Various measures taken in the planning of the project to ensure equality were 
discussed earlier in this thesis. The most important  among them was the allotment  of 
equal sized farms to the settlers.
The Tables 7-1 and 7-5 show the pre-project pattern of income dist ribut ion and the 
dis tr ibut ion of land holdings. These indicate a wide disparity in the dist ribut ion of both 
land holdings and household incomes prior to the project. The mean income per family 
was one third of the target income under the project.
The allocation of equal sized holdings, settler selection criteria, water  distribution 
pa t te rn etc. in System H were designed to achieve equity. However, the observed pattern 
of income dist ribut ion is far from equal (Table 7-3). The pattern of operat ional  land 
holdings has also changed from the original equal size at the commencement  of settlement 
(Table 7-6).
A comparison of income distribution observed in our sample with national da ta  on 
income dist ribut ion provides an indication of the success in attaining equity through 
planned sett lement in System H. The comparisons are between the level of inequality in 
the sample and those for the nation as a whole, the rural sector and the Zone in which 
System H is located, using the Gini index. This index is obtained as one minus twice the 
area under the Lorenz curve which relates the cumulative proportion of income received 
when units are arranged in ascending order of their income. Although the use of Gini 
index has been criticised0 for various reasons, it is used here for the convenience in 
facilitating comparisons writh published da ta  for Sri Lanka.
°Kuznets (1976) states that the standard Gini coefficient is a summary that can conceal as much 
as it reveals.
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The Gini index for the total household income in the sample is .30. This is lower 
than the figure of .49 for the entire rural sector of Sri Lanka in 1981/82 (Table 7-2). Thus 
income distribution within the project area appears to be relatively more egalitarian than 
in the wider rural sector though it showed greater inequality than  was probably 
anticipated a t  the time of project design. The Central Bank of Ceylon stratified the whole 
of Sri Lanka into 5 Zones, and Zone 2 covers the districts of H am banto ta , Moneragala, 
Amparai, Polonnaruwa, Anuradhapura and Puttlarn. Our sample area is located in 
A nuradhapura  district. These districts are in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka and cover the 
major rice growing areas in the country and therefore may be taken to be representative 
of the w ithout project scenario for System H. The Gini index for the same peiod in Zone 2 
of Sri Lanka was .51. Again, the project area appears relatively more egalitarian.
Available pre-project income distribution da ta  given in Table 7-1 do not permit the 
calculation of exact Gini coefficients owing to the lack of an upper limit for the highest 
income group. However, assuming th a t  an upper limit of those earning more than 5000 
Rs. to be Rs. 6000 to 10000, Gini indexes range between .39 to .40. Thus post project 
income distribution appears to be more equitable than tha t  prior to the project.
The distribution of farm size in the sample (Table 7-6) was highly egalitarian with a 
Gini index of .16 compared to the wide disparity shown in Table 7-5 prior to the project. 
However, since the commencement of the project, the operational holding size has 
diverged from the fully egalitarian situation which existed immediately after land 
allocation when each farmer had 2.5 acres, therefore resulting in a Gini Index of zero. 
Although the existing distribution suggests tha t  the project has been somewhat successful 
in achieving a more equitable distribution of income one cannot assume tha t  the process 
of land reallocation has stopped. In a following section the potential for an increasing 
trend in income disparity is discussed.
Consider the numbers x( as a sample drawn frotn|a distribution function F(x).  'Assume 
that F (x ) increases on its support (the values of x for Which 0 <  F(x) < D  ^ e  mean /» 
of F(x)  exists. The firtt assumption implies that F~l {p) is well defined and is the population 
t *  quantile. Given any degree of freedom (d.f.) F(x),  the theoretical Lorenz curve 
corresponding to it is defined by L(p) -  dt The Gini index of the curve L(p)
generatedby a d.f. F(x) is A/(2/x), where 0
A *= f  j f  \*-y\dF{x)dF(y) = 4 f  x[F(x)- l /2]dF(x) .
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Table 7-5: Pre-project land ownership pattern
Size
P e r c e n t a g e  o f  
r i c e  la n d  u p la n d
F arm ers
ch en a  la n d
Less than
0.5 Ac. 
More than
71.5 98.1 56.3
0.5 Ac. 
More than
51.6 65.0 51.6
2 Ac.
More than
25.2 14.0 13.4
4 Ac .
More than
10.3 1.9 2.3
8 Ac. 1.8 0.2 0.3
Source: Sogreah 1972
Table 7-6: Farm size distribution in the sample in 1984/85
decile mean size (Ac.)
1 .92
2 1.45
3 1.89
4 2.44
5 2.5
6 2.5
7 2.5
8 2.5
9 2.5
10 3.94
Mean 2.31
Gini
index . 1629
182
7 .2 .1  S o u r c e s  o f  I n e f f ic ie n c y
It is interesting to observe that  the inequality in total household income 
dist ribution is greater than that  of farm size. The respective Gini coefficients are .30 and 
.16. This suggests tha t  farm size is not an adequate  explanator  of farm income 
dist ribut ion.  Therefore, we analyze the contr ibution to total income inequality from 
different sources using the concentrat ion coefficient following the approach of Kakwani 
(1980)4.
Total  family income is equal to the sum of all factor incomes. Suppose there is a 
total  of n factor incomes Xj, x2’*-vxn and gj (x ) is equal to the mean of the ifc^  factor 
income of the units having the same total income x. Then,
(7.1) 
n
x = X^i(x)
1=1
Kakwani (1980) showed that  if families are arranged according to their total 
income, the Gini index [G ] of total family income is given by the following:
(7.2)
n
G = 1 / 7 / E  \ C g t
1=1
where Cgj is the concentrat ion index of the i ^  factor income gj (x), Uj the mean of 
the i1^  factor income for all families and U the mean of the total family income.
This useful identity is based on the fact that  the concentrat ion index of x (total 
household income) is equal to its Gini index. The decomposition of the contribution of 
factor incomes to overall inequality in income dist ribut ion was obtained from this 
relationship.
4See Shand (forthcoming) for an application of the concentration coefficient to income 
distribution data in a Malaysian irrigation scheme.
183
The concentrat ion curve is defined as follows. Suppose income X is a random 
variable with probability density function f(X) and distribution function F(X), the 
proport ion of units having an income less than or equal to x being F(x). Let g(X) be a 
continuous function of X so that  its first derivative exists, and g(X) > 0 for all X > 0. If 
Elg(X)] exists, it follows that
Fl \g(x)) =  l / E \ g ( X ) } f  g ( X) f { X) d X  
J 0
which can be defined where 
roo
E\ g( X) \ =  /  g ( X) f ( X) d X,
J 0
so that ,
lim JF1[y(a:)]=0 (7.3)
i  — ► 0
and
lim F 1[^(x)] =  l (7.4)
x —► oc
The relationship between F^ig(x)] and F(x) will be called the concentrat ion curve of the 
function g(x). The curve is obtained by inverting the functions F j  [g (x)] and F(x) and 
eliminating x if the functions are invertible. Alternatively, the curve can be plotted by 
generating the values of F(x) and Fj [g(x)] by giving some arbi t rary values to x. Like the 
Lorenz curve, this curve is represented in a unit  square and, as implied by the equations 
(7.3) and (7.4), passes through (0,0) and (1,1).
The concentrat ion index is one minus twice the area under the concentration curve 
for g(x), while the Gini coefficient is one minus twice the area under the Lorenz curve.
Such a decomposition cannot be obtained with the Gini index for each factor. Rao 
(1969) has shown that ,
n
G < \ / U ^ u iG i
i=l
(7.5)
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where Gj is the Gini index for each factor.
According to Table 7-6 the greatest contribution to income inequality among 
sample farmers is made by the income from chillies. The next highest contribution is 
made by off-farm income. These are the two main sources of income inequality. A 
relatively minor contr ibution was made by wet/ rice  and dry/r ice.  This underlines, 
incidentally, the need to take all sources of income into account  to gain a proper 
perspective of income disparities both for within farm and for total household income 
(Shand, forthcoming).
T ab le  7-7: Income inequality by factor components
Sources of 
income
Mean
incomem
Concentration
index
Contribution of 
each factor income 
to total income 
inequality
Percentage
Contribution
Wet/rice 4836.35 
( 27.22)
. 1871 .0509 16.64
Dry/rice 1673.04 
( 9-42)
. 1340 .0126 4.12
Chillies 7346.62 
( 41.36)
.3589 . 1484 48.53
Off-farm 3907.33 
( 22.00)
.4269 .0939 30.71
Total 17763.68
(100.00)
.3058 .3058 100.00
The variation in income for each crop is explained partly by differences in levels of 
inputs  used including land, and partly by variations in technical and allocative efficiency 
among farmers. However, off-farm income and chillie income are dependent  on specific 
factors which are unrelated to holding size which are discussed separately.
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7.3 P o l ic y  Im p lic a t io n s
It was mentioned earlier that  the selection criteria for non Purana settlers permitted 
only unemployed people with experience in agriculture to be settled in the project lands. 
However, this was not enforced in the case of Purana  settlers. Purana settlers were given 
project land irrespective of their off-farm employment  status.  Accordingly, those Purana 
villagers who were employed in government  service (such as teachers), and those who 
were engaged in other  occupat ions such as t rading activities were also given project land. 
This introduced a source of income inequality among the settlers from the very beginning 
of the sett lement . Excluding people with off-farm employment  from receiving land in 
their native areas was not politically feasible and cannot  be easily justified. Off-farm 
income has been thought  of as being capable of reducing inequality in situations where 
smaller farmers can supplement  their income thus (Kada 1983). Indeed, Shand 
(forthcoming) has shown tha t  off-farm income had an inverse relationship to land holding 
size and therefore helped reduce inequality in the Kemubu irrigation scheme of Malaysia. 
Similarly, increased opportuni ties  for off-farm employment  could help to counter various 
factors contributing to inequality in the the part icular  circumstances in System H 
described above, even though at the time of the study it was itself a source of inequality.
Apar t  from differences in formal education among settlers which determine types of 
off-farm employment , e.g., in the public sector, inequality also stems from the differences 
in pre-project capital endowments.  Farmers  who s tart  off in the project with relatively 
more resources than others are likely to be advantaged in adjust ing to the new project 
environment .
Chillies can only be cult ivated on the well drained soils in the Yala season. Only 
about  50 per cent of the project lands are in this category. Therefore only those farmers 
who have suitable land can cultivate this crop. We noted earlier that all farmers who 
were allocated well drained lands under the share arrangement in the Yala season 
cult ivated chillies. Only the Head area, covering 50 per cent of the total land area, was 
i rrigated in the dry season and farmers located in the Tail shared land with those in the
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head. However, all farmers did not get land suitable for chillies owing to the fact that  the 
ratio of well and poorly drained lands is the same in the Head as in the Tail. Accordingly 
approximately 50 percent of the land cult ivated in the dry season was under chillies (71 
acres)'while the balance was under rice (74 acres). Since chillies is a highly profitable crop 
with ten times the net profit per acre from rice on the average in the dry season (Chapter 
6) it would be both socially and privately gainful to devise a pattern of land and water 
use for the dry season which would allow all the farmers to grow chillies, particularly 
since it was shown in Chapter  6 that  rice cultivation in the dry season results in a net loss 
to society.
A feasible measure is to allocate each farmer 1.25 ac. of well drained land for the 
dry season along the dist ributory channel (in the head as well as in the tail) instead of the 
current  practice of simply allocating 1.25 ac. from the head of the distributories. While 
this may involve some detailed soil mapping and blocking out into equal allotments and 
may initially require substantial  effort on the part  of the project management  to persuade 
the farmers it would be highly profitable for both farmers and for society. This would 
require the conveyance of water along the entire length of distributory channels and 
increase conveyance losses of water as there is insufficient well drained land in the head to 
be allocated to all the farmers served by a distributory channel. However, the lower 
requirement  of water for chillie-only cultivation as compared to a chillie and rice 
cult ivat ion,  may compensate for those increased conveyance losses. Otherwise the size of 
the individual allotment  can be appropriately adjusted.
Apar t  from improving income dist ribut ion, average farm incomes would also rise by- 
increasing the area cult ivated in chillies. This would mean a doubling of the chillie area 
from the present level. An increase in the quant ity of chillies produced is unlikely to 
lower the market  price of chillies to any significant extent as the quant ity supplied would 
still be a small fraction of total national demand. However, if this strategy is to be more 
widely accepted througout  the Mahaweli System, a more detailed market analysis would 
be required. If market demand is highly inelastic, then most of the benefit of the increased 
supply will be reaped by the consumers.
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According to the calculations presented in Chapter  6 the average profit per acre for 
a chillie-only cropping pattern would be Rs. 10432, as against a profit of Rs. 5639 for a 
chillie and rice (50/50) cropping pattern sin financial terms at the prevailing level of 
average input  use and average technical efficiency!. In economic terms (using shadow 
prices) the former would yield a profit of Rs. 2720 per acre while lat ter results in a loss of 
Rs 4072 per acre. This substant ia l  difference in profits in both financial and economic 
values are mainly due to the supply of irrigation water free of charge. But even if the 
issue of w'ater along the entire length of distributor) '  channels increases the conveyance 
lossess to the extent  of reducing the cultivable area under chillies by 45 per cent (which is 
highly unlikely) a chillie only cropping pa t tern will yield the same level of financial profit 
as the current  chillie and rice cropping pattern.
The observed differences in productive efficiency between farmers, and the 
increasing returns and constant returns  to scale in wet /head  rice and chillie technologies 
have important  implications for future t rends in income dist ribut ion. Farmers who 
successfully adjust to the new environment  and technology, and thus are highly efficient, 
will accumulate  more wealth than the less efficient farmers, and will be in a position to 
expand their scale of operations. Where increasing or constant returns to scale exist in a 
technology, expansion in the scale of operations is profitable. Thus a continuing trend of 
increasing inequality in land dist ribut ion and in income dist ribut ion can be expected. 
However, measures designed and implemented to facilitate rapid adjustment  by all 
farmers could help to counter this trend.
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C H A P T E R  8
S u m m a r y  and  C o n c lu s io n s
The provision of new technologies to small farmers in developing countries 
invariably requires major  investments in physical and social infrastructure such as land 
and irrigation development , agricultural research, extension services and marketing 
services. Micro-level development  plans for the provision of these facilities - usually 
formulated as specific projects - typically ignore the productivity and equity implications 
of differences in farmer ability to adjust to the disequilibria which accompany 
technological change and of differences in micro environments between farms. The fact is 
tha t  high variability in performance among farmers adopting new agricultural 
technologies under such plans/or  projects, is a common phenomenon which has important 
efficiency and equity implications. In this thesis the theoretical and empirical issues raised 
by such differences were addressed in an analysis of farmer performance in a new 
irrigation and land set t lement  project in Sri Lanka, the Mahaweli Project.
8.1 Sum m ary
First,  the broad dimensions of the efficiency and equity issues raised by differential 
farmer performance in the context  of new technology and different environments were 
discussed and illustrated with special reference to the Pilot Phase of the Mahaweli Project 
of Sri Lanka.
Then,  alternative theoretical explanations of inter-farm variability in performance 
were reviewed, and in the process, received neo-classical theory was found to be 
unsatisfactory in this context.  In particular,  the emphasis on comparat ive statics ignores 
the dynamic path of ad justment  to economic disequilibria. since neo-classical theory 
assumes (often implicitly) that  profit maximizing firms adjust instantaneously to
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conditions of disequilibria. Moreover, the pre-occupation with the states of equilibrium 
(comparat ive statics) results in a discounting of the useful economic role of 
entrepreneurship in innovat ion and in the adoption and application of innovations. 
Alternative theories were found to be useful in understanding the economic role of 
entrepreneurship and helped to provide a theoretical explanation for the existence of 
differential performance. Among these, Schul tz’s concept of the ability to adjust to 
disequilibria was found to be particularly useful for our purposes as it specifically refers to 
agriculture and to the dynamics of technological change. However, other theories,
including X-efFiciency theory, contribute  important  insights into the behaviour of the 
firm. The l iterature on human capital provided a basis for the identification of various 
types of human capital  relevant to the ability to adjust to disequilibria. Thus, measured 
differences in farmer performances were hypothesized to be due to differences among 
farmers in terms of factor endowments ,  differences in their ability to adjust,  in non­
maximizing behaviour, in market  imperfections and in various risks and uncertainties.
The concepts of technical and allocative efficiency of the firm were utilized in the 
empirical analysis for the measurement  of technical and allocative abilities of individual 
farmers. The degree of success in performance in a dynamic environment  was therefore 
considered to be a reflection of individual ability to adjust to disequilibria. Thus, 
differences among farmers in their ability to adjust to a new technological package and to 
changes in the natural and socio-economic environments were hypothesized to result in 
inter-farm variations in measured efficiencies.
The farm specific measures of ex-post performance used in this study (technical and 
allocative efficiencies) were actually based on the neo-classical model of profit maximizing 
farmer behaviour in a compet it ive market  environment . But,  these provided only a bench 
mark for the analysis. Their use did not constrain the study by imposing prior 
assumptions about  the motives of farmers or the nature  of the markets.  The focus of the 
study was on explaining observed departures  from this bench mark situation with various
factors ment ioned earlier.
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These farmer specific efficiency measures were developed to be consistent with an 
adjustment  process. Thus the Farrell measure of firm specific technical efficiency was 
accepted for the analysis of technical ability. But.  for the analysis of allocative ability an 
alternative measure was defined following Herdt and Mandac (1981). The lat ter approach 
was chosen because it was consistent with a dynamic scenario where farmers are involved 
in a process of adjustment .  In an environment  characterized by changing technology and 
by farmers with varying ability to adjust , it was more appropriate  to expect that  
individual farmers would a t t em pt  to maximize profits with respect to the particular 
components of the technology tha t  they had adopted rather than with respect to the best 
practice frontier. We reviewed the l iterature which shows tha t  farmers adopt  new 
technology in a step wise manner and tha t  the rate of adoption varies between 
individuals. Further,  we demonstrated both theoretically and empirically that  the use of 
the Farrell measure of allocative efficiency would have imposed  allocative inefficiency on 
technically inefficient farmers, purely because they are technically inefficient. Finally, 
measures of social efficiency of farmer performance were defined to enable comparisons of 
relative losses to the society due to farm level inefficiencies and to price distortions.
In our review of the s tate-of-the-art  in the estimat ion of frontier production 
functions and the measurement  of firm level efficiency on which our empirical model is 
based, a t tent ion was drawn to the major associated theoretical and empirical problems. 
The current  controversies on frontier production function approach relate to issues such 
as the choice between deterministic and stochastic approaches, specification of the error 
s tructure,  and the parameterization of the production function. These issues were 
addressed in the body of the thesis and the limitations inherent in each approach were 
made explicit. In formulat ing the model used in this thesis, a lternat ive approaches for the 
estimat ion of frontier product ion functions were tested. In particular,  we discussed the 
theoretical problems and empirically demonstrated the drawbacks of deterministic 
methods often used in such estimations. Since efficiency of the firm measured relative to a 
frontier function is essentially a residual, the accuracy of measured efficiency critically 
depends on the inclusion of all variables which influence output.  Omitted variables thus
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adversely affect the efficiency measures. The accuracy of the firm level efficiency measures 
derived and the success of the regression analysis in explaining the variation in efficiencies 
can be improved with better  specification and measurement  of environmental variables 
which should be included in the product ion functions. An interdisciplinary approach is 
likely to be particularly useful for this task.
The major  findings of the farmer efficiency analysis were:
1. The estimates of frontier product ion functions and the levels of technical 
inefficiency obtained were consistent with our hypothesis tha t  the greater the 
adjustment  required by individual farmers (e.g., due to the lack of location 
specific recommendations) the greater was the average inefficiency. However, 
individual farmers who were endowed with particular forms of human capital 
such as technology, environment  and land specific experience achieved high 
levels of efficiency even in adverse environments.
2. The greater the importance of technical efficiency in a given location lower 
was the returns to scale for that  environment.  Thus, the estimates of the 
returns  to scale for each rice growing environment  were consistent with the 
implications of the observed technical efficiency levels in each location.
3. Technical efficiency variations were found to be significantly related to 
a lternative forms of human capital such as different types of farming 
experience, literacy and age as well as to particular component  practices of the 
new technology used by individual farmers. Thus different forms of human 
capital hypothesized to be important  under different circumstances were found 
to be statistically significant in the determination of observed technical 
efficiency variations. How'ever, the proportion of variability in technical 
efficiency explained by these factors was lower in environments where the 
heterogeneity in physical micro-environments was high.
4. Allocative efficiency was closely related to technical efficiency. This was 
consistent with our hypothesis tha t  in a dynamic environment  such as the 
study area, ex-post allocative efficiency (among other factors) depends on 
close correspondence between ex-ante expectations and actual yields 
associated with the various inputs  and practices. Such familiarity with the 
technology is likely to be positively associated with high technical efficiency. 
The importance of the relationship technical and allocative efficiencies has 
been generally ignored in the l iterature of firm behaviour. Other important  
variables explainning variations in measured allocative efficiency were farmer 
specific rate of interest, literacy and farmer age.
5. Most of the overall economic efficient variation among farmers was explained 
by technical efficiency variations. This suggests that  technical efficiency was 
relatively more impor tan t  in the determination of economic efficiency in an 
environment of technological change, and should therefore be the principal 
focus of policy.
A social efficiency analysis carried out utilizing our measures of social efficiency
192
showed that  firm level inefficiencies referred to above lead to substant ial  losess in social 
terms. In fact, the prevailing market  distor tions were found to result in only a 12 per 
cent loss in social profits if farmers were privately fully efficient. Thus,  increased private 
efficieny in Maha/head ,  M aha/ ta i l  and Yala/chill ie environments,  if achieved were found 
to be capable of generating substant ia l  social gains. Notably however, the cultivation of 
rice in the Yala season was found to be socially inefficient even if farmers were fully 
efficient privately.
Comparison of pre and post-project farm income dist ribut ions showed that  post­
project mean farm family incomes (in real terms) were higher and that  inequalities were 
lower. However, post-project, incomes (in real terms) were lower and income inequality 
was higher than project targets.  Observed inequality in income distribution far exceeded 
the inequality in operational holding size. Analysis of the contr ibutions to overall income 
inequality from various income sources showed tha t  the income from chillie cultivation 
and that  from off-farm income were the most  impor tan t  to this result. Thus land quality 
(which determined to a large extent  the cropping pattern and potential productivity) and 
human capital endowments  (which determined on-farm economic efficiency as well as off- 
farm employment) were the major factors w'hich influenced farm family incomes and 
income distribution.  Crop diversification in the Yala season by expanding chillie 
cult ivat ion emerged as a measure which offers potential efficiency and equity gains.
8.2 C o n c l u s i o n s  a n d  I m p l i c a t i o n s  for  F u t u r e  R e s e a r c h
In a dynamic situation where farmers are at  an early stage of adjustment  to new 
technology in an unfamiliar natural environment , high individual technical and allocative 
efficiencies cannot  be expected even if they are profit maximizers in a competitive market 
environment . Variation among individuals in their levels of efficiency, however, are to be 
expected to the extent their human capital and other resource endowments  differ at  this 
stage. High efficiency on the average is more likely to be a characteristic of static
environments.
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The levels of farmer efficiency in the different environmental  complexes in the study 
area showed tha t  where the available technology is well adapted to the environment, 
farmers will achieve high levels of both technical and allocative efficiency rapidly. In a 
less favourable environment for the technology, farmers who at ta in technical efficiency 
with successful farm specific adjustments  are likely to be allocatively efficient as well. 
Thus, in general, with a well defined set of opt imal  practices, the two efficiencies are 
likely to be positively correlated as observed in the two wet season environments. Where 
such a well defined set of opt imal  practices does not exist and appropriate 
recommendations are not available to guide the farmers, a relatively longer period will be 
needed for farmers to evolve a suitable package by their own experimentat ion (i.e., 
learning by doing). In the initial stages, farmers are likely to try out  familiar practices 
and inputs in such situations. But they are unlikely to perceive correctly the ex-post 
technical efficiency of their actions at  the time of input applications and therefore 
technically highly efficient farmers are likely to make substant ial  allocative errors. Under 
such circumstances, the relationship between efficiencies is hard to predict on an a priori 
basis.
Policy options emerging from this analysis fall into three categories: investment in 
environmental  modifications, in human capital improvement  and in adaptive research. 
First, improved w'ater availability in the tail and in the dry season through better  wrater 
management  at  farm and system level can improve farmer performance. This has 
implications for irrigation systems management and related benefits and costs. Second, 
selection of farmers w’ith appropriate forms of human capital and /o r  improving the stock 
of such human capital of farmers without  such initial advantages with education and 
extension can increase efficiencies. Third,  adaptive research directed towards determining 
best practices under less favourable environments and the dissemination of this 
information can lead to more rapid adjustment  by individual farmers and thus, to higher 
technical and allocative efficiency.
While social costs of farm level inefficiencies are substant ia l,  the social costs due to
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price distortions and the resulting misallocation of resources were found to be relatively 
low in this particular s ituation.  In fact, if farmers were fully efficient both technically 
and allocatively, the average loss in social profit due to resource misallocation resulting 
from price distortions was only 12 per cent of the potential profit.
The relatively high social cost of farm level inefficiencies in comparison with those 
due to price distortions has impor tan t  policy implications. It indicates a potential for 
improved performance at  farm and project level even if policies affecting the markets 
remain unchanged. It is our view tha t  it is probably easier to capture such potential gains 
a t  farm and project level than to change broader national pricing policies.
The findings of this study strongly suggest that  both ex-ante and ex-post appraisal 
of agricultural projects should investigate farm level inefficiencies in addition to price 
distortions and their effects on resource allocation within such projects. This is especially 
important  in the case of projects which involve new and diverse environments and 
technology transfer, where human capital factors can create inefficiency. In such 
instances, projects need to be planned with a carefully projected analysis of the benefits 
and costs of assistance to the farmers for rapid and successful adjustment .  In the absence 
of such measures there wull be inevitable delays in farmer adjustment  which will lower 
project benefits in the early stages and therefore depress economic rates of return.
Given the wide '•ariation among farmers in their human capital endowments and 
the heterogeneity in the quality of land, the concept of “differential ability to adjust to 
disequilibria” suggests that  inequalities in income dist ribut ion are inevitable. The notion 
that the provision of equal a llotments  of land will lead to equality in income distribution 
is, both simplistic, and unrealistic as was empirically confirmed for this study area. Policy 
measures suggested above for increasing efficiency may also reduce inequality in some 
circumstances.
Important areas for future theoretical and empirical work include, the desirability of
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developing the stochastic frontier function methodology in wavs which will relax the 
current  restrictive assumption that  the frontier function is a neutral transformation of the 
average function. This may also enable researchers to relax the assumption that  firm 
specific functions are neutral t ransformations of the best practice frontier for the entire 
group. Wider empirical application of our approach for analysing farmer adjustment  to 
changes and that  for comparing the relative importance of social losses due to farm level 
inefficiencies and price distortions in other environments are likely to yield important  
policy insights on the factors affecting farmer; firm adjustment  to changes in their 
decision making environment . Another important  area of research is to analyse the 
dynamics of firm level efficiency and farmer ability over time using the approach outlined 
in Chapter  3. In this connection, we were constrained by the lack of necessary panel data  
and were confined to use cross section data .  Nevertheless we were able to demonstrate  the 
usefulness of this approach in a study of the dynamics of adjustment.
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A p p e n d ix  1
D er iv a t io n  of Indices  of  A l loca t ive  
E con om ic  and  Social Efficiency
Our true Cobb-Douglas production frontier is given by,
m n
Where, Xj to X m are variable inputs and X ^  j to X fl are fixed inputs. Technical 
efficiency is given by U and random deviations in output  by V.
Given our assumptions of half normal (negative) distribution of U and normality of 
V, and the maximum likelihood estimation, the estimated coefficients A and bj are 
relevant at 100 per cent technical efficiency. Using these coefficients and the t/- estimated 
for each farm, farm specific production functions may be derived by substituting 
estimated U\ in the above production frontier. This assumes that, technical efficiency 
neutrally transforms the farmer specific production function and that the technology 
reflected by the estimated frontier coefficients other than the constant are identical to all 
the farmers in the sample. In the Cobb-Douglas case this amounts  to a rotation of the 
frontier to the left as technical efficiency decreases from the 100 per cent level 
representing the frontier. Accordingly, the production function of a farmer who is 50 
percent technically efficient will lie below that of a farmer who is 60 percent efficient. The 
frontiers of both these will lie below the estimated frontier for the sample.
•For simplicity, the above general model may be written as follows in logarithms.
1 n Q  y 1 n .4 + 6 1 1 n A I + 6-, 1 n A 2  • /><> I n A 3  11 -I \ (2)
Where,
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Q —-ou tpu t (rice)
X j  =  land (fixed in p u t)
X 2-- pre harvest labour 
X g — n itrogen 
U =  techn ica l efficiency
Given perfect m arkets  and p ro fit  m a x im iz in g  farmers the m a x im u m  p ro f i t  can be 
obta ined by so lv ing the fo l low ing  m a x im iz a t io n  p rob lem  to  de te rm ine  the o u tp u t  level 
and in p u ts  which  m ax im ize  p ro f i ts .
Short run  p ro f i t  is the difference between to ta l  revenue and to ta l  va r iab le  cost. T h is  can 
be w r i t te n  as fo llows:
■n=TR-TVC (3)
Maximize 11 =  P ^ Q - ( 7 3X 3) 0 )
subject to  p roduc t ion  func t ion  given in (2 ). T he  Lagrang ian  func t ion  is
(5)
The  first order cond it ions  are
dL
dL
( 6 )
dL
( 7)
In the Cobb-Doug las  case, these tu rn  out to be
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Given the prices (expected price of rice), Pj (reint), P2 (wage) and P  ^ (price of 
nitrogen) the simultaneous solution of the production function together with first order 
conditions for a profit maximum (MPP Price Ratio) yields the profit maximizing Y, Xp 
X2 and Xg, for each farmer at his level of technical efficiency IJ. The relevant system of 
equations can be written in logarithms as follows:
lnQ=lnA+b l^nX yYb2lnX2+b^ lnX^ -\-U-\~V ( 8 )
In Q - f l n  6 2 = l n  JY2 + l n  ( P 2 / P  ) ( 9 )
In Q - f - ln  6 o ~ l n  A ^ + l n  ( P g / P ^ ) ( 1 0 )
Where Xj is a fixed input the system reduces to 3 equations as follows: where
n
InA =lnA+U-\-b In ^  6 X
J  . J  J
; = m - f  1
Written in matrix form,
Y=(xTxylxTc
Where,
1 -b2
1 -1 0
1 0 -1
*In A
lnP2 / P ; lnb2 ■= c
=  X
. lnPs/fl<r lnhs. J
i n )
( 12)
and
Y
* 2
A 'o
=  Y
Name the resulting \  .X2 and X.> \  X, and \  respectively t.o denote [>rofit maximizing 
input levels and output for each farmer1. A unique solution to this system exists provided
1 Often researchers have been satisfied with the calculation of par t i al  average al locative efficiency 
measures  for each input holding the use of other inputs at their  geometr ic mean level. The
extension of this approach to our firm specific al locative efficiency measure will result in the 
calculat ion of part ial  al locative efficiencies for each input while holding the others  at their  actual  
level. We prefer the s imul taneous solution approach since the former approach yields ambiguous  
resul ts  when farmers overuse one input when other  inputs are underut i l ised.  T he  lat ter  approach 
provides an overall  allocative efficiency measure instead of input specific measures  with the former.
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that the"determinant (X) of the coefficient matrix is between zero and one in value. This 
determinant is in fact, 
n
mXa ),
t = l
where,
n
x=d>,-),
t’=l
gives returns to scale from the technology. When returns to scale are constant X^O, 
yielding a singular matrix with no unique solution. It can be shown that a determinate 
solution exists only when 0 < X < 1, i.e., when returns to scale are decreasing (Beattie and 
Taylor 1985). Increasing returns to scale describe a situation where increasing input 
application yields output increases at an even greater rate. Hence, a profit maximum 
cannot exist. Even when returns to scale are constant or increasing for fixed and variable 
inputs together, it is likely that a unique short run allocative efficiency may exist since 
only variable inputs are taken into consideration.
The maximum profit for each farmer given his technical efficiency and the fixed 
input of land is obtained by the following.
n
Maximum FI -  PyV-J2 (13)
t =  1
*
The expected output Y for each farmer at his actual input level is obtained by 
• • •substituting the actual input levels used, by him denoted as X ■ in equation (1) above.
1 .»
This gives the expected output at the level of inputs applied. This in fact, may vary from 
the actual output due to random variations in output. Thus we adjust for such random 
variation in output in our calculation of allocative efficiency since they have no 
relationship with allocative decisions of the farmer.
The r \ ; v v h v  profit at his actual input level is obtained from the following.
n
Expected 77 = PqQ - ^  P^X ■ (14)
i-  1 »
Finally, the success of each farmer in maximizing expected profits is obtained as follows:
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(Expected'll  /  M a x i m u m  ll)x\ö()  (15)
This ratio for individuals may vary from a maximum of 100 where the expected profit is 
equal to maximum profit, to a negative real number w here 
n
p,Q < L  W i
l —  ]
Calculation of  E conom ic  Effic iency
The potential maximum profit at 100 per cent technical eficiency is calculated by 
assuming U =  1, the natural logarithm of which is zero. Accordingly, the equation [11] is 
changed as follows while the rest of the system remains unaltered.
n
In A = /n / l4  6 in  /  b X  ■; Z _ >  j  j
] =  m - f - 1
However, the predicted output  at actual input use is identical to that  derived for the 
calculation of allocative efficiency.
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A p p e n d ix  2
A C o m p a r iso n  o f  A l t e r n a t iv e  A p p r o a c h e s  to  M e a su r e  Firm
Specif ic  T ech n ica l  Eff ic iency
Alternative procedures for the measurement of firm-specific technical efficiency 
using cross section da ta  were discussed in Chapter 3. All these methods can be grouped 
into two major types: deterministic approaches and stochastic approaches. Deterministic 
methods, whether they are statistical or programming approaches, do not allow for purely 
random variations in output and therefore are likely to yield biased estimates of technical 
efficiency. The selection of a suitable approach to estimating a frontier functions for this 
thesis was based on a comparison of the two approaches by estimating frontier production 
functions from both methods.
The deterministic method selected for this comparison was the Corrected Least 
Squares (COLS) method of Greene (1980). A major advantage of this method compared 
to other deterministic approaches (programming) is th a t  production coefficients of inputs 
have standard  errors and thus statistical properties, except for the intercept. Greene 
(1980) showed tha t  COLS estimates are efficient and consistent although biased. 
Programming methods, on the other hand have no statistical properties, and are 
dependent on a few observations (one per dependent variable) and thus are highly 
sensitive to the influence of outliers. Accordingly, the estimates of intercept as well as the 
other coefficients are suspect, whereas in the COLS the input coefficients are OLS 
estimates. As shown by Schmidt (1985 -86) these should not be significantly different 
from those obtained from the stochastic frontier (SF) model. Technical inefficiency is 
assumed to be a neutral transformation of the intercept in the SF model. Therefore, the 
only differences between COLS and SF frontier estimates are in the intercept. The SF 
model is presented in detail in Chapter 3 and thus is not repeated here.
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The COLS method of estimating a frontier production function is to first obtain 
OLS estimates of a production function and then increase the value of the estimated 
intercept until all the farmer specific residuals become negative in value except for one 
which will be zero. Thus the OLS residual with the highest positive value, i.e., the 
residual of the farmer who is placed at  the greatest positive distance from the average 
production function, will be assigned the value zero and will be taken to be the most 
efficienct firm (100 per cent technically efficient). Obviously this method ignores the 
stochastic element in crop production. Further ,  like any other deterministic approach a 
statistical test of the significance of inefficiency is not provided. The SF model provides 
such a statistical test.
The da ta  for the study was collected from a farm record book survey carried out in 
two locations in Block 313 of the System H of Mahaweli Development Project in Sri 
Lanka in the Wet  season in the 1984/85 crop year. Although the operational plan of 
water dist ribut ion was designed to enable farmers in both “head” and “tail” of the 
channel to have equal access to water on a rotat ional  basis, in practice farmers located at 
the “head” have access to water throughout  the season while access to water for those at 
the “tail” is more limited. The randomly selected sample had 63 farmers in the head and 
61 farmers in the tail. The total farmer population in the Block was 436 (see Chapter  4 
for details).
Cobb-Douglas production frontiers1 (deterministic and stochastic) w'ere fitted 
separately for “head” and “tail” with rice (unhusked) output  in bushels as the dependent 
variable. The explanatory variables w'ere: area cultivated (in acres), the number of man 
days of labour in pre-harvest operations, and quanti ty  of nitrogen applied (in kilograms)'1. 
The estimates of the SF and COLS frontier production functions for the head and the tail 
are given in Table 1. Firm specific technical efficiency measures derived from both 
deterministic and stochastic methods are reported in Table 2.
^Despite the well known limitations of the Cobb-Douglas specification we have used it for the 
usual reasons.
~ln other specifications inputs such as pesticides, v\ eedicides, potassium and phosphorus were 
also included as independent variables but were found toi be not significant.
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R e s u l t s
The SF and COLS methods yield sharply contrasting TE levels for the “head75 while 
the results from both methods are similar for the “ tail” . These illustrate two extreme 
situations.
In the “head7’ , the SF approach suggests tha t  all variations in output  from the 
frontier are due to purely random factors; the ratio 7 was not statistically significant. 
However, the COLS measures show substantial technical inefficiency in the “head” with a 
mean sample TE of only 53 per cent.
In the “tail” , both procedures suggest the existence of considerable technical 
inefficiency and give a sample mean TE of 50 per cent . With the SF model, the ratio 7 is 
.97 which is statistically significant at a 1 per cent level; in other words 97 per cent of the 
total  variation in output  from the frontier is a t t r ibu tab le  to the technical inefficiency in 
the SF approach.
The differences between these two sets of results arise from the relative importance 
of the “ U” and “V” terms in total error (E). When the symmetric random error “ V” 
dominates “ E” - as is the case in the “head” - the SF and COLS results diverge. When 
“U” is unimportant ,  the SF procedure suggests that  all variation from the frontier is due 
to random error rather  than any technical inefficiency, while such variation is a t t r ibuted 
to technical inefficiency by COLS.
However, the results from the “tail” show tha t  when “V” is relatively small - as 
indicated by the high value of 7 - the two procedures yield almost  identical results. 
Further,  the rankings obtained with the two approaches are strongly correlated (Kendall ’s 
tau coefficient is .96 and significant at  1 per cent level) and are consistent with 
Waldman's  (1984) conclusions^.
O
*Tf we ignore the statistical significance and compute rankings for TE from SF method for the 
“ head” , a similar high correlation is obtained between those and TE rankings from COLS. 
However, the mean TE from the SF method for the “ head” is 81 per cent as against 53 per cent 
from COLS.
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The high level of technical inefficiency in the “tail"1 revealed by both approaches is 
not surprising. The available “new7 rice production technology was developed for areas 
with adequate and timely suply of water. While these conditions prevail in the “head71 of 
the irrigation channel, the “tail“ experiences severe water supply problems. These 
uncertainties with regard to water availability require farmers to excercise considerable 
skills in their management  decisions regarding the timing and methods of various cultural 
practices and farmers who are capable of adapting the available technology to their 
part icular conditions obtain higher output .
Higher (average) productivity in the “head11 compared with the “tail” is consistent 
with the situation often observed in irrigation systems (see, for example, Skold et al., 
1984 and Godell, 1984). While the complete absence of variation in technical efficiency 
among farmers in the “head” (implied by the SF results) is somewhat  unexpected, it is 
not implausible4. This environment  is ideal for the practice of the available technology in 
the recommended form and does not impose great demands on management  skills. In such 
a situation random variations can be more important  in explaining observed product ivity 
differences between firms than differences in TE,  hence, a deterministic procedure such as 
COLS tends to overestimate the average level of inefficiency.
4 A s im ilar result has been reported by H uang and Dagi (1984) for N orth w est  India.
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T a b le  1: Comparison of Stochastic and Deterministic (COLS) Estimates of
Frontier Production Functions for Block 313 in System H 
in the Wet Season 1984/85.
Head Reach (63 sample farmers)
Variable Stochastic Estimate Deterministic Estimate
Intercept 2.530 (0.3116) * * * 3.019
Land 0.624 (0.1176) * * * 0.601 (0.1263) ***
Labour 0.408 (0.0888) * * * 0.409 (0.0940) ***
Nitrogen 0.120 (0.0391) * * * 0. 127 (0.0408) ***
a2 0.1183
1 0.3575
(0.3228)
log likelihood
function -0.01157
Tail Reach (61 sample farmers )
Variable Stochastic Estimate Deterministic Estimate
Intercept 3.075 (0.3318) * * *
Land 0.760 (0.1863) * * *
Labour 0.145 (0.1074) *
Nitrogen 0.262 (0.0677) ***
cr2 0.6732
-y 0.9753***
(0.0200)
log likelihood 
function -25.0235
2.752
0.739 (0.2577) *** 
0.274 (0.1948) * 
0.260 (0.1358) ***
Notes: Standard Errors are given in parentheses.
COLS intercept has no standard errors.
*** stands for significance at 1 per cent level. 
** " " " 5 per cent ”
* " M " 10 per cent "
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T a b l e  2: Frequency distributions of farm specific technical
efficiency from stochastic and deterministic frontier 
production functions
Head Tail
— —
Range Stochastic a/ Deterministic Stochastic Deterministic
01 - 10 0 0 1( 1.6) 4( 6.5)
1 1 - 2 0 0 1( 1.6) 3( 4.9) 1( 1.6)
21 - 30 0 3( 4.7) 2( 3.3) 8(13.1)
31 - 40 0 8(12.7) 10(16.4) 9(14.7)
41 - 50 0 14(22.3) 22(36.0) 7(11.5)
51 - 60 0 21(33.3) 7(11.5) 14(22.9)
61 - 70 0 11(17.4) 8(13.1) 9(14.7)
71 - 80 0 3( 4.7) 2( 3.3) 4( 6.5)
81 - 90 0 0 4( 6.5) 3( 4.9)
91 -100 63 2( 3.2) 2( 3.3) 2( 3.3)
No. of 
cases 63 63 61 61
Note: figures within parentheses axe percentages, 
a/ There is no significant technical inefficiency here.
207
A p p e n d ix  3
M a x i m u m  Likelihood E s t im a t io n  of  a F ro n t ier  F u n c t io n
The statistical model of our production frontier may be written as follows:
Y- are observable random variables that are output values. Xj are inputs and Bj are 
coefficients.
Assuming that 13 and V are independent, U is normally distributed but truncated at 
the mean, and V is normally distributed, the corresponding density functions for the two 
random errors can be written as follows (Aigner et. al 1977, Battese and Corra 1977, 
Kalirajan 1981).
( i )
where
Ei=Ui+vi, i=l,2,3,...,N
fu(ui )= l / y / l / 2n A / c u-exP(-u l 2/ 2(ru2)’ ( 2 )
i f  U; < Ü
fu(uj)=0 , otherwise
and
/„(t’.') = 1 /'^ 1 / 2 ’T•1!°  v  eXP(- V ] 2/ 2a V2 )  • ( 3 )
where: - co < v < -f oo
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The negative error Uj is interpreted as technical inefficiency in production while Vj 
accounts for the usual statistical noise. However, these two random errors are not 
observable. The observable error Ej is composed of uj -f-v-. The observable random 
variable Y (output)  in our production function has the following density function.
Av(n)=/£-,(n-*A) (i)
where fg- denotes the density function for Ej. This is obtained from the joint  probability 
density function for Uj and Vj. Note tha t  the value of the random variable Ej never 
exceeds tha t  of Vj since Ej=Uj-r-Vj and Uj is a negative random variable.
where F(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the s tandard normal random
variable. The above expression can be written as
f ( E i) = i ; ffV T j2 iexp{ - l /2E i2/ c 2}{l-F(£'1, 7/ l - 7)}  (6)
where +
and 7=cru2/<72
Now the density function for f(Yj) is obtained by substi tut ing (Yj-XjjBj) for Ej in the 
above equation, resulting in the following:
/(K )=l,Vv/T ^ e x P{-l.'2(K1.-x;S ;)2} { l-F((y;-IyBy).7/ l - 7) } (7)
Given the sample observations, Vj,y2,y3,...,yn, on the random variables, Y-, the 
likelihood function is given by
L ( Y : 6 ) (8)
n
= I !  { l /o-vT/^Tj  1-F((yr x; ß ; )/er)v '7 / (  1-7)].exp l ' 2{Yi-xj Bj) 2/ o 2 J
i =  1
wdiere 6 , the parameter  to be estimated, is equal to and 7). The maximum
likelihood method can be employed to find the values for parameter  Ö which maximizes 
the above likelihood function. It is convenient to write the logarithm of the above
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function since the natural logarithm of a function has a maximum value a t  the identical 
position to tha t  of the original function.
L(Y-,0)=-n/2. lnx/2-n/2. lnc2+S> 2 {(1-7/1) (9)
whe re B t x -By) ((1 -1 /  9) •1 / 2) 17 2
M aximum likelihood estimates of 9, can be obtained by first taking following partial 
derivatives
dL dL dL
----  ,—  ,and —
d B  da d~)
with respect to elements of 9 and setting them equal to zero and solving simultaneously. 
Numerical methods are used to find a covergence solution to the maximum  likelihood 
param eters owing to the difficulty in expressing them in closed form from the 
simultaneous solution of the above. We use the Newton-Raphson technique following 
Battese and Corra 1977. The advantage of this method is tha t  it locates a convergence 
solution more quickly than other techniques since it uses second order partial derivatives. 
Rapid convergence is obtained if the initial estimates are in close vicinity of the maximum 
likelihood estimates (Bard 1974). This technique is unable to converge to a solution if the 
likelihood function is not well behaved and has the drawback tha t  it may get trapped in 
local m axima most other techniques (Harville 1977; Taha 1976). A pre-determined 
specified proportion of change was allowed a t every iteration as suggested by Kale (1962) 
to restrain the possibility of successive estimates overshooting the true solution.
As such the modified estimator is
9=9o- a { d L 2(})9o) / d 9 d 9 ' y idL(Y:9o)/ d9 (10)
where a  is the pre determined proportion of change and varies from 0 - 1 .
d L / d6anddL2 'd9de’
are first and second order partial derivatives of the likelihood function evaluated at the 
initial estim ator 0Q. A Number of researchers have used this modified estimator (Battese 
and Corra  1977, Kalirajan 1979). Initial estimate of 9Q was obtained by estimating our
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product ion function specification through OLS since it is reasonable to expect the frontier 
technology to be at  least as high as the average technology. Therefore, the initial 6q is 
assumed to be ß- and obtained from OLS. Since OLS does not provide an estimate for 
7 , different values of 7 ranging from 0 - 1 are tried in the iterations. Iterations are carried 
out till the likelihood function achieves its maximum value and the est imator  associated 
with tha t  maximum value of the likelihood function is the maximum likelihood estimator,  
i.e.. the parameters of the frontier function.
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A p p e n d i x  4 
T h e  Q u e s t i o n n a i r e
1. B ack grou n d  In form ation
1.1 F a r m er  B a ck g ro u n d
Sample Identification Number:
Enumerator’s Name:
Farmer’s Name:
Sex:
Age(No. of Years):
Marital Status:
Residence prior to settlement in System-H:
District:
Village:
Occupation prioir to settlement in System-H:
Whether compensation received for land and property losses 
due to Mahaweli Project:
If yes, How much?: Rs.
1.2 The Farm 
Irrigable allotment No.:
1.2 .1  L ocation
within the distributory channel: 
within the field channel:
soil type:
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1.2 .2  T enure
Extent under own cultivation:
Extent under other tenure:
Type of other tenure:
Tenure period:
Crop share: Bu. of Paddy 
Land rent: Rs.
1.3 H o m e ste a d ,  h ouse  and the  h ouseho ld
1.3 .1  H o m e ste a d  id en tif ica t ion
Village name:
Village no.:
Allotment no:
1.3 .2  O ther m em b e r s  o f  the  h ouseho ld
Relationship Sex Age Education Occupation Nature of
to the farmer participatio
in farm work
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
10
1.3.3 The H ou se
Walls:
Roof :
No. of rooms:
Toilet:
1.3 .4  O w nersh ip  o f  D u ra b le  H o u seh o ld  G oods  
Radios:
Sewing mechines:
Pressure lanterns:
Bicycles:
Motor Cycles:
1 .3 .5  O w nersh ip  o f  farm  im p le m e n ts /m e c h n e r y  and  d rau gh t an im a ls
4 wheel tractors:
2 wheel tractors: 
trailors:
Tractor ploughs:
Animal ploughs:
Levelling boards:
Water pumps:
Power sprayers:
Hand sprayers:
Weeders:
Seeders:
Threshers:
Buffaloes:
Cattle:
1 .3 .6  H o m e ste a d  u t il iza t ion
Crop Extent No.of trees Animals
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type Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1.4 O t h e r  l a n d  c u l t i v a t e d  in  1 9 8 4 /8 5  c ro p  y e a r  in a d d i t io n  to  
t h e  lega l  a l l o tm e n t
L o c a t i o n  E x t e n t  Type t e n u r e  R en t S ha re  U t i l i z a t i o n
o f  l a n d
1
2
3
4
5
6
1.5 C u l t i v a t i o n  d e ta i l s  o f  1 9 8 3 /8 4  c ro p  y e a r
1.5.1 1 9 8 3 /8 4  M a h a  s e a s o n  
P a r c e l  Crop E x te n t
1
2
3
Y ie ld
4
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1.5.2 1983/84 Yala season
Parcel Crop Extent Yield
1 
2
3
4
2 M a h a  season 1984/85
2.1 C rops c u lt iv a te d
Date Extent Crop Variety reason Source
for the of
selection seed
Nature R s . 
of
payment
Bu.
/paddy
2.2 L and p r e p a r a tio n ,  nursery  and crop e s ta b l ish m e n t  
2.2 .1  Labour
Date Activity Family labour Exchange labour Hired labour Wage
male female male female male female male female
2 .2 .2  D r a u g h t  p o w er
Rs .Date Activity Power
source
Nature
of
Payment
Bu ./paddy
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2.2.3 Basal fertilizer application
Date Mixture Amount Nature Rs. Bu./paddy
of
payment
2.2.4 Chem icals applied to the nursery
Date Activity chemical Nature Rs. Bu./paddy
of
payment
2.3 D eta ils  o f  credit obtained
Date The need Input Form
of
repayment
Rs. Bu./paddy Annual 
rate of 
interest
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2,3.1 D e ta i ls  o f  o u ts ta n d in g  deb ts  
Amount source
2.4 A p p l ic a t io n  of fe r ti l ize r  top  d ress ings ,  pestic ides 
a n d  w eed ic ides  a n d  o th e r  fo rm s of w eed  co n tro l
2.4.1 L a b o u r
Date Activity Family labour Exchange labour Hired labour Wage
male female male female male female male female
2.4.2 F e r t i l i s e r
Date Mixture Amount form Rs. Bu./paddy
of
Payment
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2 ,4 .3  P e s t i c i d e s  a n d  w e e d i c i d e s
D a t e  M i x t u r e  Amount fo r m  R s . B u . / p a d d y
o f
Pay m en t
2 .5  W e e d ,  p e s t  a n d  d i s e a s e  i n c i d e n c e
The l e v e l  o f  weed i n f e s t a t i o n  a s  r e p o r t e d  by t h e  f a r m e r :  
The r e l e v a n t  w e e d s :
The l e v e l  p e s t  damage a s  r e p o r t e d  by t h e  f a r m e r :
The r e l e v a n t  p e s t s :
The i n c i d e n c e  o f  d i s e a s e s  a s  r e p o r t e d  by t h e  f a r m e r :
The r e l e v a n t  d i s e a s e s :
2 .6  H a r v e s t i n g ,  p r o c e s s i n g  a n d  t r a n s p o r t
2 . 6 .1  L a b o u r
D a t e  A c t i v i t y  F a m i l y  l a b o u r  E x c h a n g e  l a b o u r  H i r e d  l a b o u r  Wage
m a le  f e m a l e  m a le f e m a l e  m a l e  f e m a l e  m a le  f e m a l e
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2 .9 .2  D ra u g h t  p ow er
Date Activity Power Nature Rs. Bu./paddy
source of
Payment
2 .6 .3  Y ie ld
Crop Variety Extent harvested Amount harvested
2 .6 .4  T h e  sale o f  p rod u ce
Crop Variety Date Outlet Price/kg. Amount
2.7 R e p a y m e n t  o f  loans
Date Creditor Amount Rs. Amount in kind
2.8 A g i c u l t u r a l  e x t e n t i o n
Does the farmer know the extension worker for the area?
If yes, does he know his name?
How many times did the farmer meet the extention worker 
daring the last season?
How did the farmer obtain information on the seed variety, 
fertilizer, pesticide and weedicide types quantities and 
times of application during the last season?
What is the correct dosage of basal fertlizer for an acre 
of rice according to the farmer?
What is the correct dosage of top dressing for an acre of 
rice according to the farmer?
a/ Ureah
b/ T.D.M
Does the farmer transplant rice?
If not, why?
Does the faxmer practice manual weeding?
If not, why?
Does the farmer apply weedicides?
If not, why?
Does the faxmer apply pesticides?
If not, why?
Does the farmer obtain bank loans for cultivation?
If not, why?
Does the farmer experience labour shortages?
If yes, when?
What are the reasons for labour shortages?
Does the faxmer recieve irrigation water on time?
Does the faxmer recieve sufficient irrigation water?
Did the farmer experience crop losses due to elephants?
If yes, about how many bushels of rice?
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3 Yala Season
3.1  F a r m  a n d  F a r m e r  I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
I r r i g a b l e  a l l o t m e n t  N o . :
L o c a t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  d i s t r i b u t o r y  c h a n n e l :
L o c a t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  f i e l d  c h a n n e l :
S o i l  t y p e :
F a r m e r ’ s  name:
C ro p  s h a r e  ( “B e th m a " )  f a r m e r ’ s  name:
Type o f  o t h e r  t e n u r e :
C ro p  S h a r e :
B a c k g r o u n d  o f  t e n a n t :
M a j o r  o c c u p a t i o n  o f  t e n a n t :
3.2 Land p rep era tion , nursery  and crop e s ta b l ish m e n t  
3 .2 .1  Labour
D a t e  c r o p  A c t i -  F a m i l y  l a b o u r  E x ch a n g e  l a b o u r  H i r e d  l a b o u r  Wage 
v i t y
m a l e  f e m a l e  m a l e  f e m a l e  m a le  f e m a l e  m a le  f e m a l e
3 .2 .2  D r a u g h t  p ow er
D a t e  c r o p  A c t i v i t y  Power
s o u r c e
Rs .N a t u r e
o f
P aymen t
B u . / p a d d y
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3 .2 .3  B a sa l  fertilizer ap p lica t ion
Pa.te Crop Mixture Amount Nature R s . Bu./paddy
of
payment
3 .2 .4  C h em ica ls  ap p lied  to  the nursery
Date Crop Activity chemical Nature R s . Bu./paddy
of
payment
3.3 D e ta i l s  o f  credit o b ta in ed
Date The need Input Form
of
repayment
Rs . B u ./paddy Annual 
rate of 
interest
3.4 A p p l i c a t i o n  o f  f e r t i l i ze r  top  d r e s s i n g s ,  pe s t i c id e s  
a n d  w e e d i c i d e s  a n d  o t h e r  fo rm s  of  w e e d  c o n t r o l
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3.4 .1  L abour
Date Crop Acti- Family labour Exchange labour Hired labour Wage 
vity
male female male female male female male female
3 .4 .2  F er ti l iser
Date Crop Mixture Amount form Rs. Bu./paddy
of
Payment
3.4.3 Pest ic ides  and weedicides
Date Crop Mixture Amount form Rs. Bu./paddy
of
Payment
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3.5 W e e d ,  pest  and  d isease  inc idence
The level of weed infestation as reported by the farmer: 
The relevant weeds:
The level of pest damage as reported by the farmer:
The relevant pests:
The incidence of diseases as reported by the farmer:
The relevant diseases:
3.6 W a t e r  ava i lab i l i ty  for Crops
Crop Adequacy 
of the 
amount 
recieved 
per issue
Adequacy 
of the 
number 
of
issues
Whether
water
is available 
on
schedule
3.7 H a r v e s t in g ,  p r oc e ss in g  and  tran sp ort
3.7.1 Labour
Date Crop Acti- Family labour Exchange labour Hired labour Wage 
vity
male female male female male female male female
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3.7.2 Draught power
Date Crop Activity Power Nature Rs. Bu./paddy
source of
Payment
3 .7 .3  Y ie ld
Crop Variety Extent harvested Amount harvested
3 .7 .4  T h e  sale o f  p rod u ce
Crop Vaxiety Date Outlet Price/kg. Amount
3.8 R e p a y m e n t  o f  loans
Date Creditor Amount Rs. Amount in kind
3.9 A g icu ltu ra l  e x te n t io n
How did the farmer obtain information on the seed variety, 
fertilizer, pesticide and weedicide types quantities and 
times of application during the last season?
What is the correct dosage of basal fertlizer for an acre 
of chillies according to the farmer?
What is the correct dosage of top dressing for an acre of 
chillies according to the farmer?
Does the farmer transplant chillies?
If not, why?
Does the farmer practice manual weeding?
If not, why?
Does the farmer apply weedicides?
If not, why?
Does the farmer apply pesticides?
If not, why?
Does the farmer obtain bank loans for cultivation?
If not, why?
3.10  F a r m  fam ily  in c o m e  from  off-farm  sources  
(O ctober  1984 to  S e p te m b e r  1985)
Salaries from permenent employment:
Wages from casual emlployment :
Profits :
Rents :
Other
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